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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis contains three distinct, single-authored papers that are all related to the
field of industrial organization. Chapter 2 proposes an empirical framework that allows
to estimate the degree of industry competition and the degree of horizontal integration
of merging firms. Thus, this chapter is also linked to the field of organizational
economics. Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the effects of consumer biases on market outcomes
and assess the effectiveness of specific consumer protection policies. These chapters also
relate to the field of behavioral economics. In chapter 5, I provide a general discussion
and give an outlook on open problems in the literature. In the following, I outline the
different chapters in more detail.
Identification and Estimation of supply-side behavior Modern empirical research
in industrial organization very often makes use of structural econometric models. These
models impose significant structure on firm and consumer behavior to enable the
estimation of the underlying parameters in a single industry. This is important, because
it avoids having to make inference by comparing industries with systematically different
characteristics.
Empirical organizational economics on the other hand often aims to find the
determinants of firm performance by using differences in characteristics across firms
and industries, see for example Bloom et al. (2012). In chapter 2 of this thesis, I
propose a framework that can be applied to questions both from industrial organization
and organizational economics. First, I ask how fast and how strongly merging firms
jointly maximize profits after a horizontal merger. This relates to the question of
whether merging firms finally fully integrate and form a single unit or whether
1
2they remain operationally separate after a merger. Second, I ask what is the form
of competition between firms in an industry. This is one of the core questions in
industrial organization. Conceptually, I approach both questions using a structural
model that makes use of both pre- and post-merger industry data.
To my knowledge, this is the first framework that makes use of such a structural
model also in an organizational context. Adopting structural models in this case is
complementary to the existing approaches. Unlike existing approaches, this enables to
make inference on within-firm behavior by using aggregate data in a single industry.
I especially focus on the cooperation between merging divisions. Variation in retail
prices, quantities sold and input prices before and after the merger across all products
in the industry allow me to estimate the form of divisional cooperation in a horizontal
setting. I show that the difference between observed and predicted post-merger prices
results in a structural cost error. I combine this error with appropriate instruments to
identify the underlying supply-side parameters.
From an industry viewpoint, this research relates to a relatively old literature of
estimating industry conduct. The main difficulty lies in jointly identifying marginal
costs and the form of industry conduct. This is important because marginal costs are
usually assumed to be unobservable to the researcher.
The literature in this context started with estimating conduct in homogeneous
product cases, see for example Bresnahan (1989) for an overview. Even though some
of these approaches were applied to several industries, econometric research later
showed that these approaches do not identify the parameters of interest (Corts 1999).
Identifying conduct parameters in differentiated product cases turns out to be even
more problematic because one has to find sufficient variation to be able to identify
the different conduct parameters of interest. Because of difficulties in finding such
appropriate variation, the literature has largely abstained from directly estimating
industry conduct in the differentiated product case.
With my framework, I try to bridge the gap between the old conduct estimation
literature and the modern differentiated product demand models. Using the merger
itself as variation on the supply side, I estimate the underlying industry conduct
between firms. As in the organizational case, I make use of a structural cost error
3to identify the supply side parameters. When using data from the ready-to-eat cereal
industry, I find that between 14.3 percent and 25.6 percent of the markups are due to
cooperative behavior between firms.
Exploration of consequences of consumer biases and assessment of effectiveness of
consumer protection policies Besides focusing on the identification and estimation
of behavior both within and between firms, this thesis also aims to contribute to the
understanding of interactions between firms and consumers. The interactions between
fully rational consumers and firms have already been studied for a long time. In recent
years, more attention has also been given to deviations from full consumer rationality,
see for example Ellison (2006) and Vickers (2004). Potential consumer biases are in
some cases used by policy makers as a justification for further regulatory intervention.
However, such policy interventions often have several drawbacks and have to be
analyzed carefully. First, they can restrict the choice set of potentially sophisticated
consumers, thereby suppressing potentially optimal choices. Second, such intervention
may cause a best response from firms with respect to prices or product quality that is
harmful for consumer welfare. In chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, I study the effects of
two specific consumer biases on market outcomes and the effectiveness of associated
consumer protection policies.
In chapter 3, I focus on the prevalence and high profitability of extended warranties in
many retail industries, especially the consumer electronics industry. In this industry,
extended warranties have become a prominent tool by retailers to increase profits. This
is due to the fact that many consumers buy extended warranties in combination with
a new product, but do not claim it even if the product breaks down and they are still
eligible for a refund or repair. Furthermore, in other instances, some consumers make
a false inference about the quality of a product because of the existence of a warranty.
I provide a model that can explain both effects using a single consumer bias. In the
model, some “naive” consumers underestimate the costs they incur when claiming a
warranty payment after a product breakdown. Producers anticipate this behavior and
respond by optimally setting their contracts. In monopoly, this can lead to two non-
standard outcomes. First, since naive consumers overpredict the value of an extended
warranty, a monopolist can profitably offer extended warranties at a price that is
4higher than the average willingness to pay of a fully sophisticated consumer. Second,
he can offer a low-quality product at medium prices. This is because product quality
is not observable prior to the purchase of the good. Therefore, the warranty also has a
signaling role. At some medium warranties, a naive consumer believes that the product
is of high quality, while it is still optimal for the producer to offer a low-quality product.
To my knowledge, this is the first model that formalizes exploitative contracting via
misperceptions of product qualities.
Competition between firms decreases prices, but naive consumers still make mistakes
in that they do not choose their utility-maximizing product. I study the consequences
of a consumer protection policy in terms of a minimum warranty standard. Such a
policy is able to avoid exploitation via offering low quality products at high prices.
However, it is not able to prevent firms from selling exploitative extended warranty
contracts.
In chapter 4, I focus on a prediction error attributable to state-dependent utility
and advertising and assess the effects of mandatory cooling-off periods on welfare.
The model gives a psychological intuition for the persuasive effects of advertising.
Advertising is able to influence a state-dependent “projection bias” people face when
having to predict their future consumption utilities. Models of persuasive advertising
usually face the problem of an ambiguous welfare evaluation: such advertising usually
changes the underlying utility of a consumer. An assessment of the effects of advertising
might then differ using pre- and post-merger utility. Since advertising only influences
the bias and not the underlying preferences, this model allows for an unambiguous
welfare evaluation.
Both researchers and policy makers previously advised to implement mandatory
cooling-off periods to prevent consumers from making mistakes due to “impulse
buying”. I analyze such a policy in my framework. I find that its welfare effect
ambiguous. While some consumers might be saved from impulse buying, others who also
value a product in a high way ex-post will have a loss due to the foregone consumption
utility in the first period. An assessment of this policy crucially depends on the fraction
of consumers that are initially prone to impulse buying. Furthermore, in some cases an
overall welfare standard and a consumer policy standard can give diverging normative
predictions of such a policy.
5Relationship to previous own work This thesis consists of five chapters, and
includes three distinct, single-authored research papers. Chapters 1, 2, and 5 were
exclusively created during my time in Mannheim. Chapter 3 extends my own work of
Michel (2009). Several sections, especially the main monopoly section, simultaneous
oligopoly section, and the introduction largely include similar or identical parts
compared to my previous work. There are, however, several key contributions that are
new to this thesis. First, the previous work neither focused on nor explicitly mentioned
extended warranties, which are a key policy component of the chapter. Second, the
sequential oligopoly section covering Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 is not included either, as
have all graphs in this chapter. Third, the analysis of consumer protection policies and
all other extensions in section 3.5 are new. Chapter 4 extends my own work of Michel
(2009) and Michel (2007). Several sections of this chapter, especially the introduction,
the main model, the monopoly section, the duopoly section, and the welfare section
largely include similar or identical parts compared to my previous work. However, there
are also crucial differences compared to my previous work. First, previous work does
not focus on one of the two key questions in this chapter, namely the consequences
of mandatory cooling-off policies on consumer and overall welfare. Second, section
4.6, including Propositions 4.5 - 4.7 are not included either. Furthermore, the chapter
contains several new graphs, tables, and additional motivation.
Chapter 2
Identification and Estimation of
Intra-Firm and Industry
Competition via Ownership Change
This chapter proposes and empirically implements a framework for analyzing industry
competition and the degree of joint profit maximization of merging firms in
differentiated product industries. Using pre- and post-merger industry data, I am able to
separate merging firms’ intra-organizational pricing considerations from industry pricing
considerations. The insights of the chapter shed light on a long-standing debate in the
theoretical literature about the consequences of organizational integration. Moreover, I
propose a novel approach to directly estimate industry conduct that relies on ownership
changes and input price variation. I apply my framework using data from the ready-to-eat
cereal industry, covering the 1993 Post-Nabisco merger. My results show an increasing
degree of joint profit maximization of the merged entities over the first two and a half
years after the merger. I find that between 14.3 and 25.6 percent of industry markups
can be attributed to cooperative industry behavior, while the remaining markup is due
to product differentiation of multi-product firms.1
1I would like to thank my advisors Volker Nocke, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, and Yuya Takahashi for
their guidance and support. I also benefited from conversations with Steve Berry, Pierre Dubois, Georg
Duernecker, David Genesove, Alex Shcherbakov, Andre Stenzel, Andrew Sweeting, Naoki Wakamori, and
Stefan Weiergraeber, and received helpful comments from seminar participants at Mannheim, Toulouse, the
2012 CEPR Applied IO Summer School, and the EARIE 2012 in Rome.
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72.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I propose a framework to address two open questions in industrial
organization and organizational economics, and apply it to a merger from the ready-
to-eat cereal industry. First, I examine to what degree merging firms jointly maximize
their profits after a horizontal merger. This bridges a gap between empirical industrial
organizational models and organizational economics models. Second, I provide a way
to directly identify and estimate industry conduct in differentiated product models,
which has for a long time been a problem in the industrial organization literature.
Existing empirical merger models make several simplifying assumptions with respect
to both industry and within firm behavior. On an organizational level, these models
assume that merging firms fully internalize their profits immediately after a merger. On
an industry level, the form of supply side competition is either assumed to be known,
or is chosen from a discrete set of non-nested forms of competition using some selection
criterion. These assumptions are usually used together with pre-merger data to predict
post-merger industry prices. My framework makes use of both observable pre- and post-
merger data. This allows me to relax either the assumption of full profit internalization
or the assumption of known industry conduct while keeping the other. I recover pre-
merger marginal costs using first-order conditions between merging firms and predict
post-merger marginal costs using a cost function estimation. Different forms of industry
conduct or post-merger profit internalization of merging firms, respectively, will lead
to different markups charged by firms. My identification strategy searches for the form
of supply side competition that best predicts post-merger industry prices. I can show
that the difference between predicted and observed post-merger prices amounts to a
structural cost function error term, which helps to identify the supply-side parameters
of interest given proper instruments. Thus, my approach can be seen as a supply side
analogue to common demand side models that use structural error terms to identify
demand side and cost function parameters, see for example Berry et al. (1995).
I apply the developed techniques to data from the ready-to-eat cereal industry
covering the 1993 Post-Nabisco merger. In January 1993, Philipp Morris corporation’s
owned Kraft foods with its Post cereal line purchased the Nabisco ready-to-eat cereal
8branch from RJR Nabisco. The results indicate an increasing degree of joint profit
maximization among merging firms after the merger. This suggest the existence of
informational or contractual frictions among merging firms shortly after the merger.
With respect to industry competitiveness, I find that between 14.3 and 25.6 percent
of industry markups can be attributed to cooperative industry behavior, while the
remaining markup is due to product differentiation of multi-product firms.
The paper extends the existing literature along several dimensions. To my knowledge,
this is the first paper to focus on estimating the degree of joint profit maximization
of a merged entity. This links the empirical industrial organization literature to
the theoretical organizational economics literature on intra-firm coordination and
horizontal integration by allowing for frictions between different divisions of a
firm. Conceptually, the approach also differs from existing empirical organizational
economics models in that its focus is on behavior within a single (post-merger)
organization rather than on correlations across firms and industries. Moreover, I show
that using proper supply side variation, it is indeed possible to estimate industry
conduct directly in differentiated product industries. Using demand side variation, this
can typically not be achieved due to a lack of sufficiently many demand rotators, see
for example Nevo (1998).
Following the seminal paper by Berry et al. (1995), identification of demand and
cost parameters relies on orthogonality conditions between structural error terms and
appropriate instruments. Unlike the existing literature, I also identify the model’s
underlying supply side parameters, i.e. the degree of profit internalization and industry
conduct, respectively. I show that the difference between observed and predicted post-
merger prices represents a structural cost error term. I set up moment conditions that
rely on orthogonality conditions between this error term and cost-side instruments to
identify the supply side parameters.
Modern empirical industrial organization models assume that a merged entity
maximizes the joint profits of all its products, thus abstracting from agency problems
within the firm. From an organizational viewpoint, several theories predict that full
internalization of joint profits cannot be achieved after a merger. Incentive structures
that give managers bonuses based on the performance of their own division rather
9than the performance of the firm as a whole can cause different horizontal divisions
to compete with each other. Fauli-Oller and Giralt (1995) analyze a headquarter’s
choice of the optimal incentive scheme for division managers. Whenever products of
different divisions are substitutes to each other, managers bonuses will be partly based
on their own division’s performance. There is also a growing literature in organizational
economics that focuses on the trade-offs between coordination of decision-making
through a headquarter and strategic communication of division managers.2 Other
reasons for no full maximization of joint profits immediately after a merger are delays
in post-merger harmonization of firm strategies due to old contractual agreements, or
a lack of information concerning revenue potential right after a merger.
I focus on a single merger to assess its consequences on joint maximization of profits.
This differs from conventional empirical organizational economics frameworks that
focus on correlations between observable firm characteristics across different firms and
industries.3
When estimating industry conduct, I maintain the assumption that merging firms
internalize the profits after the merger. Given marginal cost estimates and price-
elasticities obtained from demand side-estimation, I can predict the effects of an
ownership change on prices ex-post. By varying the form of supply side competition
(i.e. industry conduct), and accounting for input price changes on the cost side, I look
for the form of competition that most accurately predicts the effects of the merger-
induced ownership change on prices. I estimate the predicted post-merger prices and
compare them with the observed post-merger prices. The differences of observed prices
and predicted prices is used to form moments in order to obtain the model’s underlying
conduct parameters using a Generalized Methods of Moments estimator.
Previous attempts to estimate both marginal costs and industry conduct have
2Alonso et al. (2008) study the optimal degree of centralization when managers communicate strategically.
They show that while centralization can improve horizontal outcomes, it will lead to adverse vertical effects.
Dessein et al. (2011) show the existence of endogenous incentive conflicts between headquarter managers and
division managers within multi-divisional firms.
3There is a large empirical literature in organizational economics focusing on the determinants for specific
organizational structures across firms and industries, see for example Lafontaine and Slade (2012), and Bloom
et al. (2012) for an overview over the literature. McElheran (2010) finds a positive correlation between
delegation of IT system adoption in multi-divisional firms and local information advantages, but a negative
correlation between delegation of system adoption and firm size. Thomas (2011) argues that a reduction in the
brand portfolios of firms in the laundry detergent industry across different countries would lead to an increase
in their profits.
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mostly been made using demand side variation. Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982)
provide identification results for estimating conduct in the homogeneous good case. In
differentiated product industries, these approaches usually face two kinds of problems.
The first problem is the difficulty to find a sufficient number of demand rotators.
Without such rotators, these approaches are not able to identify industry conduct.4 The
second problem relates to the estimation techniques, which only estimate the economic
parameters of interest accurately in special cases. Corts (1999) critically discusses the
identification of conduct parameters. He argues that the estimated parameters usually
differ from the “as-if conduct parameters” and therefore do not reflect the economic
parameters of interest. The static conduct estimation models are furthermore not able
to detect all dynamic forms of collusion. While I cannot account for the latter point
due to the static character of my framework, my estimation technique can overcome
the former.
There is a small literature related to the estimation of industry conduct using supply
side variation. Ciliberto and Williams (2010) develop an approach that relies on multi-
market contact for estimating conduct in the airline industry. Their model includes
conduct parameters that can have three different values, accounting for different degrees
of cooperation among profit-maximizing firms. Oliveira (2011) uses marginal profit
ratios in a dynamic model to distinguish between market competition and efficient
“stick-and-carrot” collusion in the airline market. Brito et al. (2012) explore the effects
of three Portuguese insurance mergers on coordinated effects and efficiency. They find
no indication for an increase in coordinated effects after the mergers.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview
over the industry and the merger. Section 2.3 introduces the baseline model and
discusses the conduct estimation strategy in detail. Section 2.4 provides identification
results for both estimating the degree of joint profit maximization of merging firms
and estimating industry conduct, respectively. Section 2.5 presents estimation results
for both techniques. Section 2.6 introduces several extensions to the baseline model as
outlined above. Section 2.7 concludes with a discussion of the results.
4Nevo (1998) discusses advantages and disadvantages of a direct conduct estimation compared to a non-
nested menu approach. He argues that in practice estimating conduct directly will be impossible due to a lack
of sufficiently many distinct demand shifters.
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2.2 Industry Overview and the 1993 Post-Nabisco Merger
2.2.1 The ready-to-eat cereal industry
There are several factors that make the ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry an excellent
starting point for oligopoly analysis.5 Economies of scale in packaging different cereals,
as well as in the distribution of products, cause barriers to entry for new firms. There
is a frequent introduction of new products by existing firms, which goes in line with
large advertising campaigns in the beginning of a product’s lifecycle.6 The cereals differ
with respect to their product characteristics, such as sugar content or package design,
and target different consumer types. At the start of the period I analyze, the industry
consists of 6 main nationwide manufacturers: Kellogg’s, General Mills, Post, Nabisco,
Quaker Oats, and Ralston Purina. Figure 2.1 shows the market shares of the different
products. It is common to classify the cereals into different groups, such as adult,
family, and kids cereals, see also Nevo (2001). Table 2.1 shows the classification of the
different cereal brands in my dataset into different segments. Kellogg’s as the firm with
the biggest market share has a strong presence in all segments. General Mills is mainly
present in the family and kids segments, whereas Post and Nabisco have their main
strengths in the adult segments.
On a retail level, cereals are primarily distributed via supermarkets. Supermarket
promotions via price reductions or quantity discounts are a further tool used to increase
quantities sold for a period of time. Many retailers also own private labels that compete
in their stores with the nationwide manufacturers. I use scanner data from the first
quarter of 1991 until the fourth quarter of 1995 from the Dominick’s Finer Food
database. My main dataset for the conduct estimation includes 28 brands from the
6 different nationwide firms. The scanner data involves 35 stores from the Chicago
Metropolitan area, see Figure 2.2 for a geographic map of the stores. In particular, the
dataset includes data on product prices, quantities sold, data on promotions, as well
as 1990 census data yielding demographic variables for the different store locations. I
use additional input price data from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. Even
5This industry has already been studied extensively, see for example Schmalensee (1978), Nevo (2000), and
Corts (1995). Although Corts presents a detailed industry description, to my knowledge the dynamic aspects
on the supply side have not been investigated in detail.
6See for example Hitsch (2006) for a study of the determinants of successful brand introductions.
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though I also observe data on Dominick’s private label cereal, I do not include it in
my conduct estimation. There are two reasons for this. First, I want to focus on the
degree of competition between firms that are operating nationwide. Because a private
label is only present for one retailer, and in my case a locally operating retailer, it
will have different underlying objectives than the nationwide operating manufacturers.
Second, a private label firm belongs to its retailer, thus leading to a joint maximization
of profits upstream and downstream. This would require additional assumptions to be
compatible with estimating “upstream” industry conduct.
In my data, I also observe the retailer’s average acquisition costs for each product at a
given time. This variable reflects the inventory-weighted average of the fraction of the
retail price that was paid to the producer. From this variable I can compute a proxy for
the average retail margin for a given period.7 Figure 2.3 shows the development of the
retail margin proxy over time for the different firms in the dataset. There are several
interesting features. The retail margin varies significantly across the different firms.
On average retail margins are highest for Ralston, the firm with the smallest market
share, followed by Kellogg’s, the firm with the highest market share. Thus, there is no
clear relationship between retail margin and firm size, suggesting that there is no higher
bargaining power for Kellogg’s.8 Another interesting fact is that the retail margin drops
significantly around the time of the merger, from over 15% to single digit figures for
several firms, including the merging firms. It is not clear whether this drop is due to
the merger, which would imply some form of renegotiation between manufacturers and
retailer in the period, or whether it is instead a pure coincidence.
2.2.2 The 1993 Post-Nabisco merger
Between 1990 and 1992, prices steadily increased in the industry, see Figure 2.4 for
the price development per firm. On November 12, 1992, Kraft Foods made an offer
to purchase RJR Nabisco’s ready-to-eat cereal line. The acquisition was cleared by
the FTC on January 4, 1993. On February 10th, 1993, the New York State attorney
however sued for a divestiture of the Nabisco assets, which was finally turned down
7Dominick’s uses the following formula for the average acquisition costs (AAC): AAC(t+1) = (Inventory
bought in t) Price paid(t) + (Inventory, end of t-l-sales(t)) AAC(t).
8Another potential source for bargaining power not modeled here is bargaining power in form of leading to
more premium shelf spaces.
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3 weeks later.9 Figure 2.5 shows the merging firms’ price development over all stores.
Table 2.2 shows the price development per product for the first four quarters after
the merger. Average prices for the merging firms increase over time, which is in line
with a unilateral effects merger model. The price development of other firms is more
heterogeneous. Kellogg’s decreases part of its brands prices while increasing some
of its other prices. Prices for Ralston also go up. Prices for most of General Mills
products slightly decrease. This can be attributed to both a change in General Mills
high management in 1993, in which the company responded to soaring market shares,
and to the fact that General Mills was mostly present in the kids and family segment
that was not affected as much by the merger. Overall industry behavior remained stable.
Between 1993 and March 1995, industry-wide prices for branded RTE cereal increased
moderately. Starting from the second quarter of 1995, I observe a downward trend in
industry prices across different firms. In March 1995, two US congressmen started a
public campaign to reduce cereal prices, which received a huge media attention. There
is evidence that industry prices decreased after this campaign.10 For this reason, I only
consider the period until the first quarter of 1995 for most estimations.
Exogeneity of merger From an estimation standpoint, it is important to discuss
concerns and potential effects of merger endogeneity. After the 1988 leveraged buyout
of RJR Nabisco, the ownership group accumulated a substantial pile of debt. There
is a popular claim that company divestitures were used to reduce the overall debt
level. Merger endogeneity would only bias the results if the merger had led to unknown
synergies, or if an anticipation of the merger by firms in the industry had led to a
change in the competition between firms. There are no factory closures within the
first two years of the merger. Therefore, synergies in factory production are unlikely
to be achieved. Within the first two years after the merger, I also do not observe a
fundamental change in industry pricing due to the merger, which is backed by anecdotal
evidence. Thus, there is a relative steadiness in industry behavior in the short run.
9See Rubinfeld (2000) for a detailed description.
10See Cotterill and Franklin (1999) for a detailed analysis. In April 1996, Post decreased the prices for
its products nationwide by 20%, thereby permanently increasing its markets share. This was followed by
significant price cuts two months later by General Mills and Kellogg’s. Overall, margin over production cost
fell by 12% in 1996 due to these actions.
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2.3 Empirical Model
My approach has three basic steps. In the first step, I estimate industry demand using
a discrete choice model to back out price elasticities. In the second step, I recover
marginal costs using first order conditions, which I subsequently use to estimate a cost
function. In the third step, I predict post-merger prices, which I then use to estimate
either the degree of profit internalization among merging firms or industry conduct. In
the industry conduct case the last two steps are repeated in an iterative process.
2.3.1 Demand side
My demand specification is closely related to Nevo (2001). There is a total number of J
brands in the market. Denote the number of individual consumers in every market by
I, and denote the number of markets by T , where a market is defined as a time-store
combination. Using a Random Coefficient Logit model, individual i’s indirect utility of
consuming product j at market t can be written as:
uijt = xjβ˜i + α˜ipjt + ξjt + ijt, i = 1, .., I; j = 1, .., J ; t = 1, .., T. (2.1)
xj denotes a K-dimensional vector of firm j’s observable brand characteristics, pjt
denotes the price of product j at market t, and ξjt the brand-specific mean valuation at
market t that is unobservable to the researcher but observable to the firms. Finally, ijt
is an idiosyncratic error term. The coefficients β˜ and α˜ are indiviual specific coefficients.
These coefficients depend on their mean valuations, on demographics in each region,
Di and their associated coefficients Π, as well as on an unobserved vector of shocks, vi
that is interacted with a scaling matrix Σ:α˜i
β˜i
 =
α
β
+ ΠDi + Σvi, vi ∼ N(0, IK+1). (2.2)
Because not all of the potential consumers purchase a good in each period, I also
require an outside good. The indirect utility of not purchasing any product and thus
consuming the outside good can be written as:
ui0t = ξ0 + pi0Di + σ0vi0 + i0t.
15
As is common in the literature, I normalize ξ0 to zero.
Denote the vector of all demand side parameters by γD. This vector can be decomposed
into a vector of parameters obtained from the linear part of the estimation, γD1 = (α, β),
and a vector of parameters obtained from the nonlinear part of the estimation, γD2 =
(vec(Π), vec(Σ)), respectively.
The indirect utility of consuming a product can be decomposed into a mean utility part
δjt and a mean-zero random component µijt+ijt that takes into account heterogeneity
from demographics and captures other shocks. The decomposed indirect utility can be
expressed as
uijt = δjt(xj, pjt, ξjt, γ
D
1 ) + µijt(xj, pjt, vi, Di; γ
D
2 )
δjt = xjβ − αpjt + ξjt, µijt = [pjt, xj]′ ∗ (ΠDi + Σvi), (2.3)
where [pjt, xj] is a (K + 1)× 1 vector.
Consumers either buy one unit of a single product or take the outside good. They will
choose the option which yields the highest indirect utility. Using these assumptions,
this characterizes the set Ajt of unobservables that yield the highest utility for a specific
choice j:
Ajt(x.t, p.t, δ.t, γ
D
2 ) = {(Di, vi, it)|uijt ≥ uilt∀l ∈ {0, .., J}},
where dotted indices indicate vectors over all J brands. The market shares predicted
by the model can then be obtained via integrating over the different shocks, using
population moment functions P ∗(·):
sj(x.t, p.t, δ.t, γ
D
2 ) =
∫
Ajt
dP ∗ ()dP
∗
v (v)dP
∗
D(D). (2.4)
There are several possibilities to estimate the model that depend on different
distributional assumptions. The most general case is a Random Coefficients Logit
model. Its main advantage is a very flexible form of substitution patterns. This is
desirable because it enables a detailed analysis of the substitution patterns between
different brands that does not rely on any model structure. To be able to integrate
out the market shares, one needs to make distributional assumptions with respect to
the unobservable variables (Di, vi, ijt) and then estimate the model using Generalized
Methods of Moments.
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2.3.2 Industry technology
The J brands in the industry are produced by N ≤ J firms. Each brand can only
be produced by one firm. An important part of the model is the representation of
marginal cost. As is common in the literature, I assume that marginal costs can be
decomposed into cost factors that are observed to the researcher as well as a component
that is unobserved to the researcher. I use a linear relationship between marginal costs
and the observable cost component. This reflects a relatively weak substitutability of
input production factors over the medium- and short-run in the RTE cereal industry.
Henceforth, I will omit the market index t in my exposition for notational simplicity.
Denote the vector of brand j′s observed cost drivers by wj, and j’s unobserved cost
component by ωj. The marginal cost for brand j can be written as:
mcj = wjγ
S + ωj (2.5)
where γS denotes a vector of marginal cost parameters.11
2.3.3 Pre-merger industry competition
Each firm f owns a portfolio of brands Ff . I further allow a firm’s objective function
to potentially depend on other firm’s profits. Denote by θij the degree to which brand
i takes into account brand j’s profits when setting its optimal price. This implicitly
defines a pre-merger ownership matrix Θ with the entries Θjr = θjr. Each of the
parameters within Θ are normalized to lie in between 0 and 1, where 0 implies no
internalization of profits, and 1 implies full internalization of profits. Note that since
only relative weights matter for the first order condition, this is a normalization without
loss of generality. Not allowing for negative conduct parameters also implies that a firm
does not derive a positive utility from “ruining” another firm. This leads to a matrix
11The baseline specification implies that marginal costs are constant for different output levels. This is a
relatively strict assumption, which can be relaxed by introducing scale effects. Denote qi firm i
′s total units
sold in a period. If one assumes scale effects, i.e. decreasing marginal costs in total production together with
a Cobb-Douglas cost function, then this can be written as: mcj = τ log(qj) + wjγ
S + ωj , where τ is the scale
parameter.
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of the form
Θ =

1 θ12 .. θ1J
θ21 1 .. θ2J
.. .. .. ..
θJ1 θJ2 .. 1
 .
Given Θ, the objective function for product j can be written as:
Πj = (pj −mcj)sjM +
∑
r 6=j
θjr(pr −mcr)srM, (2.6)
where sr denotes the market share of brand r, and M the market size.
The first order condition for product j’s objective function with respect to its own price
can be written as:
sj(p) +
J∑
r=1
θjr(pr −mcr)∂sr
∂pj
= 0. (2.7)
I make the assumption that pre-merger, each firm fully internalizes the profits of all of
its brands, which implies θij = 1 if i, j ∈ Ff . The marginal costs of all brands in the
industry are unobserved to the researcher but common knowledge among firms.
Define Ωjr ≡ −θjr ∗ ∂sr∂pj . Having estimated the demand parameters γD, one can already
infer the marginal costs of production mc conditional on the form of the ownership
matrix Θ:
mc(γD,Θ, p, x) = ppre − Ω−1(γD,Θ)spre. (2.8)
Substituting the recovered pre-merger marginal cost mc(γD,Θ, p, x) into equation (2.5)
yields:
mc(γD,Θ, p, x) = wγS + ω (2.9)
I estimate the cost function parameter γS in equation (2.9) using a two staged
least squared estimation to account for the unobserved cost component ω. I discuss
instrumentation in Section 2.4. I then use observed post-merger input price drivers,
wpost, to linearly project the post-merger input price component of marginal cost.
Product j′s predicted input price component post-merger, mˆcj can then be written as:
mˆcpostj (γ
D, γS,Θ, p, x, w) = wpostj γ
S. (2.10)
It is important to note that this linear projection will not contain the unobserved cost
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component ωj. Henceforth, for notational simplicity I will drop the observable factors
w, x, and p when referring to marginal costs.
The key differences between estimating the degree of profit internalization of merging
firms and estimating industry conduct between firms lies in the treatment of the pre-
merger ownership matrix Θ and on the assumptions with respect to the merging firms’
post-merger profit internalizations.
2.3.4 Post-merger prices when estimating the degree of profit internaliza-
tion between merging firms
When estimating the degree of profit internalization post-merger, I assume that the
form of pre-merger industry competition, Θ, is known to the researcher. I assume
that a merger will involve a change in the pricing strategies of the merged entity.
Denote by θ˜ the degree of joint profit maximization between the merging firms, which
I assume to be unobserved to the researcher, but common knowledge among firms in the
industry. I assume that non-merging firms will not change their competitive behavior
after a merger, but will adapt to the change in the merging firms’ pricing. Under these
assumptions, given the degree of joint profit maximization θ˜, the model’s post-merger
prices given the parameters γD and γS can be written as12:
pˆpost(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜) = mˆcpost(γD, γS,Θ) + Ω−1(γD,Θ, θ˜)spost + ωpost
θ˜
. (2.11)
Here, ωpost
θ˜
reflects the unobserved cost component in the cost function post-merger.
Thus, the unobserved error will not be accounted for in the linear projection of the
post-merger marginal cost in equation (2.10), but remains a separate term in the post
merger equation.
2.3.5 Post-merger prices when estimating industry conduct
When estimating industry conduct, I assume that neither the form of pre-merger
conduct, Θ, nor post-merger industry conduct are known to the researcher. A key
identifying assumption is that even though the researcher does not know the underlying
12Even if the degree of joint profit maximization, θ˜, is part of a post-merger industry conduct matrix, I will
explicitly state it in the model. This is to clearly distinguish the case of estimating the joint profit-maximization
parameters from the case when estimating the industry conduct matrix Θ.
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form of conduct, he knows exactly how the merger will affect industry conduct. There
are two channels for this, namely post-merger profit internalization of merging firms,
and how competitors consider the merged entity post-merger. I assume that merging
firms will fully internalize their profits after a merger. Non-merging firms compete with
each other in the same fashion. The change between merging and non-merging firms
after the merger is also known to the researcher, which is summed up in the following
assumption.
Assumption 2.1 (Conduct between merging and non-merging firms). Let f, g be two
distinct merging firms, and h a non-merging firm. Let θpreik and θ
post
ik denote the pre-
and post-merger conduct parameters between firm i and k, respectively. Then, ∀i ∈ Ff ,
∀j ∈ Fg, ∀k ∈ Fh, one of the following three cases holds regarding the conduct between
a merging and a non-merging firm:
a. θpostik = θ
pre
ik ; θ
post
jk = θ
pre
jk (no change in conduct);
b. θpostik = θ
pre
ik ; θ
post
jk = θ
pre
ik (acquiring firm standard).
c. θpostik = θ
pre
jk ; θ
post
jk = θ
pre
jk (target firm standard);
Under Assumption 2.1a, the merger does not change how competitors consider the two
merging firms after the merger. In this case, the merging firms will fully internalize the
profits after the merger. Under Assumption 2.1b, the fully merged entity is considered
and behaves as the acquirer did pre-merger. Assumption 2.1c implies the reverse, i.e.
that the merged entity behaves as the target. I do not have to pre-specify the values of
the conduct parameters, but just the way in which the parameters change. Other change
patterns can also be accounted for, as long as the change in conduct between merging
and non-merging firms is known post-merger. Let the underlying form of pre-merger
conduct, Θ, be element of the set B. The post-merger conduct can then be expressed
via a transition function b : B → B which maps the pre-merger conduct matrix Θ
into the post-merger conduct matrix Θpost = b(Θ). This is because all merger-induced
ownership transformations are known to the researcher. Under these assumptions, for a
specific form of pre-merger industry conduct Θ and transition function b, the predicted
post-merger prices given the estimated parameters γD and γS can be written as:
pˆpost(γD, γS,Θ,Ωpost, b(Θ)) = mˆc(γD, γS,Θ) + Ω−1(γD, b(Θ))spost + ωpostΘ . (2.12)
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As for the case of estimating the degree of post-merger profit internalization, the
unobserved cost component ωpostΘ is not accounted for in the marginal cost term mˆc,
but is rather a distinct component in the pricing equation. Appendix A illustrates
different cases of pre- and post merger industry conduct. It is worth mentioning the
key difference to conjectural variation models. I treat the conduct parameters Θ as part
of the firms’ underlying objective functions rather than as behavioral responses with
respect to the competitors’ price setting behaviors. I then form moment conditions
to recover the underlying “level” conduct parameters using a Generalized Method of
Moments estimator.
2.4 Identification
In this section, I will present identification results for the different stages of the
model, and in particular the two supply side estimation approaches. Section 2.4.1
discusses identification restrictions for the demand and cost function estimation.
Section 2.4.2 discusses the identification restrictions when estimating merging firms’
profit internalization parameters. Section 2.4.3 focuses on identification restrictions
when estimating industry conduct.
My estimation method requires identification of three sets of parameters: demand-side
parameters, γD, cost parameters γS, and the supply side parameters, which amount
either to the degree of profit internalization θ˜, or to the industry conduct Θ. The
correlation between price and both unobserved brand and cost characteristics requires
instrumentation for each brand in the demand and pricing equations, respectively.
2.4.1 Model identification of demand and cost parameters
Identification of demand parameters
Denote by ξ(γD, x, p) the structural error term vector that consists of the market-
specific unobservable brand valuations for all brands. Regarding the demand side, I
assume that when being assessed at the true demand parameter values γD0 , this error
term is uncorrelated with respect to a Mξ-dimensional set of exogenous demand side
instruments, Zξ. This leads to the identification restriction:
E[Z ′ξξ(γ
D
0 , x, p)] = 0. (2.13)
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Note that I implicitly assume that the demand can be estimated independently of the
marginal cost and supply side parameters, respectively. The orthogonality conditions
would be violated if industry conduct or a change in production costs, not prices,
would influence consumer choice through the unobserved brand-specific component.13 I
assume that the observable product characteristics of the different goods are exogenous,
and therefore do not respond to changes in industry pricing. Also accounting for
potential brand replacement or additional brand introductions would make traction
of the full model nearly impossible. Because of the inherent endogeneity between price
and unobserved brand characteristics, I need to find adequate instruments for the
demand estimation. I use two different sets of instruments to do so.
My first set of instruments relies on production cost shifters. The economic assumption
is that input cost variation should be correlated with variation in prices, but not
with consumers’ preferences for unobservable product characteristics. I use both cost
factors that affect all products in similar fashion, such as labor costs, packaging, and
transportation, as well as factors that differ among products, such as interactions
between product characteristics and input prices for wheat, sugar, and corn. My second
set of instruments is the ownership change itself. As argued above, a merger should
cause a change in industry prices. Similar to a cost shift, one can assume that the
merger affects prices, but not the demand characteristics. This assumption would be
violated if the merger caused a change in brand value which would affect the ξ’s of the
merging firms. Because the actual brand names of the cereals involved did not change
after the merger, such an effect seems unlikely.
Identification of cost parameters
Conditional on a specific form of pre-merger industry conduct Θ, I can back out
the marginal cost via a first order condition and then regress them on observable
product characteristics combined with input prices.14 This allows me to predict the
input cost component mˆc of the post merger marginal costs using post-merger input
price data and the estimated parameters. I make the implicit assumption that firms
13This assumption would be violated if the merger caused a change in the perceived “brand values” of the
merged entities, which would affect the ξ components in the demand equation.
14Explicitly using input prices to estimate a cost function is a difference to previous studies in the ready-
to-eat cereal industry.
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cannot substitute between different input goods. The recipes and production processes
for a specific product in the ready-to-eat cereal industry remain constant over time,
such that this assumption is likely to hold in the medium and short term. My identifying
assumption concerning the marginal cost component pre-merger is that the structural
error term vector representing unobserved cost characteristics ωpre is uncorrelated to
a Mω-dimensional set of exogenous instruments Zωpre :
E[Z ′ωpreω
pre
j (γ
D, γS0 ,Θ)] = 0, (2.14)
where γS0 reflects the true parameter value for γ
S. Together with the change in
ownership, the marginal cost estimates will influence the predicted post-merger prices
in the market.
Berry et al. (1995) argue that the computation of the optimal set of instruments
when only conditional moment conditions are available is very difficult and numerically
complex. As a less computationally demanding approximation, they use polynomials
resulting from first order basis functions of the product characteristics. The validity
of these basis functions as instruments relies on exchangeability assumptions of firms’
own characteristics with respect to permutations in the order of competitors’ product
characteristics. Because I allow for the possibilty of collusion among firms, this changes
the structure of potential Nash equilibria. The brand specific unobservable marginal
cost component ω may be correlated with unobservable product characteristics.
Therefore it is essential to look for instruments that are correlated with marginal costs,
but not with the structural cost error. To account for the effects of unobserved cost
drivers on prices, I use first order basis functions of the own brand characteristics, own
firm characteristics, and competitors’ characteristics.
2.4.2 Model identification of post-merger profit internalization parameter
Setting equation (2.11) equal to the observed post-merger prices ppost, and solving for
the unobserved post-merger cost-component vector ωpost
θ˜
(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜), yields:
ωpost
θ˜
(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜) = ppost − mˆcpost(γD, γS,Θ)− Ω−1(γD,Θ, θ˜)spost. (2.15)
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As an identification restriction for the degree of joint profit maximization, I use
orthogonality conditions between the residual of observed and predicted post-merger
prices, which results in the structural error ωpost
θ˜,j
(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜) for a product j, and a
Mθ˜-dimensional matrix of instruments Zθ˜.
The model consists of a system of J equations for the different products whose prices
are functions of the profit internalization parameters, θ˜. The main identification task is
to find meaningful moments that allow to identify the parameters. Using the difference
between the predicted and observed post-merger prices of all brands would result in only
one moment, which would render estimation of more than one parameter infeasible.
I instead make use of orthogonality restrictions to generate two additional sets of
moments. First, because I treat product characteristics with respect to demand, x, as
exogenous with respect to firm behavior in the short run, I can use them as instruments.
This is analogous to the identification of the production cost. Second, an increase in
consumer income will have a positive demand effect at a given price. If such an income
shock does not translate in higher labor costs, then the shock should be uncorrelated
with the unobserved post-merger cost component vector ωpost. I use regional income
data and local consumer price indexes as additional instruments. This leads to the
identification restriction
E[Z ′
θ˜
ωpost
θ˜
(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜)] = 0. (2.16)
Making use of the structural error term ωpost
θ˜
to construct orthogonality conditions
to identify the supply side parameters does not rely on the linear cost function
specification and only requires separability between the observed parameters γS and
the unobserved cost component ωpost
θ˜
. Appendix B derives the structural error term
under the assumption of a logarithmic cost function.
2.4.3 Model identification of industry conduct parameters
Comparing to the case when estimating industry conduct, the main difference is
that one estimates the industry ownership matrix Θ instead of the internalization
parameters θ˜. Equating equation (2.12) with the observed post-merger prices ppost, and
solving for the unobserved post-merger cost error vector ωpostΘ (γ
D, γS,Θ; b()) yields:
ωpostΘ (γ
D, γS,Θ; b(·)) = ppost − mˆcpost(γD, γS,Θ)− Ω−1(γD,Θ, b(Θ))spost. (2.17)
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Besides the conventional first- and second-order polynomials of the observed product
characteristics x, I use additional cross-firm polynomials which indicate the proximity
between different firms’ product portfolios. From a theoretical viewpoint, the proximity
of two firms’ brand portfolios should at least partly determine the potential profits from
collusion between those firms. Furthermore, this should also determine the maximum
degree of sustainable collusion between them. Denote xsj as the s
th component of
product j’s observed product characteristic vector xj. Denote by h(xsj, f) a J × 1 row
vector whose entries consists of the average of brand characteristic xs between firm f
and the average brand characteristics of each product’s firm. Thus, the entries of this
vector are 0 whenever a brand belongs to firm f . In case a brand belongs to firm g 6= f ,
the entry will be 1
Jf
∑
i∈Ff xsi − 1Jg
∑
j∈Fg xsj, where Jf denotes the number of brands
of firm f . Under the assumption that cooperation between firms also depends on the
proximity of the brand portfolios, given the correct form of conduct, the unobserved
cost components of a firm should on average be uncorrelated with the differences in
average brand characteristics h(xs., .). For a given product characteristic s, this yields
the additional moment restrictions
E[ωpostΘ (γ
D, γS,Θ; b(·))h(xs.,, f)] = 0,∀f ∈ {1, .., N}.
Per characteristics used, this will results in N − 1 additional moment restrictions.
As in the profit-internalization case, I will also use data on disposable income as an
instrument for the unobserved cost component.
Stacking the different instruments into the MΘ-dimensional instrument matrix ZΘ, this
yields the following identification restrictions:
E[Z ′Θω
post
Θ (γ
D, γS,Θ; b(·))] = 0. (2.18)
One key assumption is that industry conduct is known among firms. Relaxing this
assumption would cause two problems. First, this would make the assumption on
symmetric behavior between two different firms harder to sustain. Second, I would
have to specify beliefs of the different firms regarding other firms’ behavior, which
could not be identified.
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Relationship to Corts’ (1999) Critique Previous research has used a conjectural
variation approach in order to identify industry conduct, see for example Bresnahan
(1989). In these models, a firm forms a “conjecture” about the responses of their
competitors towards an increase in its own quantity. In this context, a conjecture
can be seen as a reduced-form game theoretic best response function in symmetric
quantity setting games. Corts (1999) critically discusses the identification of conjectural
variation parameters. He shows that a conjectural variation parameter only estimates
the marginal responsiveness of the marginal cost function with respect to changes in a
demand shifter. As a researcher, one is however interested in the average slope of the
marginal cost function instead of the marginal slope. My approach differs significantly
from the conjectural variations approach and is not subject to this critique. In my
framework, each firm sets prices for its portfolio of brands instead of quantities. Instead
of forming conjectures about other brands’ reactions, each firm’s underlying objective
function includes preferences for profits of other firms, thus allowing for cooperation
among different firms. The preference parameters with respect to other firms’ profits
are essentially the conduct parameters I am interested in. I assume that these conduct
parameters, as well as the marginal costs of all brands, are common knowledge in the
industry, but not observed by the researcher. Using first order conditions of all brands’
objective functions, my identification strategy allows to estimate both marginal cost
parameters and the level conduct parameters. These amount to the “as-if conduct
parameters” in Corts (1999).
Corts’ also criticizes the static game character of conventional conduct estimation
models. My approach is not fully exempt from this critique. I partially account for
industry dynamics by modeling the merger-induced industry change. Nonetheless, my
static approach may not detect certain dynamic collusion patterns. One big advantage
of a static approach is a higher degree of tractability. Modeling repeated games makes
identification of conduct even more difficult due to a larger set of potential dynamic
equilibrium strategies. With my approach, I am also able to identify patterns of full
collusion as well as patterns of collusion between only a subset of firms.
Rank conditions for industry conduct
This section provides identification results for different specifications when estimating
continuous conduct parameters “directly”. This is opposed to the menu approach,
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which selects among different non-nested models without estimating conduct
parameters.
Recall the assumptions made on firms’ own-profit maximization. As in standard
unilateral merger models, I also assume that a merger does not change the behavior
between non-merging firms. There are furthermore some global assumptions that reduce
the parameter space which I will discuss in detail.
I only consider cases in which a firm treats all brands of a specific competitor’s firm
in the same way. This excludes the possibility that single brands of different firms
collude while others play against each other competitively. From a pure rank condition
perspective the number of parameters I would have to estimate when accounting for
brand-specific collusion between firms would easily exceed the number brands in the
market. This makes it impossible to identify the parameters.
Bilateral symmetry between firms One way to reduce the number of parameters
to be estimated is to restrict the model to cases in which all brands of two firms play
against each other in the same way. As a consequence, all brands have the same cross-
conduct parameters for all of their brand pairs. This still allows for partial collusion
between two firms, but does not allow for more elaborate strategies, such as for example
collusion only between some brands of two firms. In terms of the parameter space, this
reduces the number of cross-conduct parameters to N(N−1)
2
.
Proposition 2.1 (Necessary conditions for identification under bilateral symmetry
between firms). Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds, and that for distinct firms f, g, θij =
θik = θji = θki ∀i ∈ Ff ,∀ j, k ∈ Fg. Then industry conduct is identified only if
the number of firms is sufficiently small compared to the number of products, i.e. if
N(N−1)
2
≤ J .
Proof: See Appendix E.
Same responsiveness to all cross-firm brands Another possibility is a case in which
each firm behaves in the same way to all of its competitors.
The advantage of this specification is that it reduces the number of parameters to
only N different cross-conduct parameters. However, there are also several problems
associated with the assumption. First, it is again no longer possible to detect partial
collusion between a subset of firms in the industry. Second, there is a consistency
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problem with respect to a mutual responsiveness: Under this assumption, it can be
possible that firm 1 is acting collusively with firm 2, and firm 2 on the other hand acts
competitively towards firm 1, something which is hard to justify from an economic
perspective.
Proposition 2.2 (Necessary conditions for identification under same responsiveness
to all cross-firm brands). Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds, and that for distinct firms
f, g, h , θij = θik ∀i ∈ Ff ,∀ j ∈ Fg,∀ k ∈ Fh. Then rank conditions are met only if
N ≤ J .
Proof: See Appendix E.
It is easy to see that the necessary rank conditions hold trivially. It can still be the case
however that there are two or more identical conduct equations, which would violate
identification.
Same responsiveness between all firms The most restrictive specification assumes
that the cross-conduct parameters are identical for all brands in the market. The biggest
advantage is that this returns a single cross-conduct parameter instead of a complicated
matrix, and thus always meets the rank conditions. One disadvantage is that very often
this parameter will severely restricts the set of estimable economic models. For example,
one will not be able to test for partial collusion in the market, or for differences in
competitive behavior between different firms.
Proposition 2.3 (Necessary conditions for identification under same responsiveness
between all firms). Suppose for distinct firms f, g, h , θij = θji = θik = θjk = θkj ∀i ∈
Ff ,∀ j ∈ Fg,∀ k ∈ Fh. Then the rank condition for industry conduct is always met.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Overall, the direct approach requires more structure and a larger parameter space
than conventional selection methods. This is because explicitly accounting for conduct
parameters requires more degrees of freedom. Therefore, I will provide results
specifically tailored for the different assumptions provided in the beginning of this
section. Clearly, the most important trade-off is the one between the allowed flexibility
of industry conduct and the number of parameters that have to be estimated. Table
2.3 sums up the necessary rank conditions for all cases.
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Identifying industry conduct via product entry or exit Besides using a merger as
an identification strategy for estimating industry conduct, one can also think about
using other structural changes. Concerning product entry, there is the problem of
comparing competition with and without the entrant. While one can still make the
assumption that entry does not change how existing brands compete with each other,
one has to define how a new product will interact with the existing products.
Unlike product entry, using product exit as an identification strategy is still feasible.
However, one has to ask why a product will exit. One reason can be that it is just not
profitable, which will then probably imply that its impact on the market is relatively
low. Therefore, a reduction of the brand space would not result in a big shift for firms
strategies. Another possibility would be that a brand is profitable on its own, but it
would be more profitable for a multi-brand firm to exit the product out of the market.
This would result in an endogeneity problem when estimating conduct using product
exit.
2.5 Estimation
2.5.1 Demand estimation
I use the technique of Nevo (2001) to recover the structural demand side parameters
γD and the unobservable error term ξ(γD, x, p). Using Nevo’s estimation strategy on
the demand side allows me to estimate all the demand side parameters independently
of the supply side. I solve for the mean utility level across all brands at market t, δ.t, as
to match the empirical market shares sjt(x.t, p.t, ξ.t, γ
D) from equation (2.13) with the
actual market shares sjt observed in the data. Following equation (2.13) the objective
is to find:
γˆD = arg min
γD
ξ(γD, x, p)′ZξA˜−1ξ Z
′
ξξ(γ
D, x, p); (2.19)
where A˜−1ξ is an estimate of the asymptotically efficient covariance
E[Z ′ξξ(γ˜
D, x, p)ξ(γ˜D, x, p)′Zξ], given demand parameters γ˜D obtained from the first-
stage GMM estimation.
Defining the market size is an important assumption, for it has implications on the
different market shares and also on the differences between markets. I assume that the
market size is correlated with store specific characteristics. I compute the market size
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of a specific store as a function of the average total sales of all supermarket products
sold in this store.15
Estimates Table 2.4 shows results for a Random Coefficients Logit demand model.
In this specification I include random coefficients for price, a constant, and sogginess
of cereal. I furthermore include coefficients for sugar content, content of refined grains,
segmentation dummies, a time dummy as well as firm dummies. The inclusion of firm
dummies reflects controlling for firm-specific valuations, i.e. accounting for a fixed firm
value rather than a brand value. Furthermore, I use demographic data on mean income,
income standard deviation, household size and on number of small children to interact
them with the random coefficients. The results show a negative relationship between
income and price sensitivity, which is consistent with higher markups in high income
neighborhoods. Price sensitivity also interacts negatively with the number of small
children, which might account for their responsiveness to advertising. However, both
demographic interaction coefficients are not statistically significant. Appendix C shows
details about the estimation routine and other computational issues.
As a robustness check, I also estimate different variants of a multinomial Logit
model. Table 2.5 shows demand side estimation results for several specifications of
the multinomial Logit model. I use input prices and prices of other zones together
with the ownership change as instruments for the sales price. When also including firm
dummies yields a more elastic demand curve than specification (6) without instruments,
however, the price coefficients are relatively close to each other. A bigger difference
occurs between specifications that include and do not include firm dummies. This can
be seen by comparing specifications (1) and (2) to (3) and (4). Overall, all of the price
coefficients are lower in absolute magnitude than the mean coefficient of a Random
Coefficient Logit estimation. This suggest that the random coefficient model is able to
capture some of the consumer heterogeneity through interacting demographic variables
which increases the price coefficient in absolute terms.
Demand Elasticities Individual market shares depend on the mean utility as well as
on the random and demographic components. Product j’s market share for individual
15Because revenue from ready-to-eat cereal only amounts to a very small fraction of the total revenue
generated in a store, the endogeneity between the market size variable and the cereal prices is negligible.
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i at market t can be written as:
sijt =
exp(δjt + µijt)∑J
k=0 exp(δkt + µikt)
(2.20)
Integrating over the whole distribution of individuals yields the aggregated market
shares from the model. The cross-price elasticity between goods j and k at market t,
ηjkt, can be written as
ηjkt =

−pjt
sjt
∫
αisijt(1− sijt)dPD(D)dPv(v) j = k
pkt
sjt
∫
αisijtsiktdPD(D)dPv(v) j 6= k
(2.21)
When using the random coefficients model, one needs to compute the individual market
shares using the model structure in equation (2.20). Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 show the
mean elasticities over all markets for the baseline random coefficient Logit specification.
The own-price elasticities are highly negative for all firms, with the exception of
Kellogg’s Just Right Fruit, which has an absolute own-price elasticity lower than one.
One potential reason for this can be an increased popularity of adult cereals over the
period in my dataset, such that both price and demand went up for this cereal at the
same time.
There is furthermore significant variation in different brands’ substitution patterns,
which is related to the type of cereal. Adult cereals, such as Kellogg’s Just Right and
Kellogg’s Nutri Grain, exhibit much lower cross-price elasticities than kids cereals,
as for example Kellogg’s Fruit Loops or General Mills Honey Nut Cheerios with
coefficients higher than .1. Overall, the substitution patterns are relatively close to
previous industry estimates, see for example Nevo (2001).
2.5.2 Post-merger profit internalization
I first outline each step of the estimation algorithm when estimating the degree of joint
profit maximization.
Estimation algorithm
1. Estimate demand parameters γD: In a first step, I estimate the demand
parameters without having to specify the supply side.
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2. Recover pre-merger marginal costs using first order conditions,
estimate cost function, and predict post-merger prices Under the
assumption of a known pre-merger industry ownership matrix Θ, I use equations
(2.5) and (2.8) to back out pre-merger marginal costs. Using variation in the
input costs w over time, I then predict the post- merger input price component
of marginal costs, mˆc.
3. Pick degree of profit-internalization θ˜, predict post-merger prices, and
compute appropriate moments I predict the markup firms charge conditional
on a specific θ˜ value. Together with the estimated post-merger input price
component of marginal costs from step 2., I then predict the post-merger prices.
4. Repeat 3. until GMM criterion is minimized I recover the post-merger
unobserved cost component ωpost
θ˜
and interact it with the instruments Zθ˜. I
estimate the model using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to find the
parameters that minimize the weighted moment criterion.
I assume that at a given point in time, marginal costs are constant across all stores. All
stores are within the same metropolitan area and are operated by the same retailer.
Therefore, the only channels through which marginal costs could differ across stores
are either a difference in the retail margin across stores, or a difference in distribution
costs. I do not find evidence for structural differences regarding the retail margin in
the data. Differences in the distribution costs also do not seem likely because of the
relative proximity of the stores.16
In the second step of my estimation procedure, I use the marginal costs that were backed
out conditional on a specific form of industry conduct and estimate the marginal cost
equation (2.8) via minimizing the following objective function:
γˆS = arg min
γS
ωpre(γDγS,Θ)′ZωA−1ωpreZ
′
ωω
pre(γD, γS,Θ), (2.22)
where A−1ω = Z
′
ωZω, therefore this amounts to a linear GMM estimator.
16There may be differences in store-specific fixed costs due to differences in rents or wages between the store
locations. Such effect would not translate in marginal cost differences, but may be a channel for cost synergies
after a merger.
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The brand specific unobserved marginal cost component ωprej may be correlated with
unobservable product characteristics. Therefore it is essential to look for instruments
that are correlated with marginal costs, but not with the error term. To account for
the effects of unobserved cost drivers on prices, I use first order basis functions of the
own brand characteristics, own firm characteristics, and competitors’ characteristics.
This relies on an exchangeability argument of product characteristics when facing a
unique Nash equilibrium, see for example Berry et al. (1995).
Having obtained the demand side coefficients γD and the cost parameters γS for
the given form of pre-merger industry conduct Θ, I estimate the degree of profit-
internalization θ˜ by minimizing the GMM objective function:
ˆ˜θ = arg min
θ˜
ωpostθ (γ
D, γS,Θ, θ˜)Zθ˜W˜
−1
˜˜
θ
Z ′
θ˜
ωpost
θ˜
(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜), (2.23)
where W˜θ˜(
˜˜θ, γ˜S) is a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix
E[Z ′
θ˜
ωpost
θ˜
(γˆD, γˆS,Θ, ˜˜θ)ωpost
θ˜
(γˆD, γˆS,Θ, ˜˜θ)′Zθ˜] for a given first-stage parameter vector
˜˜θ.
The moments consist of the empirical residuals ωpost
θ˜
(γD, γS,Θ, θ˜) interacted with the
specific instruments Zθ˜, as described in Section 2.4.
There are several advantages from using the actual post-merger prices instead of
simulating a post-merger price equilibrium. First, when simulating for a new price
equilibrium, one needs to make an assumption regarding competition in the market.
Already without estimating industry conduct, this is computationally demanding.
Furthermore, it does not make use of all the available post-merger data, i.e. market
shares and prices. Second, by using post-merger price simulation, one also risks
averaging out specific competitive patterns and introduces a simulation error.17
Estimates Table 2.8 shows the cost function estimates for four symmetric forms of
industry competition, ranging from multi-brand Nash competition, i.e. Θ = 0, to full
collusion, i.e. Θ = 1. The median marginal costs implied by the model lie between $.114
17One important issue concerns the standard errors. Because of the sequential character of the estimation
routine, I have to account for the demand estimation error when estimating standard errors for marginal
costs and the supply side parameters, respectively. I account for these effects by using a second estimation
routine. After having obtained the parameter estimates of the estimation algorithm, I estimate a sequential
model that estimates all of the parameters simultaneously. This has the advantage of increasing efficiency of
the estimation, as well as yielding consistent standard errors. Its disadvantage is the computational power
required for this estimation. So far, I do not account for the estimation error when computing standard errors,
which can potentially cause a bias in these estimates.
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per serving for multi-product Nash pricing and $.072 for full collusion, implying median
markups between 40.8 and 63.1 percent. The cost function estimations show that
especially the influence of wheat on overall marginal costs is decreasing in the degree
of industry competition, Θ. Figure 2.6 shows the development of profit internalization
parameters over time for four different forms of industry competition, ranging from
multi-brand Nash competition to partial collusion, i.e. Θ = .5, between all firms pre-
merger.
The results indicate an increasing degree of profit internalization over the first six
quarters for all three industry specifications. The parameter values are the highest for
the Nash specification and are decreasing in the degree of industry cooperation. In the
last two quarters of 1994, there is a sharp drop in the profit internalization, which is
followed by a sharp increase over the last year.
Overall, except for the drop in joint profit internalization in 1994, the results are
consistent with an increase in profit internalization over time. However, the point
estimates as stated in Table 2.9 for this estimation technique are not statistically
significant. This is due to a relatively flat GMM objective function at the optimum
parameter values.
2.5.3 Industry conduct estimation
When estimating industry conduct, I have to iterate the processes of recovering pre-
merger marginal costs, predicting post-merger marginal cost using a cost function
estimation, and computing the industry conduct moments. This is because my object
of interest, i.e. the pre-merger conduct matrix Θ, influences the implied marginal cost
in the industry. Overall, the above steps can be decomposed into two parts. I use
a nested two-step routine on the supply side. In the first step, I back out marginal
cost conditional on a specific form of conduct as the outer loop. In the second step, I
recover the supply side parameters by regressing the backed out marginal costs on the
observable cost characteristics while controlling for unobserved brand characteristics.
First, I will outline the conduct estimation routine.
1. Estimate demand parameters Using the instruments discussed above,
I estimate the demand parameters, without having to specify supply-side
competition.
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2. Pick Θ given the identification restrictions
3. Infer marginal costs and predict post-merger prices for given choice of
Θ, and compute appropriate moments Having estimated the demand side
parameters, I can infer the marginal costs of production conditional on the form of
conduct Θ using proper instruments. Using post-merger input cost data and the
estimated cost-parameters, I can predict post-merger marginal costs. Given the
conduct matrix Θ and the estimated demand parameters γD, I can then predict
post-merger prices given Θ.
4. Repeat steps 2-3 until GMM criterion is minimized I recover the post-
merger unobserved cost component ωpostΘ and interact it with the instruments ZΘ.
I estimate the model using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to find the
conduct parameters that minimize the weighted moment criterion.
In the second step of my estimation procedure, I use the marginal costs that were
backed out conditional on a specific form of industry conduct and estimate the cost
function from equation (2.8) via minimizing the following GMM objective function:
γˆS = arg min
γS
ωpre(γD, γS,Θ)′ZωA˜−1ωpreZ
′
ωω
pre(γD, γS,Θ). (2.24)
A˜−1ω is a consistent estimate of the covariance E[Z
′
ωω
pre(γˆD, γ˜S,Θ)ωpre(γˆD, γ˜S,Θ)′Zω]
for a given first-stage parameter vector γ˜S.
Having obtained the demand side coefficients γD and the cost parameters γS for any
form of industry conduct, I estimate the conduct parameters Θ by minimizing the GMM
objective function. The moments consist of the empirical residuals ωpostΘ (γ
D, γS,Θ; b(·))
interacted with the specific instruments ZΘ, as described in section 3.
Then the GMM objective in can be written as:
Θˆ = arg min
Θ
ωpostΘ (γˆ
D, γˆS,Θ; b(·))Z ′ΘW˜−1Θ Z ′ΘωpostΘ (γˆD, γˆS,Θ; b(·)), (2.25)
where W˜ (Θ˜, γS) is a consistent estimate of the covariance
E[Z ′Θω
post
Θ (γˆ
D, γˆS, Θ˜; b(·))ωpostΘ (γˆD, γˆS, Θ˜; b(·))′ZΘ] for a given first stage conduct matrix
Θ˜. Here, γˆS denotes the cost estimates from the second step that are conditional on a
specific form of conduct.
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Estimates Table 2.10 shows estimation results when estimating a single industry
conduct parameter. The obtained parameter value is 0.708. It is interesting to compare
the implied price cost-margins to those from a multi-product Nash pricing supply
side model. Under multi-product Nash pricing, all of the markup can be attributed
to product differentiation, and not to cooperative effects. When estimating a single
conduct parameter, 25.6 percent of the price-cost margin is attributable to cooperative
behavior between firms.
Table 2.11 shows the results when imposing symmetry in a firm’s behavior towards
all of its rivals. One can see that the two biggest players, General Mills and Kellogg’s,
act in the most cooperative behavior, while smaller companies act more competitively.
According to this specification, General Mills acts fully cooperatively, with a parameter
value of 0.98. Under this specification, 17.4 percent of the markups are attributable to
cooperative behavior.
To account for even more heterogeneity with respect to behavior across firms, Table
2.12 shows the conduct estimation results under the assumption of bilateral brand
symmetry. The parameter estimates show a lot of heterogeneity in the parameter values,
however, under this specification, none of the parameters are statistically significant.
The implied median price-cost margins from the estimation are 14.3 percent higher
than the median multi-brand Nash price cost margins. This is lower than under a single
conduct parameter specification, reflecting the heterogeneity across different firm pairs.
2.6 Extensions
In this section I present extensions to my basic framework that address several merger
related issues.
2.6.1 Supply side selection methods
The menu approach selects the best fit among a discrete set (“menu”) of supply side
models, for example multi-brand Bertrand-Nash competition or full collusion among
all firms. This approach does not include any explicit conduct parameters, but rather
fully pre-imposes the form of competition, which often relaxes identification problems.
In practice, there are two popular ways to select among different non-nested industry
specifications. However, both have significant weaknesses.
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The first method compares the marginal cost estimates of the different supply side
specifications with cost estimates from other sources, such as accounting data, see
for example Nevo (2001). At first sight this seems to be an intuitive way to select
the most appropriate specification from the data. This approach, however, has several
disadvantages. First, outside cost estimates are not always available, or do not have
a reliable economic interpretation. Second, such data is often only available on a very
aggregate level, which makes a detailed industry introspective nearly impossible.18
Third, if different specifications yield similar cost estimates, it is not clear how one
can use these results for a reliable model selection.
The second method uses forms of non-nested selection test in combination with pre-
merger data to look for the supply specification that is closest to the true data
generating process, see for example Vuong (1989) or Rivers and Vuong (2002). In
vertical relations frameworks, such tests are relatively successful for selecting among
different non-nested models, see for example Bonnet and Dubois (2010) for a detailed
exposition. When using only pre-merger data in a horizontal framework, however, in
practice there is the problem that such tests have relatively low predictive power, due
to only very limited variation between the different pre-merger model specifications.
I exploit changes in ownership as well as variation in the input cost data to select among
different non-nested horizontal models.Using pre-and post merger data in combination
with non-nested supply side models provides a tractable in-sample test. Testing can be
done using a J-Test or using a variant of the Rivers and Vuong (2002) test. Appendix
D shows the estimation details for applying the Rivers and Vuong (2002) approach.
Table 2.13 shows the results of using the Rivers and Vuong (2002) approach for testing
different non-nested hypotheses against each other. I use five non-nested specifications
in which each firm play symmetrically against each other, with values 0, .25, .5, .75,
and 1. The results show that the non-nested test clearly rejects hypotheses of low
industry cooperation against the hypotheses of high cooperation among firms. Overall,
this approach would select a fully collusive model.
18Nevo (2001) states that his data is not sufficiently detailed to test for collusion among a subset of firms.
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2.6.2 Direct estimation of synergies
From an antitrust viewpoint, the magnitude of synergies plays a key role for the welfare
and consumer welfare effects of horizontal mergers, see for example Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) and Nocke and Whinston (2010).19 To my knowledge there is no approach
that uses a differentiated goods framework to estimate the magnitude of merger
related marginal cost synergies directly. I propose the following estimation method.
Assume that industry conduct is known in an industry pre-merger and post-merger,
and merging firms fully internalize their profits. When accounting for the change in
price elasticities and the change in conduct after the merger, I can back out marginal
costs both pre-merger and post merger via the vector of first-order conditions. When
conduct and demand is known, the only systematic change can occur with respect to
marginal costs. I will use information on the timing of the merger to assess the impact
of the merger on marginal costs of the merging firms, which in economic terms reflects
cost synergies.
Denote Θpre and Θpost the known pre- and post-merger industry conduct, respectively.
Then, using equation 2.8, I can back out the pre-merger and post-merger marginal cost
from the model:
mcpre = ppre − Ω−1(Θpre)spre
mcpost = ppost − Ω−1(Θpost)spost
Define mcall as the marginal cost vector both pre- and post-merger: mcall ≡
[mcpre;mcpost].
I will now propose three different specifications one can use to estimate for synergies
between merging firms given pre- and post-merger data.
1. Synergies in observable cost characteristics If one assumes that synergies affect
all observable brand characteristics in the same way, but do not affect unobserved brand
characteristics, then one can estimate the following equation:
mcjt = (1 + κ1merge,j)(γ
Swj) + ωj + jt, (2.26)
19One example for an industry with significant synergies is the beer industry. After the 2005 Coors-Molson
merger, the company stated that it made $ 66 million worth merger related synergies in its first year as joined
entity.
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where κ represents the change in the observable brand characteristics on input prices,
and 1merge is an indicator function equal to one if the brand belongs to one of the
merging firms in the post-merger periods.
2. Synergies in unobservable cost characteristics If one assumes that synergies
will affect only the unobserved brand specific component, then one can estimate the
following equation:
mcjt = γ
Swj + 1
preωprej + (1− 1pre)ωpostj + jt, (2.27)
where 1pre is an indicator function equal to one in pre-merger periods.
3. Synergies in output A third possibility to account for synergies is to test for
returns to scale in total firm output. This can account for increasing returns to scale
in distribution cost or advertising. In this case, the marginal cost for brand j of firm f
can be written as
mcjt = τ
∑
i∈Ff
log(qi) + γ
Swj + ωj + jt, (2.28)
where qi denotes the total quantity sold of brand i. Since I only observe output in one
metropolitan area and brand, I have to assume that my data is representative for the
average output over all retailers in the industry.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a framework to estimate the degree of joint profit maximization
between merging firms and the form of industry conduct in the ready-to-eat cereal
industry. The merger-induced ownership change serves as an important variation to
identify firm behavior in the industry.
The availability of pre- and post-merger industry data allows me to estimate the degree
of joint profit maximization rather than to assume it. The results shed light on the
question of cooperation within a firm after a merger. The empirical descriptive findings
show a partial pricing adjustment by the merging firms immediately after the merger.
Furthermore, the structural estimation suggest an overall increase in the joint profit
maximization over the first 10 quarters. The results are in line with informational and
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contractual frictions in a post-merger integration period.
The merged firm’s pricing potential also crucially depends on the form of industry
conduct. The biggest difference of my conduct estimation approach compared to other
approaches lies in exploiting supply-side shifts using both pre- and post-merger industry
data and thereby inferring the underlying degree of competitiveness. I do not have to
rely on aggregate outside data or on relatively weak selection methods to determine
the industry conduct. The estimation results suggest that markups in the industry
are above those predicted under multi-product Nash pricing. I find that between 14.3
and 25.6 percent of the estimated markups can be attributed to cooperative industry
behavior.
The proposed methods require sufficient variation in the price movement across
different products or a variation in input prices. This might not be achieved in
all horizontal merger cases. However, in the growing literature on ex-post merger
evaluations there are already examples with seemingly sufficient variation, for example
painkillers (Bjoernerstedt and Verboven 2012), motor oil and syrup (Weinberg and
Hosken 2012), and cars (Yoshimoto 2011). Up until now, this literature mainly
compares the predictions of different demand models under the assumption of multi-
product Nash competition. Both methods can be applied to all of these mergers. Besides
additional information about competition and merging firms’ behavior within these
industries, using such data would also give interesting information about behavior
across industries. From an organizational perspective, this can yield insights about
the effects of different managerial firm structures on post-merger behavior, and about
differences in the potential to maximize joint profits. From an industry perspective, this
can also provide information about the relationship between competition and market
power across different industries.
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2.A Rank conditions examples
In this section I present further examples that highlight the effects of the assumptions
made above. The main question will be under which circumstances marginal costs and
industry conduct will be jointly identified in a model.
3 firms, brands 1 and 2 belong to same firm Consider an industry that consists
of 4 brands, where brands 1 and 2 belong to the same firm. For simplicity, assume in
this example that marginal costs are constant for each firm. Furthermore, denote by
pi,mci, si the price, marginal costs and market share of firm i, respectively. θij describes
the degree to which brand i takes into account the profits of brand j when making its
decision. In the example, the maximization problem of brand 1 thus yields
max
p1
(p1 −mc1)s1(p) + (p2 −mc2)s2(p) + θ13(p3 −mc3)s3(p) + θ14(p4 −mc4)s4(p)
The first-order condition for brand 1 with respect to its price then yields
(p1 −mc1)∂s1
∂p1
+ s1 + (p2 −mc2)∂s2
∂p1
+ θ13(p3 −mc3)∂s3
∂p1
+ θ14(p4 −mc4)∂s4
∂p1
= 0
There is a change in the ownership matrix pre- and post-merger if firms 2 and 3 merge.
When making the additional assumption that each firm maximizes the profits of all
of its brands, and merging firms fully internalize their profits, the associated pre- and
post-merger conduct matrices can be written as
Θ =

1 1 θ13 θ14
1 1 θ23 θ24
θ31 θ32 1 θ34
θ41 θ42 θ43 1
 ; Θpost = b(Θ) =

1 1 θ13 θ14
1 1 θ23 θ24
θ31 θ32 1 1
θ41 θ42 1 1

From firm 1’s first order condition, conditional on the form of industry conduct, firms
will adapt their prices after an ownership change. In the above example, without
symmetry, there are 10 parameters to estimate, with only 4 equations, such that the
rank conditions are never met for identification. I introduce different assumption on
firm supply to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated.
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Bilateral symmetry between firms Instead of bilateral brand symmetry, a stricter
assumption is that for all brands of two distinct firms, each brand will take the other
firms’ brands into account in the same fashion when making its pricing decision. Pre-
merger and post-merger conduct can be written as
Θ =

1 1 θa θb
1 1 θa θb
θa θa 1 θc
θb θb θc 1
 ; Θpost = b(Θ) =

1 1 θa θb
1 1 θa θb
θa θa 1 1
θb θb 1 1

This leads to a number of 3 parameters to estimate, with 4 available equations, such
that the system is identified in absence of multi-collinearity.
Symmetry among all cross-firm brands When assuming that all brands take the
brands of all other firms into account in the same way, this results in the following pre-
and post-merger conduct:
Θ =

1 1 θa θa
1 1 θa θa
θa θa 1 θa
θa θa θa 1
 ; Θpost = b(Θ) =

1 1 θa θa
1 1 θa θa
θa θa 1 1
θa θa 1 1

There is only one conduct parameter to estimate and in 4 equations.
Post-merger internalization of profits When estimating the internalization of post
merger profits among merging firms, the form of industry competition. If one assumes
multi-product Nash pricing in the 3 firm, 4 brand case, then pre- and post-merger
industry conduct can be written as
Θ =

1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 ; Θpost =

1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 θ˜
0 0 θ˜ 1

Here, θ˜ represents the degree of profit-internalization between firms 2 and 3.
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2.B Derivation of structural production error term using
logarithmic cost function
Instead of the linear cost specification from equation (2.9), I now assume a logarithmic
cost specification.
log(mc(γD,Θ, p, x)) = wγS + ω. (2.29)
Combining the above equation with the recovered marginal cost estimates from
equation (2.5), and solving for the pre-merger structural error term ωpre yields
ωprej (γˆ
D, γS,Θ) = log
(
mcj(γ
D, γS,Θ, p, x, w)
eγSwj
)
. (2.30)
The post-merger structural error when estimating post-merger profit internalization
can be derived as
ωθ˜post(γ
D, γS,Θ, θ˜) = log
(
ppost − Ω−1(γD,Θ, θ˜)spost
mˆcpost(γD, γS,Θ, p, x, w)
)
. (2.31)
The structural error term can be obtained in an analogous fashion. The computed error
terms can then again be combined with instruments discussed in section 3.
2.C Computational details
For the Random Coefficient Logit model, I use the derivative-based SOLVOPT
algorithm. In practice, this algorithm has shown to provide more accurate estimation
results in terms of a lower GMM objective function, see for example Knittel
and Metaxoglou (2011). I also compute theoretical and numerical gradients at the
equilibrium, which both are very close to zero, the highest gradient being of magnitude
0.003. In my estimation routine, I draw 50 individuals per store, and combine the draws
with demographic store characteristics.
For my GMM supply-side routine, I use a basic finite-descent accelerated random search
(ARS) algorithm, as proposed by Appel et al. (2004). For each estimation step, I use
1500 starting points.
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2.D Rivers and Vuong approach
Formal Rivers and Vuong approach Consider a non-nested conduct specification
h, with conduct matrix Θh at a time.20 Note that this can include differences in the
conduct matrix between pre- and post-merger. Under this hypothesis, one can recover
the marginal cost using equation (2.5): mc = p − Ω−1(Θh)s. When estimating a cost
function, I decompose the structural unobserved error term into a fixed brand-specific
unobserved component and a random shock component: ωhjt = ω
h
j + 
h
jt. Using my
marginal cost specification 2.9 leads to
mchjt = w
′
jtγ
S + ωhj + 
h
jt. (2.32)
I assume that the random shock component uncorrelated to the observable input
characteristics and to the unobserved brand-specific component:E[hjt|ωhj , wjt] = 0.
The test looks for the cost equation with best statistical fit using the observable input
characteristics from the cost function. Note that these characteristics are brand-specific,
but do not change with the different conduct specifications. If one tests between two
different models, h, and h′, one obtains the following equations for the industry prices.
phjt = Ω
−1(Θh)s+ w′jtγ
S
h + ω
h
j + 
h
jt
ph
′
jt = Ω
−1(Θh
′
)s+ w′jtγ
S
h′ + ω
h′
j + 
h′
jt
For a given specification h, denote Qhn(γ
S, ω) the lack-of-fit criterion given the
parameters γS and ω. For any specification h, one now aims to find the parameter
values that minimize the lack of fit criterion Qh:
min
γSh ,ω
h
j
Qhn(γ
S
h , ω
h
j ) = min
γSh ,ω
h
j
1
n
∑
j,t
(hjt)
2 =
1
n
∑
j,t
[pjt − Ω−1(Θh)s− ωhj − w′jtγSh ]2
This does not require any of the specifications to be the correct model. Denote by
Q
h
n(γ
S
h , ω
h
j ) the expected lack-of-fit criteria for specification h.
Given specifications h and h′, there are three different hypothesis one has to test against
each other, which have the following asymptotic properties.
20This Appendix uses similar structure and notation as Bonnet and Dubois (2010).
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H0 : h and h
′
are asymptotically equivalent if limn→∞{Qhn(γSh , ωhj )−Q
h′
n (γ
S
h′ , ω
h′
j )} = 0.
H1 : h asymptotically better fit than h
′ if limn→∞{Qhn(γSh , ωhj )−Q
h′
n (γ
S
h′ , ω
h′
j )} < 0.
H2 : h
′ asymptotically better fit than h if limn→∞{Qhn(γSh , ωhj ) − Q
h′
n (γ
S
h′ , ω
h′
j )} > 0.
Denote by Tn the test statistic that accounts for the variation in the lack-of-fit criteria
for the different hypotheses.
Tn =
√
n
σˆhh′n
{Qhn(γˆSh , ωˆhj )−Qh
′
n (γˆ
S
h′ , ωˆ
h′
j )}, (2.33)
where σhh
′
n is the variance of the difference of the estimated lack-of-fit criteria. . Rivers
and Vuong show that if two models are strictly non-nested, the asymptotic distribution
of Tn is standard normal. Thus, one has to compare sample values of Tn with the critical
values of a standard normal distribution.
2.E Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. The demand parameters γD can be estimated from equations 10 and 13,
respectively. Regarding the supply side, there are J estimable equations, one equation
per brand post-merger. Because each firm has one conduct parameter for each
competitor, this leads to an overall number of N(N − 1) parameters. The bilateral
symmetry assumption reduces this number to N(N−1)
2
. This leads to J equations with
N(N−1)
2
parameters. The model is only identified if there are at least as many equations
as parameters, i.e. if N(N−1)
2
≤ J .
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. The demand parameters γD can be estimated from equations 10 and 13,
respectively. Regarding the supply side, there are J estimable equations, one equation
per brand pre-merger, and one equation per brand post-merger.Because each firm has
one conduct parameter for all firms, this leads to an overall number of N conduct
parameters. This leads to J equations with N parameters. The model is only identified
if there are at least as many equations as parameters, i.e. if N ≤ J .
Proof of Proposition 2.3
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Proof. Using the same reasoning as in the proof for Proposition 2.2, there are J
equations and one parameter to estimate, so that the result trivially holds.
2.F Graphs and tables
Adult enhanced Adult simple Family Kids
PO Raisin Bran NAB Orig. Shrd. Wheat GM Wheaties PO Honeycomb
GM Raisin Nut Bran NAB Spoon Size Shrd. GM Cheerios GM Apple-Cinn. Cheerios
KE Raisin Bran PO Grape Nuts Cereal KE Corn Flakes GM Honey Nut Cheerios
KE Nutri Grain GM Total Corn Flakes KE Crispix GM Lucky Charms
QO 100% Natural KE Special K RA Corn Chex GM Trix
KE Just Right Fruit Nut RA Wheat Chex KE Froot Loops
RA Rice Chex KE Frosted Flakes
KE Corn Pops
KE Smacks
QO Cap’n Crunch
Table 2.1: Product segmentation
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Brand Name % 92Q3-93Q1 % 92Q3-93Q3 % 92Q3-94Q1
NAB Orig Shred Wheat 0.03 0.12 0.11
NAB Sp.Size Shrd Wheat 0.01 0.03 0.09
PO Grape Nuts Cereal 0.04 0.01 0.04
PO Raisin Bran 0.07 0.04 0.23
PO Honeycomb 0.08 0.08 0.10
GM Raisin Nut Bran -0.02 0.03 0.12
GM Apple-Cin Cheerios -0.02 -0.10 -0.05
GM Wheaties -0.01 -0.12 -0.17
GM Cheerios -0.09 -0.14 -0.09
GM Honey Nut Cheerios -0.02 -0.07 -0.17
GM Lucky Charms -0.07 -0.11 -0.05
GM TOTAL Corn Flakes 0.00 0.06 -0.09
GM Trix -0.22 -0.12 0.07
KE Froot Loops 0.00 -0.14 -0.12
KE Special K 0.04 0.02 -0.09
KE Frosted Flakes 0.01 0.03 -0.13
KE Corn Pops 0.05 -0.23 -0.28
KE Raisin Bran 0.06 -0.06 -0.04
KE Corn Flakes -0.02 -0.03 -0.24
KE Smacks 0.06 -0.01 0.13
KE Crispix 0.04 0.08 0.15
KE Just Right FruitNut -0.24 0.02 0.18
KE Nutri Grain 0.03 0.01 0.06
RA Corn Chex 0.03 0.06 0.05
RA Wheat Chex 0.03 0.05 0.05
RA Rice Chex 0.02 0.05 0.06
QO 100% Natural Cereal 0.03 0.05 -0.14
QO Cap’n Crunch -0.27 0.04 -0.12
Table 2.2: Product specific price development
Note: Column 1 shows of quantity-weighted average percentage deflated price change between
quarter 3, 1992, and quarter 1, 1993. Columns 2 and 3 show the price developments between
1992, quarter 2 and 1993, quarter 3, and 1994, quarter 2, respectively.
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Conduct specification Necessary condition
Bilateral symm btw. firms N(N−1)2 ≤ J
Same resp. to cross-firm br. N ≤ J
Same resp. btw. all firms J ≥ 1 (always met)
Menu approach J ≥ 0 (always met)
Table 2.3: Identification conditions for different specifications
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction
Small Child Income Household Size St.Dev. Income
price -34.97 1.69 -387.90 -93.38 – 44.37
(7.69) (3.80) (333.60 ) (191.10) – (32.35)
const -1.42 -.14 – – 12.30 –
(.55) (.60) – – (7.87) –
mushy .12 .01 6.33 1.36 – –
(.40 ) (.23 ) (19.14 ) (12.14 ) – –
sugar -.03
(.00 )
refined grains .46
(.03)
quarter trend .02
(.00)
adult segment 1.25
(.06)
kids segment .47
(.04)
Table 2.4: Demand side estimates γS for Random Coefficient Logit model
Note: Num Obs: 19600. Interactions with demographics from US 1990 Census data around each store. Omitted
category: Firm dummy variables to account for firm-specific brand valuations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -11.5485*** -11.6427*** -7.3154*** -10.2634*** -13.8593*** -11.2802***
(0.2287) (0.4481) (0.2736) (0.494) (0.2376) (0.1254)
Constant -2.2791*** -3.2689*** -2.3519*** -1.8492*** -3.1581*** -2.147***
(0.0487) (0.1515) (0.0602) (0.1051) (0.0878) (0.0358)
Sugar -0.0344*** -0.051*** -0.0143*** -0.0189*** -0.0528*** -0.0414***
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0007)
Fat -0.0369*** 0.0346*** 0.0155*** 0.0153*** 0.0184*** 0.0073***
(0.004) (0.0067) (0.003) (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0025)
Refined grains 0.4682*** 0.3481*** 0.2636*** 0.2679*** 0.4377*** 0.4383***
(0.0207) (0.0349) (0.0277) (0.0395) (0.0198) (0.0134)
Sales 0.7569*** 3.4081*** 2.3924*** 5.0058*** 1.5109*** 0.1584***
(0.067) (0.2007) (0.0918) (0.215) (0.073) (0.0102)
Quarter dummy -0.0001*** -0.0492*** -0.0304*** -0.0647***
(0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0049)
Kids Cereal 1.0309*** 1.698*** 0.7072*** 0.9768*** 2.7253*** 1.581***
(0.054) (0.0816) (0.0528) (0.0784) (0.1024) (0.0338)
Adult Cereal 0.3237*** 0.6644*** 0.4202*** 0.6491*** 1.6531*** 0.2053***
(0.0301) (0.0488) (0.0327) (0.0502) (0.1019) (0.0385)
Input price IV Yes No Yes No No No
Zone IV No Yes No Yes Yes No
Ownership IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Firm dummies Yes Yes No No Yes No
Table 2.5: Demand estimation results for different Logit specifications
Note: P-values: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 ; Num Obs: 19600.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
Industry competition Θ = 0 Θ = 0.25 Θ = 0.5 Θ = 1
Wheat 0.123∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.046∗∗
Rice 0.057∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
Oat 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Corn 0.092∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
Sugar 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Vitamin 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Median mcpre 0.1036 0.0961 0.0864 0.0606
Mean mcpre 0.1005 0.0930 0.0837 0.0586
Std. mcpre 0.0669 0.0616 0.0564 0.0481
Median mcpost 0.1138 0.1062 0.0971 0.0721
Mean mcpost 0.1161 0.1087 0.0994 0.074
Std. mcpost 0.0807 0.0709 0.0608 0.0489
Table 2.8: Cost function estimates γS
Note: P-values: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Num Obs: 7840. Columns 2-5 show estimates for different forms
of symmetric industry conduct, raging from full competition between firms to full collusion. Wheat, Oat, Corn, Sugar,
Rice, Vitamins reflect coefficients for interaction between input prices and relative ingredient content in product.
Industry competition Θ = 0
(Nash)
Θ = .25 Θ = .5
Estimated
θ˜
Estimated
θ˜
Estimated
θ˜
1-2 quarters .30 (1.03) .11 (.69) .02 (.51)
3-4 quarters .36 (1.05) .19 (.71) .02 (.49)
5-6 quarters .43 (1.41) .22 (.87) .07 (.94)
7-8 quarters .02 (.92) .02 (.79) .02 (.65)
9-10 quarters .98 (80.2) .98 (103.7) .98 (95.5)
Table 2.9: Joint profit maximization estimates θ˜
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Num Obs: 9800. Degree of merging firms’ joint profit
maximization over time, θ˜, for different degrees of symmetric industry competition, Θ.
Numerical minimization is restricted to values of θ˜ ∈ [.018, .982].
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Conduct Parameter Std. Dev
Inter-Firm Conduct .708*** .023
Type of competition Median PCM St. Dev PCM
Estimated Conduct .548 .216
Multi-brand Nash .408 .285
Full collusion .631 .217
Note: P-values: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 ; Num Obs: 7840. Recovered
parameters from multi-product Nash pricing reflects the case of θ = 0 for all cross-firm
conduct parameters. Recovered parameters from full collusion reflects the case of of θ = 1
for all cross-firm conduct parameters.
Table 2.10: Estimation of single conduct parameter
Conduct Parameter Std. Dev.
General Mills .981*** .318
Ralston .070 .206
Kellogg .402*** .013
Post .102 .106
Nabisco .314*** .025
Quaker Oats .195*** .070
Type of competition Med. PCM Std.PCM
Estimated Conduct .494 .244
Multi-brand Nash .408 .285
Full collusion .631 .217
Table 2.11: Conduct estimates under symmetry to all firms
Note: P-values: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 ; Num Obs: 11760. Recovered
parameters from multi-product Nash pricing reflects the case of θ = 0 for all cross-firm
conduct parameters. Recovered parameters from full collusion reflects the case of of θ = 1
for all cross-firm conduct parameters.
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GM RA KE PO NA QO
General Mills 1 .886 .046 .555 .799 .982
Ralston 1 .932 .856 .070 .982
Kellogg 1 .841 .086 .022
Post 1 .456 .977
Nabisco 1 .018
Quaker Oats 1
Type of competition Med.
PCM
Std.PCM
Estimated Conduct .476 .193
Multi-brand Nash .408 .285
Full collusion .631 .217
Table 2.12: Conduct estimates under bilateral firm symmetry
Note: P-values: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 ; Num Obs: 11760. Recovered
parameters from multi-product Nash pricing reflects the case of θ = 0 for all cross-firm
conduct parameters. Recovered parameters from full collusion reflects the case of of θ = 1
for all cross-firm conduct parameters.
Cross-firm Θij = 0.25 Θij = 0.5 Θij = .75 Θij = 1
Conduct
Θij = 0 14.10 12.64 11.17 9.75
Θij = .25 11.35 9.84 8.35
Θij = .5 8.26 6.67
Θij = .75 4.90
Table 2.13: Selection method results using Rivers and Vuong test
Note: Test statistic follows a standard normal distribution. Num obs:
11760.
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Figure 2.1: Pre-merger market shares
Figure 2.2: Geographical location of stores in dataset
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Figure 2.3: Retail margin development per firm
Note: Retail margin proxy computed as 1−AAC, where AAC are the average
acquisition costs observed in the data for a firm per quarter. AAC reflects the
percentage of the retail price paid to a producer.
Note: Firm prices computed as deflated quantity-weighted average prices over
all products sold of same firm per quarter.
Figure 2.4: Average price development per firm
56
Figure 2.5: Price development of merging firms across stores
Note: Squares indicate quantity-weighted average deflated firm prices per store
per quarter. Lines indicate average firm prices across all stores.
Figure 2.6: Degree of joint profit maximization θ˜ over time
Note: Lines reflect degree of merging firms’ joint profit maximization over time, θ˜, for
different degrees of symmetric industry competition, Θ. Degree of joint profit maximization
is estimated separately for two-month intervals, and then harmonized between neighboring
intervals.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of random price coefficient α˜
Chapter 3
Contractual Structures and
Consumer Misperceptions –
Warranties as an Exploitation
Device
This chapter analyzes how contractual non-price features can be used to increase firm
profits in the presence of biased consumers. We develop a model in which some consumers
underestimate their costs of claiming a warranty payment. When a monopolist can signal
his product quality by offering warranties, this gives rise to two different forms of consumer
exploitation. First, he can offer contracts such that naive consumers overestimate the
product quality and pay more than their willingness to pay for a good. Second, he can
offer extended warranties for an excessive price, which also leads to overpaying consumers.
Our results show that industry competition among firms is not able to prevent naive
consumers from making non-optimal decisions. We introduce consumer protection policies
in terms of minimum warranty standards. Such policies can sometimes mitigate consumer
misperceptions, but also have the risk of distorting the market negatively if consumer
utilities are sufficiently differentiated. The results match several empirical facts that are
hard to explain with fully-rational consumers alone, namely the existence of consumer
quality misperceptions, the high profitability of extended warranties, and the profitability
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of mail-in rebates.12
1I would like to thank Erik Eyster, Michael Grubb, Volker Nocke, Matthew Rabin, Andre Stenzel, Elu
von Thadden, as well as participants at the CDSE Seminar Mannheim, EARIE 2011 Stockholm, and at the
ENTER Jamboree 2011 Tilburg for helpful comments. A previous version circulated under the title “When
Consumer Naivete´ affects Product Qualities – Warranties as an Exploitation Device.”
2This chapter extends my own work of Michel (2009). Several sections, especially the main monopoly
section, simultaneous oligopoly section, and the introduction largely include similar or identical parts compared
to my previous work. There are, however, several key contributions that are new to this thesis. First, the
previous work neither focused on nor explicitly mentioned extended warranties, which are a key policy
component of the chapter. Second, the sequential oligopoly section covering Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 is not
included either, as have all graphs in this chapter. Third, the analysis of consumer protection policies and all
other extensions in section 3.5 are new.
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3.1 Introduction
Recent work in economics and psychology has focused on how psychological biases
affect contract design, with a particular focus on the pricing of goods. In many instances
contractual complexity and other non-price features can also be reasons for consumer
confusion. A warranty applicable in case of a product breakdown is such a feature that
is included in many contracts. Next to the insurance effect, warranties often serve as a
signal for product quality.3
Warranty practices have recently come under scrutiny from policy makers. The
British Office of Fair Trading (OFT) concluded in its 2002 market investigation
that “The similar behaviour of electrical retailers limits consumers’ ability to make
accurate assessments of the value of buying extended warranties” and that “Consumer
protection in this market is inadequate” (OFT 2002). Subsequently, British legislature
added protection policies such as mandatory information to consumers that extended
warranties are optional, as well as a 45 day cancellation period. In 2011, the OFT
concluded that these measures were not reducing consumer confusion, and that that
common practices where “unfair and uncompetitive.” Further evidence suggests that
extended warranties are among the main profit drivers for retailers in the consumer
electronics industry.4 The market for redeemable rebates shares some patterns with
the warranty market. There is evidence that firms using redeemable rebates as a
promotional tool also because many consumers will not exercise them and end up
paying the full price, see for example Jolson et al. (1987).5
This chapter formalizes a model in which some consumers overestimate their probability
of claiming a warranty payment in case of a product failure. The model can match
the previously discussed stylized facts, i.e. the ex-ante excessive purchase of extended
3Erdem et al. (2010) and Choi and Ishii (2010) empirically analyze the main reasons consumers purchase
warranties. Both find a dominating effect of consumer quality signaling over other reasons, i.e. risk aversion
and price-prediction, respectively.
4See also “The warranty windfall” in Business Week, December 20, 2004. An extended warranty can also
be seen as an add-on good. Since the price of the warranty is observable, this is however not be consistent
with a “shrouded attribute”, as for example in Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
5Dhar and Hoch (1996) conduct field experiments in order to compare how consumers react to both
redeemable coupons and off-the-shelf price discounts. They find that coupons lead to both a higher increase
in the number of sales and higher profits compared to the price discounts, for only an average of 55% of the
consumers redeem the coupons.
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warranties, cases of consumer quality misperceptions, and the profitability of mail-in-
rebates for firms by introducing a single consumer bias. Moreover, it introduces a novel
form of consumer exploitation, namely an overestimation of product quality through
false inference via the warranty. We focus on optimal contract setting and consumer
choices both under monopoly and oligopoly, and analyze the effectiveness of consumer
protection policies in terms of minimum warranty standards.
The model’s intuition is the following: Many goods have a certain probability of having
a defect. This probability can be reduced by putting more quality into the production
process, which is costly for the producing firm. Firms can issue warranty rights to
consumers in terms of reimbursements or repair should a defect occur. When consumers
consider buying a good whose quality they cannot observe, they make inferences about
the quality that has been put into the good based on the predicted firm’s profits for
each possible product quality. Thus, they take into account a firm’s trade-off between
lower effort costs and higher costs of warranty payments. If all consumers are fully
rational, firms can use high warranties to signal high product quality to consumers and
therefore overcome a moral hazard problem.
However, we argue that some people underestimate the costs of returning the good
in order to request a warranty payment. Such costs can be for example additional
unforeseen shipment costs and opportunity costs of time spent sending the good back
to the firm.6 Because the firm’s reimbursements costs in case of a low product quality is
lower than expected by some consumers, a warranty grant may mislead such consumers
into thinking that a good has a higher quality than is actually the case. A wrong
inference about the quality of such a good through a warranty leads to a higher
willingness to pay for the good ex-ante, which can be exploited by a monopolist.
A second way for a monopolist to extract excessive rents from naive consumers is
to bundle a high quality product together with an extended warranty. Since naive
consumers make correct predictions about the quality of a product in such a case, the
monopolist benefits solely from an overprediction of the extended warranty valuation.
If the share of naive consumers is sufficiently high, both cases then lead to a market
6Further examples are the foregone utility of consuming features of a good that are still partly working, or
costs due to losing the warranty certificate of a good which is necessary to claim such a warranty.
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distortion that also persists in oligopoly.
The consumer bias is modeled as a systematic underestimation of the return costs
consumers incur when claiming a warranty. There is empirical, experimental, and
anecdotal evidence that such a bias exists in many markets. Evidence from both
psychology and marketing suggesting that a large fraction of consumers does not
complain to producers after having experienced a product failure. The TARP (1996)
study for example shows that conditional on having a service failure, more than 70% of
the customers do not report it. Chebat et al. (2005) argue that passive emotions such
as resignation and avoidance are a strong factor for this kind of behavior. Huppertz
(2007) finds a positive relationship between the leniency of the refund system and
the number of consumer complaints. This suggest that firms can influence consumer
response behavior via the complexity of their refund system.
Besides proposing a new concept of exploitation in this model, we are also interested
in the resulting implications on the introduction of consumer policies. One problem
consumer protection policies face is how to deal with supposedly naive or uninformed
consumers, and whether market competition alone can save naive consumers from
being exploited by firms. We introduce a policy in terms of a retailer’s minimum
warranty standards. The results show that these policies can overcome the problem
of consumer quality misperceptions. In case of extended warranties, however, these
policies have no effect on consumer welfare. When allowing for differentiated preferences
with respect to product qualities, such protection policies can even hurt consumer
welfare. From a consumer policy perspective, the literature reviews of Armstrong
(2008) and especially Vickers (2004) give a useful summary of the current literature.
Vickers also explores whether reputation can overcome a firm’s commitment problem
of providing a high quality to consumers. As a necessary condition, he finds that firms
in such an equilibrium have to make positive profits, however full efficiency in terms of
the optimal price-quality bundle can still not be achieved.
Our model relates to two different branches in economics, the literature on warranties
in industrial organization and contract theory, as well as the exploitative contracting
literature in the field of behavioral economics. Spence (1977) first formalizes a signaling
63
role of warranties. In his model, the firm side is perfectly competitive, and consumers
vary in their degree of risk-aversion. The marginal costs of consumption are increasing
and convex in the probability of the good working without a defect, which he shows
to be sufficient for warranties to be a potential signal for product quality in terms of a
good’s reliability. Emons (1988) focuses on the double moral hazard problem that arises
from warranties, i.e. the trade-off between a firm’s moral hazard of producing a low
quality good when only offering a low warranty and a consumer moral hazard that arises
because consumers do not use a good carefully when having a high warranty. Mann and
Wissink (1990) assess the effectiveness of money-back and replacement warranties both
when the product quality is observable and when it is not. They find that a money-
back warranty is always better except for an intermediate range of replacement costs
of the firm. Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) develop a model in which independent non-
manufacturing firms can enter the market to sell extended warranties in the presence
of a manufacturing monopoly. They find an ambiguous effect on the profits of the
manufacturer.
There is a growing literature of Industrial Organization models with a Behavioral
Economics foundation, see Ellison (2006) and DellaVigna (2009) for broad literature
reviews. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) focus on how firms can design contracts in
order to maximize their revenue when facing consumers with hyperbolic preferences.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) give a bounded rationality explanation for why firms
shroud prices of add-on costs in equilibrium. They develop a competitive model in
which the purchase of a base good implicates add-on costs later on. Sophisticated
consumers foresee the add-on costs even without advertising and substitute away
from them if they exceed the costs of a private substitution; in contrast, myopes
are unaware of these costs if information on add-on prices is shrouded. Armstrong
and Chen (2009) develop a model in which some consumers do not pay attention to
the quality component of products when making their purchasing decision under firm
competition. In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the existence of inattentative
consumers is responsible for postive firm profits. Drago and Kadar (2006) explain
empirical evidence for people not sending back mail-in rebates offered in combination
with the purchase of certain goods. They provide a model in which consumers have
both hyperbolic preferences and suffer from a so-called “sunk-cost” effect. They show
that a relatively short rebate period increases the number of people who complete the
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rebate, while a longer duration of the rebate period increases the number of consumers
who purchase a good but decreases the number of consumers who complete the rebate.
Inderst and Ottaviani (2013) explore the provision of consumer cancellation rights in
case sellers act as advisors with respect to the suitability of a product for a consumer.
They distinguish between a case in which all consumer’s anticipate the seller’s profit-
maximizing intentions and a case in which all consumers always believe the seller’s
claims.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the setup of
our model. The analysis of the monopoly and oligopoly settings is provided in Section
3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Section 3.5 develops extensions of the baseline model such as
rebates and consumer protection policies. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of
the results.
3.2 Monopoly Setting
3.2.1 Baseline model
A risk-neutral monopolist offers a good to a unit mass of potential consumers. The
monopolist can choose whether to produce a product of low quality qL or high quality
qH , with qH > qL; qH , qL ∈ [0, 1] . The quality of the good reflects its probability of
working properly, so that this probability is increasing in the quality of the good. A
good’s quality cannot be observed by the consumers prior to its purchase. Marginal
cost ci, i ∈ {L,H} in production is constant for both quality types, with cH > cL,
and there exists no fixed cost of production. The monopolist can issue warranty rights
in terms of a payment to the consumers for the event of a breakdown of the good. In
order to receive the warranty payment, the consumer has to send the good back to
the firm, which incurs a cost r to the consumer. A cost draw r is unknown for each
consumer prior to the purchase of the good. It is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F (r), with the according probability density function f(r). We
assume that consumers cannot affect the probability of a product failure, i.e. abstract
from consumer moral hazard. In the following we will assume that there are two kinds
of consumers: A fraction of 1 − θ consumers is “sophisticated” in the sense that they
correctly predict their distribution of return costs. The other θ consumers are “naive”
in a sense that they erroneously underestimate their costs of returning the good, i.e
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firm sets (γ, q)
consumer buys good
no purchase
Payoff: 0
no breakdown
breakdown
consumer returns
consumer does not
Payoff: -p
Payoff: -p-r+w
Payoff: I-p
Period 1 Period 2
(probability (1-q)
(probability q)
return the good
the good
Figure 3.1: Timeline of the game
their anticipated distribution of return costs. Despite having the same return cost cdf
F (r), as the sophisticated consumers, naive consumers think that their distribution
of return costs r can be described by a density function f˜(r) and the corresponding
cumulative distribution function F˜ (r). F first-order stochastically dominates F˜ (r), i.e.
F˜ (r) ≥ F (r)∀r ∈ (0,∞), with F˜ (r) > F (r) for the full support of F . This implies that
naive consumers underestimate their return costs for all cost levels.
Furthermore, it is necessary to define the consumers’ beliefs about the other players’
warranty return costs. Naive consumers believe that all consumers have the return
cost distribution F˜ (r) and that the monopolist has the same beliefs. Sophisticated
consumers correctly believe that all consumers have the return cdf F (r), but also
correctly foresee that naive consumers underestimate the return cost distribution of all
consumers, and that the monopolist shares the sophisticated consumers’ beliefs. Thus,
only sophisticated consumers and the monopolist are aware of a disagreement with
respect to the return cost distribution.
Our equilibrium results are also consistent with different belief structures, which will
be discussed later.
Structure of the game Figure 3.1 shows the timing of the game. In period 1, the
monopolist proposes a contract γ = (p, w) consisting of a price p and a warranty
payment w to the consumer in case of a return of a defective product, and sets a
quality q ∈ {qL, qH}. Each consumer values a functioning good with utility I > 0,
whereas the utility from a non-functioning good is normalized to 0. Therefore, in case
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that a consumer buys the good from the monopolist, she derives a net utility of I−p if
the product works properly. In case of a defect of the good after the purchase, she has
two options: If she sends the good back to the producer, she receives a compensatory
warranty payment and hence experiences a utility of −p+ w − r. In the case that she
does not return the good to the store she experiences a utility −p. Thus, she will only
return the good if the warranty payment exceeds the return costs, w ≥ r. Therefore, the
expected ex-ante utility in case of a defect is −p+ ∫ w
0
(w− r)f(r)dr for a sophisticated
consumer, and −p+ ∫ w
0
(w− r)f˜(r)dr for a naive consumer. The outside option of not
buying the good is set to 0.
In period 2, firms have to pay warranty payments to those consumers that claim the
warranty after their good has had a defect.
The discount rate between periods is equal to 1. Given a quality q, the expected utility
of consuming a good for the sophisticated consumer can be written as
V (q, γ) = qI − p+ (1− q)
∫ w
0
[w − r]f(r)dr.
With 1
F˜ (w)
∫ w
0
[w − r]f(r)dr ≡ E[w − r|w > r], this can be rewritten as
V (q, γ) = qI − p+ (1− q)F (w)E[w − r|w > r]. (3.1)
The expected utility of a naive consumer can be written as
V˜ (q, γ) = qI − p+ (1− q)
∫ w
0
[w − r]f˜(r)dr.
Define 1
F˜ (w)
∫ w
0
[w − r]f˜(r)dr ≡ E˜[w − r|w > r]. This then yields
V˜ (q, γ) = qI − p+ (1− q)F˜ (w)E˜[w − r|w > r]. (3.2)
We make the assumption that production and consumption of a high quality good leads
to a higher welfare than the production of a low quality good and that the difference
in terms of welfare is also high enough toovercome potential cost inefficiencies caused
by signaling the high quality through a warranty.7
7Assumption 3.1 can be rewritten as (qH−qL)I−cH−cL > cH−cLqH−qL . This gives a minimum required difference
between the willingness to pay differences and cost differences of high and low quality goods, respectively.
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Assumption 3.1. (Consumer preference for high quality)
(qH−qL)2I
1+qH−qL > cH − cL.
We will now explain our equilibrium concept.
3.2.2 Equilibrium concept
To solve this game of imperfect information, we use a modified version of the Weak
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept with an additional belief refinement. Consumers
have beliefs for each possible contract γ about the probability of the product being
of high quality. Consumers then buy one unit of the good when it gives them a non-
negative expected utility. Same as under the regular Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
concept, we require that sophisticated consumers’ beliefs match the true outcome
in equilibrium. Unlike in Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, we require the beliefs
of naive consumers to coincide with the hypothetical outcome in which the naive
consumers’ predicted distribution of return costs was the true distribution, i.e. in which
the naive consumers have true expectations about their own distribution of costs of
returning the good. This deviation from rationality is a crucial step in our model for
establishing false beliefs about a product’s quality. As a belief refinement, we impose the
condition that all consumers believe that the producers will select the product quality
that yields the highest profits given the contract γ.8 As a convention, if producers are
indifferent between providing a low or a high quality product for a given contract γ,
we assume that consumers believe that the firm will produce a good of high quality.
Given the structure of our model, it turns out that sophisticated consumers always
have correct beliefs about the whole game after observing the monopolist’s contract γ.
Therefore, all non-rational behavior in the market is caused by naive consumers. We
will now formalize the belief structure of the game.
3.2.3 Belief structure
Denote by µ(γ) a sophisticated consumer’s belief about the probability of the
monopolist’s product being of high quality after having observed the contract γ offered
by the monopolist. Analogously, denote by µ˜(γ) a naive consumer’s belief about the
probability of the monopolist’s product being of high quality after having observed γ.
8This refinement is similar to that in Emons (1988).
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Denote a sophisticated consumer’s predicted consumption utility after having observed
the contract γ by U(µ(γ), γ). This can then be written as
U(µ(γ), γ) = µ(γ)V (qH , γ) + (1− µ(γ))V (qL, γ). (3.3)
The analogous predicted consumption utility for a naive consumer after having observed
γ, U˜(µ˜(γ)), can be written as
U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) = µ˜(γ)V˜ (qH , γ) + (1− µ˜(γ))V˜ (qL, γ). (3.4)
A consumer will only buy a good if her predicted consumption utility is non-negative.
Thus, the sophisticated consumers’ demand for the good, D(γ), can be written as
D(µ(γ), γ) =
1− θ, if U(µ(γ), γ) ≥ 00, if U(µ(γ), γ) < 0.
The naive consumers’ demand can be written as
D˜(µ˜(γ), γ) =
θ, if U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) ≥ 00, if U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) < 0.
The monopolist’s profit maximization problem can then be written as
maxq∈{qL,qH},γ[D(µ(γ), γ) + D˜(µ˜(γ), γ)](p− (1− q)F (w)w − c(q)), (3.5)
where c(qL) = cL; c(qH) = cH .
We now characterize the threshold warranty level at which the monopolist is indifferent
between producing a good with low or with high quality. If the monopolist wants to
attract naive and sophisticated consumers, it is profitable for him to produce a high
quality good given a warranty w if p− (1− qH)F (w)w− cH ≥ p− (1− qL)F (w)w− cL
This is equivalent to
F (w)w ≥ cH − cL
qH − qL . (3.6)
Denote the minimum level of w that satisfies the weak inequality by wS. Recall
that sophisticated consumers believe both that naive consumers have the return cost
cdf F (s) and that the monopolist shares the same beliefs about naive consumers.
Therefore, sophisticated consumers will only believe that a good is of high quality if
69
w ≥ wS. We assume that sophisticated consumers’ beliefs are such that they reflect
the dominant actions of the monopolist given the contract γ. Thus, the beliefs µ(γ) of
the sophisticated consumers have the following form:
µ(γ) =
1, if w ≥ w
S
0, if w < wS.
(3.7)
This implies our belief convention that if the monopolist is indifferent between
producing a high or a low quality good, he will produce the high quality good. Because
naive consumers believe that their costs are distributed according to the cdf F˜ (s), the
constraint for a naive consumer if she believes that only naive consumers buy the good
given a contract γ can turn to
F˜ (w)w ≥ cH − cL
qH − qL . (3.8)
Denote the minimum level of w that satisfies this weak inequality by wN . Therefore,
given a contract γ from the monopolist, a naive consumer’s belief µ˜ will be of the
following form:
µ˜(γ) =
1, if w ≥ w
N
0, if w < wN .
(3.9)
Therefore, we again use the convention that if a monopolist is indifferent between
producing with high or with low quality, the naive consumers believe that the
monopolist is producing with high quality.
3.3 Monopoly Analysis
3.3.1 Derivation of the optimal contracts
Given the system of beliefs as addressed above, there are three potential candidates for
an equilibrium that can be broadly characterized by the quality level and by whether
sophisticated consumers or naive consumers become fully exploited by the monopolist:
1. No exploitation: All consumers buy a high quality good, and sophisticated
consumers have a 0 consumption utility: q = qH , µ(γ) = µ˜(γ) = 1, U(µ(γ), γ) = 0,
U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) > 0, D(µ(γ), γ) = 1− θ, D˜(µ˜(γ), γ) = θ
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2. Return cost exploitation: Only naive consumers buy a good which is of high
quality, and predict a 0 consumption utility: q = qH , µ(γ) = µ˜(γ) = 1,
U(µ(γ), γ) < 0; U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) = 0, D(µ(γ), γ) = 0, D˜(µ˜(γ), γ) = θ
3. Quality misperception exploitation: Only naive consumers buy a good which is of
low quality, and predict a 0 consumption utility: q = qL, µ(γ) = 0, µ˜(γ) = 1,
U(µ(γ), γ) < 0, U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) = 0, D(µ(γ), γ) = 0, D˜(µ˜(γ), γ) = θ
Because of Assumption 3.1 it is never optimal for a monopolist to set a low quality
while also attracting sophisticated consumers. When the monopolist wants to attract
both consumer types, whenever U(µ(γ), γ) > 0, the monopolist can raise prices without
losing consumer demand, which is thus profitable. When the monopolist is selling to
naive consumers only, analogously, whenever U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) > 0, the monopolist can also
increase the price without losing consumer demand, which therefore increases profits.
We will now explore the three different cases in more detail.
Case 1: Both sophisticated and naive consumers buy a high quality good. We
start this section with the following claim.
Claim 3.1. No contract with w > wS in which U(µ(γ), γ) ≥ 0 can yield a higher profit
to the monopolist than the contract specified by w = ws and U(µ(γ), γ) = 0.
Proof. Under the system of beliefs we have specified above, for every contract γ we
have U˜(µ˜(γ), γ) ≥ U(µ(γ), γ). If the monopolist wants to attract all consumers to
buy the good, the highest price the monopolist can set given any warranty level is a
price such that the sophisticated consumers are indifferent between buying and not
buying the good. Assumption 3.1 implies that it is more profitable for the monopolist
in such a case to sell a high quality product to the consumers than a low quality
product. In order to credibly signal a high quality level to sophisticated consumers, the
warranty level has to be at least wS. We now show that no warranty level can yield a
higher profit to the monopolist than the level wS. Denote the monopolist’s profit when
attracting all consumers by piS. Thus, the firm’s maximization problem can be written
as maxγ,qpi(γ, q) = p− (1−q)F (w)w−c(q) s.t. Iq+(1−q)F (w)E[w−r|w > r]−p ≥ 0.
The Lagrangean of the problem can be written as
LS = p− (1− q)F (w)w − c(q) + λ[Iq + (1− q)F (w)E[w − r|w > r]− p].
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Figure 3.2: Consumer willingness to pay given warranty level
Taking the derivative with respect to p yields λ = 1. Intuitively, this implies that the
monopolist will maximize the difference between the willingness to pay of sophisticated
consumers and the production costs. With
∫ w
0
rf(r)dr = [rF (r)]w0 −
∫ w
0
F (r)dr, this
can then be written as L = Iq − (1 − q)[∫ w
0
F (r)dr] − c(q). The first-order derivative
with respect to w then yields
∂LS
∂w
= −(1− q)[F (w)] ≤ 0∀w ≥ 0. (3.10)
Therefore, given w ≥ wS, the sum of consumer and producer surplus is never increasing
in w. From Assumption 3.1, it follows that it is always profitable to offer a high quality
qH to sophisticated consumers, such that w ≥ wS ; because only then µ(γ) = 1 is
fulfilled. Since the monopolist can at most obtain the whole rent piS + V (qH , γ) by
selling the good to the consumers, which happens when V (qH , γ) = 0, it follows that
he cannot earn a higher profit than when setting w = wS while setting a price such
that U(µ(γ), γ) = 0. This completes the proof.
Claim 3.2. Let F (w) be continuous and strictly increasing around wS. Then wS is the
unique profit-maximizing warranty level when selling to both consumer types.
Proof. This follows immediately from Assumption 3.1 and equation 3.10.
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Case 2: Only naive consumers buy a high quality good. Again, from Assumption
3.1 it follows that it is always profitable for a firm to make the naive consumers believe
that the good is of high quality. In this segment, it is thus best for the monopolist to
set a warranty level equal or above wS in combination with producing a high quality
qH . Denote the monopolist’s profit in this case by pi
S. The Lagrangean can be written
as
LNH = θ
[
p− (1− qH)F (w)w − cH + λ[IqH + (1− qH)F˜ (w)E˜[w − r|w > r]− p]
]
.
The first-order derivative with respect to p yields λ = θ. Plugging this in the above
equation and deriving with respect to w yields
∂LNH
∂w
= θ(1− qH)
[
F˜ (w)− F (w)− wf(w)
]
. (3.11)
The second-order derivative yields
∂2LNH
∂w2
= θ(1− qH)
[
f˜(w)− 2f(w)− wf ′(w)
]
. (3.12)
Equation (3.11) shows that without further restrictions, there is not necessarily a unique
maximum of LNH with respect to w. A sufficient condition would be w
2
> f(w)−f˜(w)
f ′(w)
for all w > wS. An optimal contract for this segment consists of a high quality qH , a
warranty level w that maximizes piNH , and a price such that U˜(1, γ) = 0.
We introduce another assumption in order to better characterize the monopolist’s
optimal strategy.
Assumption 3.2. (Bounds on consumer misperceptions) For all w ≥ wN , F˜ (w)
F (w)
<
1−qL
1−qH .
Case 3: Only naive consumers buy a low quality good. In this case, it is best
for the monopolist to set a warranty level strictly below wS but equal or above wN
in combination with producing the quality qL. Denote the monopolist’s profit in this
segment by piNL.
LNL = θ
[
p− (1− qH)F (w)w − cH + λ[IqH + (1− qL)F˜ (w)E˜[w − r|w > r]− p]
]
.
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The first-order derivative with respect to p yields λ = θ. Deriving with respect to w
yields The first-order derivative with respect to w yields
∂LNL
∂w
= θ
[
(1− qH)F˜ (w)− (1− qL)F (w)− (1− qL)f(w)w
]
. (3.13)
Under Assumption 3.2 and equation (3.13), it follows immediately that wN is the
unique optimal warranty level in this case. Figure 3.3.1 shows the maximum price each
consumer type is willing to pay given a warranty level w, and the resulting optimal
contracts for the monopolist in each case.
3.3.2 Monopolist’s optimal choice of a contract
Without further restrictions on the relationship between F (r) and F˜ (r), it is not
possible to characterize a unique warranty level by some first-order conditions. When
the monopolist is targeting naive consumers only in each case, it is clear that an
optimal warranty level exists for both the interval [wN , wS] and the interval [wS,∞). For
notational ease, we define the difference between a sophisticated consumer’s expected
net warranty benefit of a high quality good and the monopolist’s expected warranty
costs per product when offering a product of quality q as R(w, q) ≡ (1−qH)F (w)E[w−
r|w > r] − (1 − q)F (w)w. Analogously, define R˜(w, q) ≡ (1 − qH)F˜ (w)E˜[w − r|w >
r]− (1− q)F (w)w as the difference between a naive consumer’s expected net warranty
benefit of a high quality good and the monopolist’s expected warranty costs per product
when offering a quality q. As shown above, the value wS is already an optimal warranty
value if the monopolist targets both naive and sophisticated consumers.9 Denote a
monopolist’s optimal warranty level in the “return cost exploitation” case 2, i.e. when
only naive consumers buy a high quality good, as wNH ∈ [wS,∞). Analogously, denote
an optimal warranty level in the “quality misperception” case 3, i.e. when selling a high
quality product only to naive consumers, by wNL ∈ [wN , wS]. Furthermore, denote the
maximum profits the firm makes in the three different cases as: piS∗ when the monopolist
also attracts sophisticated consumers; piNH∗ when the monopolist sells a high quality
good to naive consumers only; and piNL∗ when the monopolist sells a low quality good
to naive consumers only. We are now able to characterize the size of the measure of
9Here, uniqueness for a maximum in this segment is neither required nor assumed.
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naive consumers, θ, for which the monopolist is indifferent between selling a good only
to naive consumers and selling the good to all consumers.
From Case 1 we can see that the monopolist’s maximum profit when attracting both
consumer types becomes
piS∗ = qHI +R(wS, qH)− cH . (3.14)
The maximum profit in Case 2 can be written as
piNH∗ = θ
[
qHI + R˜(w
NH , qH)− cH
]
. (3.15)
Finally, the maximum profit in Case 3 is
piNL∗ = θ
[
qHI + R˜(w
NL, qL)− cL
]
. (3.16)
Therefore, the difference between the maximum profit in Case 3 and Case 2 can be
written as
piNL∗ − piNH∗ = θ
[
(R˜(wNL, qL)− R˜(wNH , qH))− (cL − cH)
]
. (3.17)
As long as this expression is positive, it is more profitable for the monopolist to sell
a low quality product to the naive consumers than a high quality product. Selling the
good to both sophisticated and naive consumers is at least as profitable as selling to
naive consumers only if piS∗ ≥ max{piNL∗, piNS∗}. From equations (3.14)-(3.16), this
can be written as
qHI +R(w
S, qH)− cH ≥ θ[qHI + max{R˜(wNL, qL)− cL, R˜(wNH , qH)− cH}.
Solving this for θ, we obtain our first proposition.
Proposition 3.1. The monopolist prefers to sell to both consumer types rather than
to only naive consumers if and only if θ ≤ qHI+R(wS ,qH)−cH
qHI+max{R˜(wNL,qL)−cL,R˜(wNH ,qH)−cH} .
Proof. In text.
Intuitively, the monopolist will only choose to sell to naive consumers if the increase
in the mark-up from selling only to naive consumers offsets the drop in demand due
to not selling to sophisticated consumers. Figure 3.3.2 shows how the choice of the
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Figure 3.3: Profitability of contract choices by fraction of naive consumers
optimal contract is determined by the fraction of naive consumers θ. As explained
above, under some circumstances it will never be optimal for a monopolist to exploit
naive consumers’ quality misperceptions. This can be seen from the lower grey dotted
line IIIb. However, for sufficiently high θ, a monopolist will always have an incentive
to exploit the consumers’ return cost misperceptions. This is because the mark-up per
consumer is always higher for the case of return cost exploitation (dashed line II)
compared to the case when all consumers buy the good. The minimum threshold level
of θ for which it is profitable to target naive consumers only results at the point at
which the highest curve when targeting naive consumers only intersects with the flat
curve I when targeting also sophisticated consumers.
We now give a numerical example.
3.3.3 Example
Example 3.1. Suppose sophisticated consumers believe that the return costs s are
uniformly distributed over 0 and 9, r ∼ U [0, 9], while naive consumers believe that the
return costs rˆ are distributed uniformly over 0 and 4, rˆ ∼ U [0, 4]. Therefore F (r) =
r
9
, r ∈ [0, 9], and F (s) = 1∀r ≥ 9. Analogously, F˜ (r) = r
4
, r ∈ [0, 4], and F˜ = 1 ∀r ≥ 4.
Let qH = 0.75, qL = 0.25; cH = 3, cL = 1, I = 8. From equation (3.6), it follows
that µ(γ) = 1 whenever F (w)w = w
2
9
≥ cH−cL
qH−qL = 4. It follows that the weak inequality
binds with strict equality if wS = 6. From equations (3.8) and (3.9), it follows similarly
for naive consumers that µ˜(γ) = 1 whenever F˜ (w)w = w
2
4
≥ 4. This weak inequality
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binds with strict equality if wN = 4. From Claim 3.1, we know that no contract can
be more profitable when selling to both naive and sophisticated consumers than the
one specified by γ = (p, w) = (IqH +
∫ wS
0
F (r)dr, wS) = (6.5, 6), in which case it is
profitable for the monopolist to set q = qH . This yields an expected profit of pi
S∗ =
θ(p − cH − (1 − qH)F (wS)wS = 2.5. When selling to naive consumers only, one can
see that the two first-order conditions (3.11) and (3.13) are weakly decreasing in the
warranty level w for the relevant ranges, i.e. for w ∈ [4, 6] in equation (3.13), and for
w ∈ [6,∞) in equation (3.11). Therefore, the optimal contracts when only attracting
naive consumers are given by γ = (p, w) = (IqH +
∫ wNL
0
F˜ (r)dr, wNL) = (6.5, 4) when
providing a low quality, and γ = (p, w) = (IqH +
∫ wNH
0
F˜ (r)dr, wNH) = (7, 6) when
providing a high quality. The profit in the former case case is piNL∗ = 41
6
θ, and is thus
higher than in the latter case with with piNH∗ = 3θ. So it follows that the monopolist
rather sells to both consumer types whenever piS∗ ≥ piNL∗, which is equivalent to θ ≥ 3
5
.
3.3.4 Discussion of the monopolist’s choice
Exploitation device As shown before, the monopolist will optimally pick the quality-
contract combination that yields the highest utility among all combinations located in
the three segments above. Only the first case yields a non-negative consumer surplus.
In this case, the sophisticated consumers’ correct evaluation of the good saves the naive
consumers from becoming exploited because of their false beliefs about both the good’s
quality and their return cost distributions. This is optimal for the monopolist if the
increase in demand due to also attracting the sophisticated consumers compensates for
the lower maximum profit per consumer when also targeting sophisticates. When the
monopolist chooses to attract only naive consumers, he is faced with two choices: The
first choice is to set a high quality and a warranty level above wS in order to exploit naive
consumers’ false beliefs about their return costs. This is similar to many overconfidence
or self-control models in the literature because consumers only mispredict their costs
but not the good’s quality.10 The second possibility for the monopolist is to make
naive consumers believe that the good is of high quality and thus charge a high price
while producing a good of low quality. In this case, the main form of exploitation
works through successfully selling a low quality product for the price of a high quality
10See for example DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), or Eliaz and Spiegler (2006).
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product, while still exploiting false believes about consumer replacement costs.
As most Behavioral Industrial Organization models rely on exploitation through pricing
schemes, this usually works best through multi-period contracts, as for example in gym
contracts, or through hidden add-on prices not anticipated by some consumers before
consuming the good. Our model also has a multi-period characteristic in terms of a
possible future breakdown after purchasing the good which then leads to a replacement
stage of the game. However, the form of exploitation in the second case does not arise
from the pricing scheme, but from the warranty setting through false signaling. In the
two cases in which only the naive consumers buy the good, their willingness to pay is
above their “true” expected utility that takes into account the correct return cost cdf
F (w). Therefore, the consumer surplus in these cases is negative, and the monopolist
will benefit from it. In each case, sophisticated consumers always earn 0 consumer
surplus. Thus, naive consumers do not exert a negative externality on sophisticated
consumers.
Minimum assumptions on naivete´ In order to establish that naive consumers
misperceive product qualities in the model, the baseline setting also requires that these
consumers do not condition their beliefs on the overall profitability of the firm. This
means that these consumers do not ask themselves whether the offered contract to
consumers is the profit-maximizing contract for a firm, but rather whether given the
consumers in the market, it makes sense for the firm to produce a high quality good
as compared to a low quality good.
Prices as signal for demand In our model, unless there is a strict money-return
policy, i.e. w = p, prices cannot signal quality. This is because the revenue from prices
a firm receives is irrespective of the probability of a product breakdown. This in turn
implies that the compensatory warranty payment in case of a breakdown is the sole
channel for signaling the product quality.
3.4 Oligopoly
We present two different oligopoly settings. In the first one, firms set their contracts and
quality levels simultaneously. In the second one, firms set their contracts and qualities
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sequentially. Similar to the monopoly setting, all firms’ qualities are unobservable to
all consumers. After the firms have set their contracts and quality levels, consumers
observe all contracts and make inferences about each firm’s quality level. We now focus
on the consumers’ decision making process in more detail.
3.4.1 Consumers’ contract choices
After all firms have set their contracts, the consumers observe all contracts Γ =
(γ1, .., γM) and can choose whether to buy one unit of one of the M products. For
each contract γi, consumers assign beliefs about the firm i producing a product
of high quality. Denote µ = (µ1, .., µM) the vector of beliefs of the sophisticated
consumers about the probability of each firm being of high quality. Analogously, denote
µ˜ = (µ˜1, .., µ˜M) the vector of beliefs of naive consumers about the probability of
each firm being of high quality. Given the beliefs about the quality of each product
conditional on the contracts observed, a consumer chooses the contract that maximizes
her expected utility if this utility is non-negative. In case of K ≤M products give her
the highest expected non-negative utility, she chooses all firms with probability 1
K
. In
the case that a consumer has bought a good that breaks down, she can decide to take
the good back to the producer in order to claim her warranty payment. She will do so
if the warranty payment is at least as high as her return costs, i.e. if wi ≥ r. The utility
of a sophisticated consumer when consuming firm i’s good of quality qi ∈ {qH , qL} can
be written as
Vi(qi, γi) = qiI − pi + (1− qi)
∫ wi
0
[wi − r]f(r)dr. (3.18)
The predicted utility for a naive consumer of consuming one unit of firm i’s product
becomes
V˜i(qi, γi) = qiI − pi + (1− qi)
∫ wi
0
[wi − r]f˜(r)dr. (3.19)
Therefore, after having observed all contracts Γ = (γ1, .., γM), a consumer’s willingness
to pay for a good i ∈ {1, ..,M}, Ui(µ(Γ), γi), yields
Ui(µ(Γ), γi) = µi(Γ)Vi(qH , γi) + (1− µi(Γ))Vi(qL, γi). (3.20)
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Similarly, a naive consumer’s willingness to pay for good i can be written as
U˜i(µ˜(Γ), γi) = µ˜i(Γ)V˜i(qH , γi) + (1− µ˜i(Γ))V˜i(qL, γi). (3.21)
We will now focus on the firms’ demand and profit functions.
3.4.2 Firms’ maximization problem
We define the set of M firms {1, ..,M} ≡ M. For a firm i ∈ M, denote the set of its
competitors M−i ≡ M\{i}. The demand of sophisticated consumers for firm i’s product
given the set of contracts Γ and beliefs µ(Γ), Di(Γ, µ(Γ)), then becomes
Di(Γ, µ(Γ)) =

1− θ, if Ui(µ(Γ), γi)) > Uj(µ(Γ), γj)∀j ∈ M−i and Ui(µ(Γ), γi) ≥ 0
1−θ
K , if Ui(µ(Γ), γi)) ≥ Uj(µ(Γ), γj)∀j ∈ M−i, Ui(µ(Γ), γi)) = Uj(µ(Γ), γj)
for K − 1 different j ∈ M−i and Ui(µ(Γ), γi) ≥ 0
0, if Ui(µ(Γ), γi)) < Uj(µ(Γ), γj) for at least one j ∈ M−i
or if Ui(µ(Γ), γi) < 0.
The demand of naive consumers for firm i’s product given the contracts Γ and beliefs
µ˜(Γ) = (µ˜i(Γ), µ˜M−i(Γ)) , D˜i(Γ, µ˜(Γ)), turns to
D˜i(Γ, µ˜(Γ)) =

θ, if U˜i(µ˜(Γ), γi)) > U˜j(µ˜(Γ), γj)∀j ∈ M−i and U˜i(µ˜(Γ), γi) ≥ 0
θ
K , if Ui(µ˜(Γ), γi)) ≥ Uj(µ˜(Γ), γj)∀j ∈ M−i, Ui(µ˜(Γ), γi)) = Uj(µ˜(Γ), γj)
for K − 1 different j ∈ M−i and Ui(µ˜(Γ), γi) ≥ 0
0, if Ui(µ˜(Γ), γi)) < Uj(µ˜(Γ), γj) for at least one j ∈ M−i
or if Ui(µ˜(Γ), γi) < 0.
Therefore, given these demand functions, firm i’s profit function becomes
pii(Γ, µ, µ˜, qi) = [Di(Γ, µ(Γ)) + D˜i(Γ, µ˜(Γ))](pi − c(qi)− (1− qi)F (wi)wi). (3.22)
Firm i’s profit maximization problem can thus be written as
maxγi,qipii(Γ, µ, µ˜, qi) s.t. (pj, γj) ∈ arg maxγj ,qj pij(Γ, µ, µ˜, qj) ; ∀j ∈ M−i. (3.23)
3.4.3 Belief structure
Similar to the monopoly case, we impose an equilibrium refinement in which consumers’
beliefs follow the producers’ dominant actions, with the convention that when producers
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are indifferent between producing a high or a low quality product, consumers believe
that the firm produces a high quality product. Furthermore, we require the beliefs of
the sophisticated consumers to be true in equilibrium, and those of naive consumers
to be true under the hypothetical situation that their expected distribution of return
costs is their true distribution of return costs. Thus, sophisticated consumers’ beliefs
about firm i ∈ {0, 1} delivering a high quality product, µi(Γ), can be written as
µi(Γ) =
1, if wi ≥ w
S
0, if wi < w
S.
(3.24)
Given the set of contracts, Γ, from all firms in the market, including contract γi for
firm i, a naive consumer’s belief about firm i ∈ M−i being of high quality, µ˜i, will be of
the following form:
µ˜i(Γ) =
1, if wi ≥ w
N
0, if wi < w
N .
(3.25)
3.4.4 Simultaneous contract setting
We first make some useful definitions. Recall the optimal warranty levels for the three
different cases from the monopoly section, wNL, wS, and, wNH . Regarding multiplicity
of maxima in each segment, wNL and wNH will now always refer to the smallest of these
warranty levels, respectively. We now define the sum of marginal costs of production
and expected warranty payments of a firm as its quasi-marginal costs: cˆNL ≡ cL +
(1− qL)F (wNL)wNL; cˆS ≡ cH + (1− qH)F (wS)wS; cˆNH ≡ cH + (1− qH)F (wNH)wNH .
Furthermore, we define Λ as the difference in a naive consumer’s predicted utility of
consuming a product with warranty level wNH priced at quasi-marginal cost and of
consuming a product with warranty level wNL priced at quasi-marginal costs:
Λ ≡ U˜(cˆNH , wNH)− U˜(cˆNL, wNL)
= cH − cL − (1− qH)
∫ wNH
wNL
F˜ (r)dr − (1− qL)F (wNL)wNL + (1− qH)F (wNH)wNH .
When there are at least four firms in the market, we can show that there always exists
an equilibrium in which all firms make zero profits. This is because given our belief
refinement, in such a case Bertrand competition in both the segment for naive and the
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one for sophisticated consumers drives prices down.
Proposition 3.2. Let M ≥ 4. Then there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in
which at least two firms set γS = (pS, w
S) = (cˆS, w
S) and q = qH , and
i) if Λ < 0, at least two firms set γNL = (pNL, w
NL) = (cˆNL, w
NL) and q = qL
ii) if Λ ≥ 0, at least two firms set γNH = (pNH , wNL) = (cˆNH , wNH) and q = qH .
All sophisticated consumers will buy a product that maximizes their utility, while all
naive consumers will not.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3.2 implies that no matter how big the fraction of naive consumers in the
market, if there are at least four firms in the market, competition will lower the price for
all goods down to zero profits for all firms, while also providing an inefficient product
choice for naive consumers. This follows again from the wrong inferences consumers
make from the warranties. Intuitively, Bertrand competition drives prices down to the
quasi-marginal costs.
If less than four firms are present in the market, there is the problem that for many
parameter constellations there does not necessarily exist an equilibrium in which all
firms set contracts simultaneously. Here, due to the presence of naive consumers,
competition does not immediately move prices down to zero profits for the firms. Given
one firm sets a high warranty level and prices such that its profits are close to zero,
the other firm has an incentive to set a warranty level such that only naive consumers
believe the good is of high quality with a lower price than the good of the other firm, and
earn a positive profit. In order to overcome these problems, we introduce at a variation
of the game, in which firms set their contracts and qualities not simultaneously.
3.4.5 Sequential contract setting
If firms set their contracts sequentially, each firm has to take into account its followers’
strategies when setting its own contract and product quality. When there are only two
firms in the market, they both always make positive profits. This is because of the
existence of two different consumer types, namely sophisticated and naive consumers.
This ensures that the first firm can always set a price above its quasi-marginal costs,
for which it makes sense for the second firm not to undercut, but rather to fully serve
only one consumer type. This leads to our next proposition.
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Proposition 3.3. If M = 2, then in each equilibrium of the sequential contract setting
game, both firms make positive profits, and the following firm’s profits are at least as
high as the leading firm’s profits.
Proof: See Appendix.
If there are more than two firms in the market, then there is the problem of a potential
multiplicity of equilibria. We restrict our analysis to cases in which all firms in the
market have a positive market share. Under this restriction, there always exist two
types of equilibria. In the first equilibrium type, all firms set prices equal to their quasi-
marginal costs, and naive consumers always choose a non-utility maximizing contract.
In the second equilibrium type, the first M−1 firms all set the same contract, in which
they set prices equal to quasi-marginal cost, which is the optimal contract for one
consumer type. Firm M then sets a price above marginal cost and attracts the other
consumer type. Only if firm M serves sophisticated consumers in such an equilibrium,
all consumers make utility-maximizing choices. We sum this up in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.4. If M ≥ 3, then in all equilibria of the sequential contract setting
game in which all firms have positive market shares, at most firm M makes positive
profits. In case firm M makes no positive profit, this is sufficient for all naive consumers
to make non-utility maximizing choices.
Proof: See Appendix.
All in all, this section has shown that competition lowers prices, but often does not
prevent all consumers from making non-optimal decisions. In the sequential setting, if
there are only two firms in the market, it might still be possible that naive consumers
pay more for the good than their true willingness to pay.
3.5 Extensions
In this section, we present several extensions to the baseline model.
Money return policies A common form of warranties are money return policies, in
which case w = p. This puts some restrictions on the warranty-price relationship.
Interestingly, depending on the magnitude of IqH , it is never be optimal for the
monopolist to exploit naive consumers’ quality misperceptions. This is because offering
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a high quality product is optimal for the monopolist as soon as IqH + F˜ (w)E˜[p− r|p >
r] ≥ F (p)p ≥ cH−cL
qH−qL . Under Assumption 3.1, this always holds. Without the w = p
restriction, it is always possible for the monopolist to set a warranty level just
high enough to (falsely) signal a high quality product to naive consumers, while
extracting the willingness to pay by setting a high price. When also aiming the good
at sophisticated consumers, the w = p restriction decreases the overall welfare. This is
because once p > wS, which is always the case, there is a welfare loss due to the increase
in return cost frictions. When exploiting consumers’ return cost misperceptions only,
the monopolist’s profits can fall compared to the case when w = p does not hold. This
is because the monopolist has to steer the extraction of the consumer rent and to set
a price as to maximally distort consumers’ beliefs through the same channel.
Mail-in rebates Once there is no uncertainty about product qualities, our model can
be used to explain the existence of money-return mail-in rebate policies. Because of the
quality certainty, a consumer is always willing to pay a total amount I for a good. When
facing sophisticated consumers only, the contract γ = (p, w) = (I, 0) is always optimal.
However, when facing naive consumers only, the optimal contract can be written as
γ = (p, w) = (I + F (w)E˜[w− r|w > r], w), where w ∈ arg maxwI + F˜ (w)E˜[w− r|w >
r]− F (w)w. The optimal warranty level w therefore maximizes the term ∫ w
0
F˜ (r)dr −
F (w)w. This arises because by offering a coupon worth w, the monopolist can increase
the base price of the good, while exploiting the naive consumers’ false predictions about
the propensity to return a good. Furthermore, if the monopolist is able to offer a variety
of contracts to consumers, he can set both of the above contracts in order to maximize
his profits. This is a consequence of an absence of coupon payment in a contract targeted
towards sophisticated consumers. Therefore, both naive and sophisticated consumers
have the same valuation for the good, and only disagree in their valuation for the
“coupon-contract”. This is not an optimal strategy for the earlier sections in which
the monopolist has to signal a high quality to sophisticated consumers by offering a
warranty payment.
Other potential reasons for consumer misperceptions There are several channels
through which consumer misperceptions can be modeled. Inderst and Ottaviani (2013)
model a relationship between a financial advisor and a private investor in which
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granting a cancellation right to consumers can increase a seller’s credibility in a cheap
talk game. In contrast to our model, naive consumers in their model always believe
every advice the seller gives them, leading the seller always claiming that a product
is the most suitable for a consumer. Thus, a consumer’s key concern in their model
is the suitability of a product to the individual taste, which amounts to horizontal
product differentiation rather than vertical product differentiation as in our model.
From a policy perspective, their recommendations are essentially opposite to ours:
Cancellation rights will offset some bad advice from sellers.
Another way of viewing our model would be that the naive consumers do not see some
hidden warranty return costs, such as a consumer’s shipping costs if she wants to return
the product. These shrouded costs would lead to an overestimation of a warranty, which
would then cause a misperception of product qualities. This kind of consumer myopia
would be similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006). There are however several aspects that
differ from this model. First, we believe that the psychological costs of dealing with a
warranty reimbursement is very difficult to be unshrouded in a Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) fashion. Such costs are very hard to be quantified, and rival warranty suppliers
will hardly be able to unshroud such costs.11 Second, in our model, a warranty cannot
be simply seen as a substitutable add-on. This is because of the signaling role of a
warranty with respect to product quality.
Self-control costs due to hyperbolic discounting could be seen as one of the explanations
for return costs. However, a purely hyperbolic model would have to imply naivete about
self-control costs in each period in order to be able to predict a behavior of never
returning a product. In any other case, there would be a last period in which returning
the product to claim a warranty would be optimal. Drago and Kadar (2006) overcome
this problem in a mail-in-rebate setting by furthermore introducing a sunk-costs regret
effect.
Consumer policy intervention: minimum warranty level In the monopoly case,
it should be obvious that a policy intervention in terms of a minimum warranty
level wmin ≥ wS can only be useful if the monopolist is exclusively selling to naive
11According to OFT (2012), one of the major problems in the extended warranty business is that retailers
have a near-monopoly status at the point of sale. In such a case, firms have even less incentive to unshrouding
warranty costs.
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Without intervention w ≥ wS Change due to intervention
ΠNL > ΠS > ΠNH ΠS no more exploitation
ΠNL > ΠNH > ΠS ΠNH now return cost exploitation
ΠNH > ΠNL > ΠS ΠNH no change
ΠNH > ΠS > ΠNL ΠNH no change
Table 3.1: Effects of introduction of a minimum warranty level
consumers, and produces a low quality. However, even in such a case a minimum
warranty level might not prevent naive consumers from becoming exploited. This is
because of the existence of two different exploitative equilibria. If it is most profitable
to sell a low quality to naive consumers in equilibrium, but it is more profitable to sell
high quality goods to naive consumers when compared to selling high quality goods to
all consumers, then such a policy intervention is not sufficient to prevent exploitation
of naive consumers. Table 3.1 sums up the changes from such a consumer intervention
when the monopolist had initially been targeting naive consumers only.
Differentiated tastes for quality in oligopoly So far we have assumed a
homogeneous preference for product quality. When preferences with respect to qualities
are differentiated and for some part of the consumers, the added utility from higher
quality does not offset the increase in marginal costs, these consumers prefer low quality
products to be offered.
Assume that a share of µ consumers in the population has preferences u(q)I for
consuming a product of quality q. We refer to these consumers as low responsiveness
types, and to the others as high responsiveness types. In both groups, the share of naive
and sophisticated consumers remains distributed at fractions θ and 1− θ, respectively.
Assume further that (qH − qL)I > cˆS − cL > [u(qH) − u(qL)]I. This implies that the
difference in the marginal costs of production including warranty expenses between
a low and high product quality exceeds the difference in the consumption utilities of
low responsiveness types. Assume for example that u(qH) = u(qL) = IqH . This is an
extreme case, in which the low responsiveness consumers do not value any increase in
product quality. In such a case, one can show instances in which a policy intervention
in terms of a minimum warranty level is harmful to the low responsiveness consumers.
In monopoly, a shift from an exploitative low quality contract to a high quality
contract increases the utility of high responsiveness consumers. For low responsiveness
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consumers, however, when an increase in quality causes an increase in the price, such
an intervention hurts their consumption utility. In the oligopoly case, if the number of
firms is sufficiently high, then there always exists an equilibrium in the simultaneous
contract setting game in which sophisticated low types buy a low quality good without
any warranty offered. Imposing a minimum warranty level wmin = wS then has two
detrimental effects: Since all firms then offer high product qualities in the market,
naive high types are better off because of the intervention. However, low preference
consumers lose from such a policy intervention. Therefore, if the fraction of low
preference consumers in the population is sufficiently high, such a policy intervention
reduces overall consumer surplus.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter formalizes an economic model that captures several traits with
respect to consumers’ return behaviors, choices of extended warranties, and quality
misperceptions. The presented evidence suggests that return costs play a significant role
in the consumers’ complaint behavior. We show that wrong inferences about a firm’s
quality, which increase the consumer’s willingness to pay in the buying period, can lead
to consumer exploitation by firms once the share of naive consumers is sufficiently high.
Consumer policy interventions in terms of a minimum warranty payment can prevent
firms from selling low quality products. This does not always stop consumers from
becoming exploited by overpaying for an extended warranty contract. Competition
always decreases prices for the goods in the market. However, this does not crowd
low quality goods out of the market, and naive consumers often not buy their most
suitable product. Note that the implications of our model are in line with some specific
formalized psychological biases. One example is the concept of projection bias, which
was introduced by Loewenstein et al. (2003). Projection bias describes situations in
which people fail to fully project their future taste changes relative to their current
taste. In our case one could think of different states as instances in which consumers
are either “active” with respect to both the purchase or return of a good, or instances
in which they are “inactive”, and thus have higher return costs. Therefore, if consumers
always buy in an active state, they on average put too much weight on low return cost
events, and are thus also susceptible to exploitative contracts.
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We show that in a differentiated oligopoly, consumer policy interventions can hurt
overall consumer welfare because of restricting consumers with a low preference for
quality to purchase high quality goods. This illustrates one problem decision-makers
face when using behavioral models such as ours for policy purposes. Even though
consumer protection policies may prevent some consumers from making mistakes, it
can have adverse effects on other people because of restricting their choices. Therefore,
any such policy should be implemented with caution, and only after weighting its
advantages and disadvantages.
There are some important open questions that we have not addressed in this chapter.
First, it is of importance to understand to what extent consumers learn from previous
bad experiences. Agarwal et al. (2009) study how consumers’ behavior changes after
having to pay overlimit or cash advance fees in a certain month. They find that shortly
after such an incident, consumers avoid paying fees by changing their behavior, but
that in later months, they fall back into old manners and eventually pay higher fees
again. Second, we do not focus much on interactions between different consumers. We
believe that interactions between consumers, such as leadership of some consumers,
or the presence of network effects, can give further insights into the determinants of
contractual structures in the presence of consumer misperceptions.
3.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. Define a strategy si of a firm i as the triple (pi, wi, qi). We first consider the
case Λ ≥ 0. We show first that when M = 4, there exists an equilibrium in which two
firms play the strategy sS ≡ (cˆS, wS, qH), all sophisticated consumers buy from these
firms, two firms play the strategy sNH ≡ (cˆNH , wNH , qH), and all naive consumers buy
from these firms. From our belief refinements it follows that sophisticated consumers
assign belief µi = 1 about firm i’s product quality as long as wi ≥ wS. From Claim 3.1
and Assumption 3.1 it follows that the utility maximizing contract for a sophisticated
consumer includes a warranty level wS, which signals a high quality level qH . Because cˆS
is already the quasi-marginal costs for a firm that produces a high quality product with
warranty level wS, it follows that no firm can profitably deviate to attract sophisticated
consumers by playing a strategy different from sS, which yields 0 profits. Similarly, per
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definition, if Λ ≥ 1, a contract that maximizes a utility of a naive consumer includes
the warranty level wNH , which also implies the production of a high quality level for
a firm. Because cˆNH is also the quasi-marginal cost of a firm offering such a contract,
it follows that no firm can profitably deviate in order to attract naive consumers by
setting a contract that is different from the contract sNH , which also yields 0 profits.
Because both sS and sNH yield 0 profits, it thus follows that no firm can profitably
deviate. Assume now that M > 4. Then, once at least 2 firms play the strategy sS,
and two firms play the strategy sNH , then it follows again that no firm can profitably
attract any consumer type by setting a different contract.
Now consider the case Λ ≤ 0. We show next that when M=4, there exists an equilibrium
in which two firms play the strategy sS ≡ (cˆS, wS, qH), all sophisticated consumers buy
from these firms, two firms play the strategy sNL ≡ (cˆNL, wNL, qL), and all naive
consumers buy from two of these firms. The proof goes similar to the proof for Λ ≥ 0.
Again, in such a situation, it follows from Claim 3.1 and Assumption 3.1 that no
firm can profitably attract sophisticated consumers by setting a strategy different to
sS, which yields exactly 0 profit. Per definition, if Λ ≥ 1, a contract that maximizes
a naive consumer’s predicted consumption utility includes the warranty level wNL,
which also implies the production of a low quality level qL for a firm. Because cˆNL is
also the quasi-marginal cost of a firm offering such a contract, it follows that no firm
can profitably deviate in order to attract naive consumers by setting a contract that
is different from the contract sNL, which yields exactly 0 profits. Because both sS and
sNL yield 0 profits, it thus follows that no firm can profitably deviate. Assume now
that M > 4. Then, it follows again that once at least 2 firms play the strategy sS, and
two firms play the strategy sNL, then no firm can profitably attract any consumer type
by setting a different strategy. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. We denote the firm that sets its contract first as firm 1, and the second firm as
firm 2. Recall first, that per definition,
1.) U(cˆS, w
S) > U(cˆNH , w
NH) and 2.) U˜(cˆS, w
S) < U˜(cˆNH , w
NH). From this, it follows
that ∀θ ∈ (0, 1)∃ p1, > cˆS s.t.
∃p2 s.t.
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1. U(p1, w
S) > U(p2, w
NH)
2. and U˜(p2, w
NH) > U˜(p1, w
S)
3. and θ(p2 − cˆNH) ≥ (p1 − cˆS).
Therefore, there exists a strategy (p1, w
S, qH) with a price p1 for which firm 1 can ensure
strictly positive profits. But since the game is sequential and only has two stages, it
thus follows that firm 1 can always ensure positive profits. Next, we show, that firm
2’s profits in equilibrium must be at least as high as firm 1’s profits in equilibrium.
Suppose not. Then firm 2 can always just slightly undercut firm 1’s price while setting
same warranty level and product quality and therefore having a higher profit than firm
1, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. In the following, we will denote the ith firm to set its contract and product
quality as firm i. Consider M = 3, and Λ > 0. We first show that in this case, player 1
will never make positive profits. Assume the contrary. Then it follows that one of the
followers either will make 0 profit or set the identical contract. Furthermore, it follows
that player 1’s strategy s1 /∈ {(cˆS, wS, qH), (cˆNH , wNH , qH)} ≡ S∗1 . Focus now on firm
3. Given strategy s1 of firm 1 and strategy s2(s1) of firm 2 such that it makes non-
negative profits, since s1 /∈ S∗1 , this already implies that firm 3 can make positive profits,
because at least one consumer segment, i.e. naive or sophisticated consumers, does not
face a price equal to quasi-marginal costs. Therefore, by undercutting one of the two
predecessors in terms of price while setting the same warranty level, it can ensure a
positive profit. Focus now on firm 2. As long as s1 /∈ S∗1 , from the proof of Proposition
3.3 we know that firm 2 can now always set a contract s2 /∈ S∗1 , such that firm 3 will
set a different warranty level and firm 2 thus makes positive profits. However, in this
case, it can never be optimal for firm 2 to set s2(s1) = s1. Suppose s1 = (p1, w1, q1) is
such that s2(s1) = s1 would ensure firm 2 and firm 1 positive profits. In such a case,
firm 2 can strictly increase its profits by playing the strategy (p1 − , w1, q1), where
 is infinitesimally small. Therefore, firm 1 can never make a positive profit. Thus, it
follows that the only possibility for firm 1 of having a positive market share is whenever
s1 ∈ S∗1 . Denote such a strategy as s∗1. But from a backward induction argument it then
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follows that for firm 2 to have a positive market share, s∗2(s
∗
1) ∈ S∗1 . Otherwise, firm
3 could always profitably set a contract such that firm 2 would have 0 demand. But
then it follows that there are only 2 different types of equilibria. Whenever s∗1 6= s∗2(s∗1),
it follows that firm 3 will only have a positive market share without making negative
profits whenever s3(s
∗
2(s
∗
1)) ∈ S∗1 . In such a case, all sophisticated consumers will buy
a contract with warranty level wS at the price of the quasi-marginal costs cˆS, and
all naive consumers will buy a contract with warranty level wNH at the price of the
quasi-marginal costs cˆNH , which is clearly not utility maximizing. On the contrary, if
s∗2(s
∗
1) = s
∗
1, then it follows again from the proof of Proposition 3.2 that firm 3 can play
a strategy s3(s
∗
2(s
∗
1)) /∈ S∗1 that ensures a strictly positive profit. Now suppose that
s∗1 = s
∗
2(s
∗
1) = (cˆNH , w
NH , qH) Then it follows that firm 3 will maximize its profits by
setting w = wS, and p3 s.t. U(p3, w
S, qH) = U(cˆNH , w
NH , qH). In such a case it follows
that naive consumers will make profit maximizing choices.
Now suppose that M > 3. From a simple induction argument it follows again that
firm 1 will never be able to make positive profits in equilibrium. Conditional on firm
1 playing strategy si ∈ S∗1 , it then follows that all firms i ∈ {2, ..,M − 1} then always
have to play strategies si(s
∗
1, ...s
∗
i−1) ∈ S∗1 in order to have a positive market share
without having negative profits.
The proof for Λ ≤ 0 goes analogously, now with S∗1 ≡ {(cˆS, wS, qH), (cˆNL, wNL, qL)}.
This completes the proof.
3.B Different beliefs for naive consumers
Naive consumers only underestimate their own return costs It is furthermore
necessary to define the consumers’ beliefs about the other players’ warranty return
costs. Sophisticated consumers correctly believe that all consumers have the return
cdf F (r). Naive consumers are aware of the beliefs of the sophisticated consumers,
and also believe that sophisticated consumers have the return cost distribution F (r).
However, they disagree with the sophisticated consumers in that they believe that their
own return cost distribution is F˜ (r). Furthermore, both consumer types think that the
monopolist’s belief about the cost distribution is the same as their own. This therefore
results in two “agreements to disagree”, one between both consumer types, and one
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between the naive consumers and the monopolist. Such agreements to disagree are
present in several exploitative contracting models, see for example Eliaz and Spiegler
(2006).
Note that if a naive consumer believes that also sophisticated consumers will buy the
good for a w with wN ≤ w < wS, a naive consumer will only believe that the good
is of high quality if the fraction of naive consumers is sufficiently high compared to
the fraction of sophisticated consumers, because the naive ones know that at such a
warranty level the sophisticates believe that the good is of low quality. Recall that
the naive consumers (falsely) think that the monopolist shares the same belief about
the true naive consumers return cost cdf, F˜ . Under the assumption that these are the
true return costs, it would be unprofitable for a firm to set a low quality level given a
warranty level bigger or equal than wN when only selling to naive consumers.
Therefore, given a contract γ from the monopolist, a naive consumer’s belief µ˜ will be
of the following form:
µ˜(γ) =

1, if w ≥ wS
1, if wN ≤ w < wS and U(µ(γ), γ) > 0 and Condition 1 is satisfied
0, if wN ≤ w < wS and U(µ(γ), γ) > 0 and Condition 1 is not satisfied
0, if w < wN ,
(3.26)
where Condition 1 says that given demand D + D˜,
(D + D˜)[p− (1− qH)(DF (w)w + D˜F˜ (w)w)− cH ] ≥
(D + D˜)[p− (1− qL)(DF (w)w + D˜F˜ (w)w)− cL].
Therefore, we again use the convention that if a monopolist is indifferent between
producing with high or with low quality, the naive consumers believe that the
monopolist is producing with high quality. The first line of equation (3.26) refers to
the case for which the warranty level is so high that also sophisticated consumers
believe that it is more profitable for the monopolist to produce a high quality good.
The second line refers to the case in which sophisticated consumers infer a low quality
from the contract offered, but still have a non-negative consumption utility. Since naive
consumers have the same and correct belief about the sophisticated consumers’ return
cost distribution, they also infer that the sophisticated consumers think the good is
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of low quality. However, given naive consumers’ beliefs about their own return cost
distribution, when Condition 1 holds they believe that it is still more profitable for
the monopolist to produce a high quality good than a low quality good. The third line
present the opposite case, while in the fourth line the warranty level is so low that also
the naive consumers believe that it is always a dominant strategy for the monopolist
to produce a low-quality good.
As in the monopoly case, naive consumers’ beliefs do not depend solely on the warranty
for the good but also on the perceived demand from the sophisticated consumers. In
a case in which a firm sells a product to both sophisticated and naive consumers,
naive consumers will only believe that this firm will produce with high quality if this
is optimal given the return cost functions for both naive and sophisticated consumers.
This is because also naive consumers believe that sophisticated consumers will always
believe that the good is of low quality as long as w < wS. Therefore, given the set
of contracts Γ from all firms in the market, including contract γi for firm i, a naive
consumer’s belief about firm i being of high quality, µ˜i, will be of the following form:
µ˜i(Γ) =

1, if wi ≥ wS
1, if wN ≤ wi < wS and Condition 2 is satisfied
0, if wi < w
N
0, if wN ≤ wi < wS and Condition 2 is not satisfied,
(3.27)
where Condition 2 implies that given demand Di + D˜i,
(Di + D˜i)[pi − (1− qH)(DiF (wi)wi + D˜iF˜ (wi)wi)− cH ] ≥
(Di + D˜i)[pi − (1− qL)(DiF (wi)wi + D˜iF˜ (wi)wi)− cL].
Analogous to Condition 1 in the monopoly case, Condition 2 states that given firm i’s
demand from both sophisticated and naive consumers, from a naive consumer’s point
of view it is more profitable for firm i to produce a high quality good than to produce
a low quality good.
Chapter 4
Persuasive Advertising and
Cooling-Off Laws under
Non-Standard Beliefs
This chapter analyzes pricing and welfare in a model in which advertising is able to
influence a state-dependent psychological bias that consumers experience when making
purchasing decisions. Consumers attribute too much weight to their current psychological
state when making a consumption decision for the future, which amounts to a “projection
bias”. We focus on how the bias distribution within the population affects the market
outcome both under monopoly and competition. Unlike most of the persuasive advertising
literature, the model allows for an unambiguous welfare evaluation. We assess consumer
protection policies in terms of mandatory cooling-off periods. Our results show that if
the share of initially motivated consumers is sufficiently low, such protection policies will
decrease both overall and consumer welfare. For higher fractions of motivated consumers,
the two welfare standards can give opposing assessments.1 2
1I would like to thank Jana Friedrichsen, Paul Heidhues, Volker Nocke, Matthew Rabin, Xiaojian Zhao,
as well as seminar participants at Mannheim and at the Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Symposium 2011 for helpful comments.
2This chapter extends my own work of Michel (2009) and Michel (2007). Several sections of this chapter,
especially the introduction, the main model, the monopoly section, the duopoly section, and the welfare
section largely include similar or identical parts compared to my previous work. However, there are also
crucial differences compared to my previous work. First, previous work does not focus on one of the two key
questions in this chapter, namely the consequences of mandatory cooling-off policies on consumer and overall
welfare. Second, section 4.6, including Propositions 4.5 - 4.7 are not included either. Furthermore, the chapter
contains several new graphs, tables, and additional motivation.
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4.1 Introduction
It is common wisdom that one of the basic means of advertising is to persuade
potential customers to buy goods. Although many advertisements inform customers
about product features, a large fraction mainly tries to create emotional links between
the good and the costumer. Research from cognitive psychology has shown that people
who are in a specific emotional state tend to remember memories experienced in a such
state better than those experienced in a different state. A related concept, projection
bias, was introduced into the behavioral economics literature by Loewenstein et al.
(2003). When an agent experiences different states over time, for example being hungry
or satiated, motivated or unmotivated, this bias makes her attribute too much weight on
her current state when predicting her future consumption utility. Thus, she overpredicts
the likelihood of the current state in the future.
In this chapter, we model the effects of persuasive advertising as a change in the bias
consumers experience when predicting their future consumption utility of a good. In our
model, consumers are susceptible towards a projection bias. Advertising affects their
decision-making process by influencing the magnitude of the bias. This has two effects:
First, consumers who are unmotivated to buy a good and therefore underpredict their
future expected consumption utility have an increased probability of recalling favorable
memories. This in turn decreases their projection bias. Second, motivated consumers
attribute an even higher probability than before on being motivated in the future.
Advertising therefore further distorts their predicted future consumption utilities and
enhances their bias.
We want to answer two main questions. The first question is how equilibrium prices,
advertising intensities, and welfare are affected by the state and bias distributions in
the population. There are many instances in which consumers’ perceptions with respect
to a good temporarily change due to a specific incident. Examples are the unexpected
success of a domestic athlete in a sport, increased consumer insecurity because of new
phenomena such as mad cow disease for beef consumption, or a rapid change in weather
95
conditions.3. In this case, our interest lies in how such incidents affect a firm’s strategy
The second question is how consumer protection policies in the form of mandatory
cooling-off periods affect overall welfare. Such policies are often advised to prevent
consumers from making impulsive buying decisions. A convenient aspect of the
model is that, unlike in most other persuasive advertising models, a consumer’s true
consumption utility is does not change due to the advertising intensity. This leads to an
unambiguous welfare evaluation, independent of using an advertising or non-advertising
welfare standard.
Our results indicate that the effects of advertising on pricing and consumer welfare
under monopoly crucially depend on whether advertising induces the monopolist to
target new consumer types. If a monopolist sells only to motivated consumers without
advertising, but also includes unmotivated consumers under advertising, this decreases
market prices and increases consumer welfare. In any other case advertising causes
an increase in prices and a decrease in consumer welfare. From an overall welfare
standpoint, advertising can increase welfare also in cases in which only motivated
consumers buy the good both with and without advertising.
The effects of cooling-off periods depend on the fraction of initially motivated
consumers in the market. We show that whenever the fraction of motivated consumers
in the population is sufficiently low, such policies decrease both overall and consumer
welfare. A mandatory cooling-off law then causes a welfare loss due to the foregone
utility of not consuming the good in the cooling-off period. If the fraction of motivated
consumers is sufficiently high, this is sufficient for the policy to increase consumer
welfare, because it makes a monopolist change his optimal strategy from targeting
only motivated consumers to targeting all consumers. For intermediate fractions of
motivated consumers in the industry, overall welfare may still decrease if the foregone
consumption utility of motivated consumers exceeds the additional consumption utility
of unmotivated consumers.
As an intuition for our model, consider the following example. Imagine a TV network
that owns the license for showing live games of a professional sports league on pay-TV
3Conlin et al. (2007) find evidence for a projection bias in catalogue order after abrupt weather changes.
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or over the Internet. It offers contracts to consumers; in this example only a season
ticket contract is offered. In addition, the network also runs advertisements on different
channels to promote subscriptions. Let us further assume that, at the beginning of the
season, people are either motivated about buying the good or skeptical about it. In
a motivated state, consumers always like to watch sports and think that it would be
a good choice to buy the good even before it is advertised. Skeptical consumers, on
the other hand, are afraid of paying too much for a season ticket and have a lower
valuation for a season ticket than motivated consumers. It seems natural to us that the
firm uses exciting scenes from earlier seasons in order to motivate potential consumers.
When confronted with such scenes, viewers think that it is more likely that they will
appreciate the good. This increases their predicted consumption utility when buying
the season ticket. There are also real life examples for such behavior: Sport networks
such as NBA TV often show some teaser highlights when advertising their season
tickets.
We believe that motivated consumers further underestimate the possibilities of boring
games or of a satiation effect after having watched several games. Consequently, they
are willing to buy a good under these circumstances for a price for which they would not
buy the good if they were fully rational.Skeptical consumers are reminded of previous
sport events they liked as well, which decreases their degree of pessimism with respect
to the purchase of the good. A monopolist has to decide whether a price should be set
that only attracts the motivated consumers or whether the skeptical consumers should
also be attracted by setting a lower price. The ratio of motivated to unmotivated
consumers is crucial for this decision.
Loewenstein et al. (2003) were the first to explicitly define the notion of projection
bias and also give the formal basis for our model. Their concept focuses on a bias
that consumers experience when predicting their utility of consuming a good in a
different state in the future. This projection bias occurs because people are said to rely
partly on their current state of mind when making a prediction about a future state.
Since their predicted utility differs from the expected utility of a rational consumer,
this can lead to non-optimal behavior. As a formal illustration of the projection bias,
Loewenstein et al. (2003) present a model in which consumers decide whether or not
to buy a durable good. Consumers exhibit day-to-day fluctuations with respect to
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the valuation of a good they can consume in several periods. When in a state with
a relatively high valuation, a consumer overpredicts his possible consumption utility.
Consequently, the consumer would buy the good even for a price so high as to have a
negative expected utility without a bias. At the same time, when being in a state with
a low valuation, he would not want to buy the good for a price that would give him
a positive expected consumption utility when making rational predictions about the
future. Conlin et al. (2007) use a structural model in order to estimate the magnitude
of a potential projection bias with respect to weather changes when consumers make
catalogue orders for clothing. They find a significant projection bias when consumers
are predicting their future tastes in this case.
The work on emotion and cognition in the branch of the cognitive psychology literature
can give further intuitions for the existence of a projection bias. In our context,
the concepts of mood-state dependent retrieval and mood congruity are of particular
interest. Mood congruity “describes the case when people in a good mood remember
emotionally positive material better than those in a bad mood, whereas the opposite is
true for emotionally negative material”(Eysenck and Keane 1993, p. 443.). If a person
finds herself in a happy mood, for example, under mood congruity she is thus said
to remember emotionally positive characteristics better than negative ones. “Memory
is said to be mood-state dependent in case the memories that subjects store when
they are in one emotional state are more retrievable later if they re-enter that same
emotional state; and their recall is worse if they attempt recall in a different emotional
state from original learning”(Bower 1992, p.22). Braun (1999) analyzes the effects
of post-experience advertising on consumer memory. She finds that post-experience
advertising can make memories about a product experience more appealing. Also
negative experiences are perceived more favorably.
There is a large and diverse literature on the different effects of advertising, see Bagwell
(2007) for a broad overview of the advertising literature. As Bagwell points out,
empirical evidence suggests that no theoretical approach seems to work in all cases.
In Bloch and Manceau (1999), consumers’ tastes are non-uniformly differentiated on
a line and firms are located at the ends of the line. Bloch and Manceau explore cases
where either both firms are owned by a multi-product monopolist or by competing
firms. At most one firm is allowed to advertise in their model. If a firm advertises,
this causes a shift in the distribution of consumers’ tastes; these then move closer to
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the advertising firm. For the class of log-concave distributions, Bloch and Manceau
show that a multi-product monopolist has an incentive to advertise the more favored
product to generate an even more biased distribution. Bernheim and Rangel (2004)
provide a model in which agents face stochastically varying environmental impulses
over time that influence the propensity to consume an addictive substance. In a “cold”
mode, agents choose according to their true preferences, while in a “hot” mode, their
brain processes suffer from a distorted forecast mechanism. In a dynamic programming
framework, such a distortion can lead to a consumption of the addictive substance
which in turn increases the probability of being in a hot mode in the future.
This chapter also relates to a small literature of marketing models with a behavioral
economics foundation. Ho et al. (2006) discuss how several behavioral economics
concepts, such as reference dependence and hyperbolic discounting, can be implemented
in a marketing context.
Section 4.2 presents the baseline model. The monopoly and oligopoly outcomes are
analyzed in section 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. In section 4.5, we present welfare
evaluations, and analyze a mandatory cooling-off periods in section 4.6. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 The Model
A monopolist is located at one point on a line of infinite length and offers a single good
to potential consumers, whose tastes are uniformly distributed on the line. Consumers
first make the decision of whether or not to buy a good and consume it at a later point.
This applies to nearly all forms of both internet and catalogue shopping of commodity
goods. We assume that there is no depreciation of the good between these two periods,
i.e. we have a unit discount rate. Furthermore, each consumer either no or exactly one
good. Each consumer has two potential states. We refer to these as being motivated
about a good, o, and being unmotivated about a good, o. Depending on the states, the
associated utilities of consuming an ideal product c, i.e. one that perfectly matches a
consumer’s tastes, is u(c, o) for a motivated consumer, and u(c, o) for an unmotivated
consumer. A consumer’s consumption utility is higher in a motivated state than in an
unmotivated state, u(c, o) > u(c, o) > 0 . The utility from not consuming the good is
set to 0 for both states of the consumer. This reflects the consumption of another good
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as an outside option for which the consumer does not experience a projection bias in
predicting her consumption utility. Consumers are aware of the fluctuations concerning
their valuations of a good. Hence, they form predictions about how likely it is that they
will be motivated when consuming the good in a later period. A rational consumer
assigns a probability q ∈ (0, 1) to the event of being motivated when consuming the
good, and a probability 1 − q to the event of being unmotivated when consuming it.
The expected utility of consuming an ideal product is thus the weighted sum of the
utilities in the two states, namely being motivated and being unmotivated. This can
be written as
u(c) = qu(c, o) + (1− q)u(c, o), q ∈ (0, 1). (4.1)
Note that when a consumer has no bias, the expected future consumption utility is
independent of the state in which she makes her buying decision. A bias occurs in our
model when consumers make their buying decisions. In such a situation a consumer
finds herself either in a motivated or in an unmotivated state. Motivated consumers
overpredict the utility of buying the good whereas unmotivated consumers underpredict
it. Loewenstein et al. (2003) refer to such time-inconsistencies as a projection bias. Let
u˜(c|o) denote the predicted utility of consuming a good in the consumption period
while being in the state o in the buying period. This results in the following definition
of a projection bias:
Definition (Projection Bias) 4.1. Predicted utility exhibits a projection bias if there
exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that for all c,o: u˜(c|o) = (1− α)u(c) + αu(c, o).
Note that this definition extends the one of Loewenstein et al. (2003).4 The difference is
that in their model, Loewenstein et al. deal with the predicted utility of a single state,
whereas we incorporate agents who predict their expected utility of a combination of
states. We believe that our specification better describes the decision-making processes
of many markets, because it reflects a possible uncertainty in the consumption utility.
If a consumer buys a new computer game, for example, she does not know in advance
how much she will enjoy playing it.
In period 1, consumers find themselves in the motivated state with probability θ ∈
4In particular, Loewenstein et al. (2003) define a projection bias in the following way: “Predicted utility
exhibits simple projection bias if there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that for all c, s, and s′, u˜(c, s|s′) = (1−α)u(c, s)+
αu(c, s′).”
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(0, 1), and in the unmotivated state with probability 1 − θ. The probability θ in our
model is independent of the probability q of having a high valuation for the good
in the second period. This enables us to explore cases in which certain outside events
might cause systematic differences between the probabilities of being in certain states in
different periods. For example, during Olympic games people might be more motivated
to buy sports equipment than before or after the event. In our model, θ > q reflects
such a case.
We now introduce our advertising concept. We assume that advertising increases the
positive projection bias for motivated consumers and decreases the negative bias for
unmotivated consumers. One intuition for these assumptions is as follows: If advertising
increases the emotional attachment to a good, a key purpose of advertising, people
are supposed to value the good more highly and are consequently also willing to pay
more for its consumption. We believe that work from cognitive psychology give an
explanation for a projection bias: Due to mood-state dependent recall, people build
their expectations based on state-correlated probabilities.
For simplicity reasons, we restrict our analysis to only two advertising intensities,
ψ ∈ {0, 1}. We distinguish between the bias of a motivated consumer, α(ψ), and
the bias of an unmotivated consumer, α(ψ). Advertising tries to emotionally attach
the consumers to their goods by creating a higher emotional captivity associated with
positive or sometimes also with scary moods. Since advertising only gives positive
associations about the good, this increases the memory selectivity in the case of
a motivated consumer and reduces the selectivity towards negative thoughts of an
unmotivated consumer. Thus, α(1) > α(0), and α(1) < α(0).
The price p of the monopolist’s good, as well as the distance of the good’s product
designs, i, from the consumer’s original preferences , x, affect her utility negatively in a
linear way. In the following, we normalize the monopolist’s location to the point i = 0
on the line. The consumption utility of a consumer located at x ∈ (−∞,∞) who is in
state o for the good, U˜x(c|o), thus becomes
U˜x(c|o) = u˜(c|o)− pi − t|x|; t > 0. (4.2)
u˜(c|o) is the perceived expected utility for consuming her ideal variety of the good
produced by the monopolist when in state o, and t is a differentiation parameter. Note
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Monopolist sets price p Motivated (fraction θ) and Consumption stage
and advertising intensity
ψ ∈ {0, 1}
unmotivated (1− θ) consumers
make purchase decision
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2
Figure 4.1: Structure of the game
that the notion “ideal product variety” refers to the horizontal differentiation in our
market. In that way, if a product differs from a consumer’s ideal variety, she ends up
having a lower utility than for consuming a product that matches her ideal preferences
and has the same price. This implies that the effect of advertising on predicted utility
is independent of the consumer’s horizontal preferences, i.e. her location on the line.
The reservation utility U of not consuming a good is 0: U(0|o) = 0 ∀o.
Given a consumer’s upward bias function α(ψ), the definition for a consumer’s
predicted consumption utility in state o can then be rewritten as
u˜(c|o) = (1− α(ψ))u(c) + α(ψ)u(c, o) = (1− q)α(ψ)(u(c, o)− u(c, o)) + u(c). (4.3)
The first term, α(ψ)(1 − q)(u(c, o) − u(c, o)), can be interpreted as the additional
predicted utility attributable to the upward bias. This markup consists of two
components; the upward-bias α(ψ) itself, which varies with the advertising intensity ψ;
and a fixed upward utility component for a given probability q, (1−q)(u(c, o)−u(c, o)).
We define this component as V (q) ≡ (1−q)(u(c, o)−u(c, o)). Therefore, for a motivated
consumer, we can rewrite the predicted utility as
u˜(c|o) = α(ψ)V (q) + u(c). (4.4)
Similarly, for the unmotivated consumers, the definition of the utility function under
projection bias can be rewritten as u˜(c|o) = u(c) + α(ψ)q[u(c, o) − u(c, o)], where
q[u(c, o)−u(c, o)] denotes the fixed downward utility component, and α(ψ) the variable
downward bias. Define the fixed downward utility as V (q) ≡ q(u(c, o) − u(c, o)). This
gives us another expression for the predicted utility for unmotivated consumers:
u˜(c|o) = α(ψ)V (q) + u(c). (4.5)
We can rewrite the definitions for the predicted utility in each state to emphasize
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consumers mispredicting the actual probabilities of being in a certain state in the
future. Define q˜ ≡ (1 − α)q + α > q, and qˆ ≡ (1 − α)q < q. Then we obtain
the following expression for the predicted utilities of motivated and unmotivated
consumers, respectively:
u˜(c|o) = q˜u(c, o) + (1− q˜)u(c, o); u˜(c|o) = qˆu(c, o) + (1− qˆ)u(c, o). (4.6)
We assume that production of the good is free, but positive advertising, ψ = 1, incurs
a cost s(ψ): Therefore, s(0) = 0 and s(1) > 0.
We assume that consumers are unaware of their projetion bias. Therefore, they
take their predicted future consumption utility for their unbiased expected future
consumption utility. This then leads to consumers maximizing their their predicted
utility in the buying period. The monopolist is aware of consumers suffering from
projection bias, and maximizes his profits while anticipating consumers’ behavior
correctly. We will now focus on the monopolist’s optimal decision-making.
4.3 Monopoly Analysis
The monopolist’s decision problem consists of setting the optimal price p and
advertising intensity ψ as to maximize his profits.
First, we derive the monopolist’s demand function. The monopolist’s total demand,
D(p, ψ), is the sum of the demand of motivated consumers, D(p, ψ), and unmotivated
consumers, D(p, ψ): D(p, ψ) = D(p, ψ)+D(p, ψ). The demand of motivated consumers
is
D(p, ψ) = 2θmax
{
α(ψ)V + u(c)− p
t
, 0
}
.
Similarly, the demand of unmotivated consumers is
D(p, ψ) = 2(1− θ) max
{
α(ψ)V + u(c)− p
t
, 0
}
.
Let x(p, ψ) ≡ max{0, α(ψ)V+u(c)−p
t
} be the distance from the monopolist to
the most distant motivated consumers who purchase a good, and let x(p, ψ) ≡
max{0, α(ψ)V+u(c)−p
t
} be the distance from the monopolist to the most distant
unmotivated consumers who purchase a good, respectively. This yields D(p, ψ) =
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2θx(p, ψ), and D(p, ψ) = 2(1 − θ)x(p, ψ) as expressions for demand. The firms’
maximization problem can be expressed as
max
p,ψ
Π(p, ψ) = D(p, ψ)p− s(ψ).
The monopolist’s demand function has a kink because of the different consumer states
in the buying period. Therefore, there exist two equilibrium candidates. Based on the
fraction of motivated consumers, θ, the monopolist has to decide whether to set a price
so high as to only attract motivated consumers or whether to set a price that also
attracts some unmotivated consumers.
Monopolist sells to both motivated and unmotivated consumers A candidate
equilibrium price in this segment has to lie within the price range p ∈ [0, p), where
p ≡ α(ψ)V +u(c). Under this condition, differentiating the monopolist’s profit function
with respect to p yields the first-order condition
∂Π
∂p
=
2
t
[θαV + (1− θ)αV + u(c)− 2p] = 0.
From the above equation, it follows that the price when selling to both consumer types
is
p =
1
2
[u(c) + θ(α(ψ∗All)V + (1− θ)α(ψ∗All)V )]. (4.7)
Necessary, but not sufficient, for this price to be optimal is that, given the price p
and advertising intensity ψ∗All, the demand of unmotivated consumers, D(p, ψ∗All), is
positive. This will only be the case if p < α(ψ∗All)V , which can be rewritten as θ <
u(c)+α(ψ∗All)V
α(ψ∗All)V−α(ψ∗All)V . When targeting both consumer types, the monopolist will optimally
set the advertising intensity according to the following rule:
ψ∗All =
0, if [θα(1)V + (1− θ)α(1)V + u(c)]
2 − [θα(0)V + (1− θ)α(0)V + u(c)]2 ≤ 2ts(1)
1, if [θα(1)V + (1− θ)α(1)V + u(c)]2 − [θα(0)V + (1− θ)α(0)V + u(c)]2 ≥ 2ts(1)
In such a case, the monopolist’s profit depends only on the advertising intensity ψ∗All,
and can be expressed as
ΠAll(ψ∗All) =
1
2t
[θα(ψ∗All)V + (1− θ)α(ψ∗All)V + u(c)]2 − s(ψ∗All). (4.8)
Monopolist only sells to motivated consumers Intuitively, such a case can only be
optimal if, for a given price p and advertising intensity ψ, no unmotivated consumer
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but at least some motivated consumers demand the good, i.e. if p ∈ P ≡ [u(c) +
α(ψ)V , u(c) + αV ). Clearly, each price equal or above p ≡ u(c) + α(ψ)V cannot be
optimal, for it always yields the monopolist a non-positive profit, which cannot be
optimal, given that a lower price leads to a positive profit. Therefore, for a price in this
interval, differentiating the monopolist’s profit function with respect to p yields
∂Π
∂p
=
2θ
t
[u(c) + αV − 2p] = 0.
We denote the monopolist’s optimal advertising intensity in this segment by ψ∗Mot.
The optimal advertising level depends on the relationship between advertising costs
and increase in consumer willingness to pay due to advertising. It is defined by
ψ∗Mot =
0, if θ[(α(1) + α(0))V + u(c)][(α(1) + α(0))V ] ≤ 2ts(1)1, if θ[(α(1) + α(0))V + u(c)][(α(1) + α(0))V ] ≥ 2ts(1).
The monopolist’s optimal price in this case is given by
p =
1
2
[u(c) + α(ψ∗Mot)V ], (4.9)
The monopolist’s profit in this segment, ΠMot, as a function of ψ∗Mot while solving for
the optimal price, can be expressed as
ΠMot(ψ∗Mot) =
θ
2t
[α(ψ∗Mot)V + u(c)]2 − s(ψ∗Mot). (4.10)
Given the specific bias functions, whether or not to sell a good only to motivated
consumers depends on the fraction of motivated consumers in the market in the
first period. For our welfare analysis, it will be helpful to focus on the conditions
under which it is best for the monopolist to sell also to unmotivated consumers
both under advertising and when advertising is not feasible. We can show as a
benchmark that if advertising is not feasible, there exists a unique threshold level
θ for which a monopolist is indifferent between attracting both consumer types and
attracting motivated consumers alone. When advertising is feasible, there is no clear
threshold level. This is because the optimal advertising intensity for the monopolist
differs when attracting only motivated consumers or attracting both motivated and
unmotivated consumers. From equations (4.8) and (4.10) we obtain the expressions
for a firm’s optimal profit, given the optimal advertising intensities ψ∗Mot and ψ∗All.
The monopolist will only attract both consumer types whenever 1
2t
[θα(ψ∗All)V + (1−
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θ)α(ψ∗All)V + u(c)]2 − s(ψ∗All) ≥ θ
2t
[α(ψ∗Mot)V + u(c)]2 − s(ψ∗Mot). Lemma 4.1 sums
up these results.
Lemma 4.1. When advertising is feasible, a monopolist will set a price to attract both
consumer types whenever ΠAll(ψ∗All) ≥ ΠMot(ψ∗Mot).
When advertising is not feasible, a monopolist will set a price as to attract both
consumer types, if and only if θ ≤
(
α(0)V+u(c)
α(0)V−α(0)V
)2
and α(0)V + u(c) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, when advertising increases unmotivated consumers’ demand sufficiently
more than motivated consumers’ demand, this can lead to circumstances for which
the monopolist sells to both consumer types under advertising and only to motivated
consumers when advertising is not feasible. Advertising can also cause a fall in the
monopoly price in this case. Empirical evidence on the relationship between price
and advertising is ambiguous, but in some studies this type of inverse relationship
is documented, see for example Bagwell (2007), pp. 1743-1746. Our model allows both
for a positive and a negative correlation between monopoly price and advertising, which
differs from some models in the literature, see for example Dixit and Norman (1978),
where the price is assumed to be weakly increasing in the advertising level. The next
section introduces and analyzes a duopoly variant of the model.
4.4 Duopoly analysis
We present a competitive model in which two competitors, firms A and B, are located
at the two ends of a line of length one, on which consumers tastes are uniformly
distributed. In particular, we assume that firm A is located at xA = 0 and firm B is
located at xB = 1.
Many advertising campaigns begin long before a new product is sold. Most of the time,
persuasive advertising does not focus on prices, but rather conveys ”soft” information
(Nelson 1974). TV ads often do not contain information about prices. When dealing
with competing firms in the market, we assume that firms set their advertising
intensities first and set prices later. The advertising intensity of one firm is perfectly
observable for the other firm before the prices are set. This results in a two-stage
game. Firms first set advertising intensities independently of each other and in the
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second stage, after observing the competitor’s advertising intensities, set prices non-
cooperatively. We assume that the advertising perception of one brand does not affect
the advertising perception of another one, so that there are no advertising externalities
Our setting also allows us to analyze cases in which both firms have different bias
functions. This reflects for example situations in which one brand has either a higher
initial reputation or a better marketing firm.5 Throughout our analysis, we however
restrict our focus to cases in which both firms have the same advertising functions. In
particular, we assume that αA(ψ) = αB(ψ) ;αA(ψ) = αB(ψ), ψ ∈ {0, 1} .
For our equilibrium concept, we first require, as in the monopoly case, that consumers
maximize their predicted utility in the buying period. Second, firms anticipate both
consumers’ and their competitor’s behavior correctly. Given these behaviors, firms
maximize their expected profits in every subgame.6 The associated profit function for
firm i is
Πi(pi, pj, ψi, ψj) = Di(pi, pj, ψi, ψj)pi − si(ψi). (4.11)
To find the equilibria of the game, we will solve the game via backward induction,
starting with finding firms’ optimal prices for any possible advertising history (ψA, ψB).
The next assumption excludes cases in which advertising is unprofitable for both firms
and gives an upper bound for the firms’ advertising costs.
Assumption 4.1. t
2
> s(1); min{(αi(1)− αi(0))V , (αi(1)− αi(0))V } > t2 + s(1).
The first part of the assumption gives an upper bound on the degree of horizontal
differentiation of tastes among consumers. As we will see later, this implies that firms
can coexist in an equilibrium in which they both advertise under the requirement that
the unmotivated consumers’ willingness to pay is sufficiently high. Under the same
requirement, the second part of the assumption assures that at least one firm will
invest in advertising. Since firms are located at the two ends of the line, the firms’
profit functions in the pricing subgame are always be continuous, assures the existence
of an equilibrium.
5In their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) experiment, McClure et al. (2004) found out that
the “brand-cued” delivery of Coca-Cola significantly increased participants’ brain activity compared to the
anonymous delivery. This was not the case for Pepsi-Cola or no-name cola. In our model, this would imply
that some firms can better influence consumers than others through advertising. If consumers have such
a subconscious pre-ordering of firms, it would be likely that advertising of highly appreciated brands also
increases the consumption utility of a good.
6Our equilibrium concept is close to the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium. However, this notion does
not apply in our case, since consumers have a projection bias.
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In the next subsection we explore under which circumstances a symmetric equilibrium
exists.
4.4.1 Symmetric equilibria
Fully served market First, we present the case when αi(1)V +u(c) ≥ 3t2 . This implies
that the differentiation in the market is relatively low compared to the unmotivated
consumers’ willingness to pay for the two goods without advertising. When setting the
same advertising intensities in the first stage, both firms will target all consumer types
and set the same prices. Whether they set the same advertising intensities depends
on the equilibrium profits in the subgame after they have set different advertising
intensities. This is our next proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose αi(1)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 . If in the pricing subgame following
history (ψA, ψB) = (1, 0) firm A’s equilibrium profits are less than
t
2
− s(1), then there
exists a symmetric equilibrium in which pA = pB = t and ψA = ψB = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
This is a relatively standard result. A firm’s reaction function is increasing in the other
firm’s price, and the only time both firms’ reaction functions intersect is at pA = pB = t.
We now show that there are circumstances in which only motivated consumers are
served also in the duopoly case when advertising is not allowed.
Equilibria in which only motivated consumers are served when advertising is not
allowed When considering welfare effects of advertising, as we will do in detail in the
next section, it is important to analyze the equilibrium outcomes when advertising is
not allowed. In such a case, since two different consumer types are present in our model.
It is especially interesting for us to discuss what happens if unmotivated consumers
only have a small willingness to pay for a good relative to the differentiation of tastes
in the market. If α(0)V +u(c) is sufficiently smaller than the differentiation parameter
t, then there exist equilibria in which both firms set prices so that no unmotivated
consumer will buy a good. We have shown in Proposition 4.2 that if the market is fully
served, a symmetric equilibrium will yield prices pA = pB = t. If α(0)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 . if
advertising costs are sufficiently low, then there are circumstances in which both firms
still set pA = pB = t and thus attract motivated consumers only. If the willingness
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to pay for the unmotivated consumers is sufficiently low, a firm would have to cut
its price too much to also attract unmotivated consumers for this to be a profitable
deviation. Recall that in the symmetric equilibrium where the market is fully served,
a firm’s reaction function is increasing in the other firm’s price. In case only motivated
consumers are served after the symmetric advertising history (ψA, ψB) = (0, 0), the
reaction functions still cut at pA = pB = t. The proof of the existence of such equilibria
is given in the Appendix.
The next subsection deals with the possibility of equilibria with asymmetric advertising
strategies.
4.4.2 Asymmetric equilibria
The last subsection has shown that even if the willingness to pay for motivated
consumers is extremely high, in a symmetric advertising equilibrium prices will never
be above t. However, under some circumstances there exists an equilibrium in which
firms set different advertising intensities. In our two-stage game, advertising can also
be considered as having a commitment value. Since the firms can see each other’s
advertising intensities in the pricing stage, their advertising decisions thereby signal
their further optimal actions in the market. We show in the Appendix that at least
a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in the subgame after firms set asymmetric prices.
Because of the complementary effects in prices, advertising asymmetries can lead to
higher prices for both consumer types. In some cases a full market segmentation is
even possible, in which motivated consumers are served exclusively by the advertising
firm, and unmotivated consumers are served by the other firm. As an intuition for this,
one can think of a situation in which advertising increases the motivated consumers’
willingness to pay so dramatically that a firm that does not advertise can barely attract
these consumers even when setting a very low price. It can be optimal for this firm to
act as a monopolist for the unmotivated consumers, given that it is optimal for the
advertising firm to only focus on motivated consumers.
The next proposition gives us the conditions for an asymmetric equilibrium:
Proposition 4.2. Suppose αi(1)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 . If in the pricing subgame following
history (ψA, ψB) = (1, 0), firm 1 will make profits of at least
t
2
− s(1), then there exists
an equilibrium in which the two firms set different advertising intensities.
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Proof: See Appendix.
In the next section, we will focus on welfare properties of our model.
4.5 Welfare Analysis
Common problems regarding welfare evaluations in persuasive advertising models
When assessing welfare effects in models including persuasive advertising, these models
usually have the problem that advertising induces a change in consumers’ tastes. Dixit
and Norman (1978) argue that in models with such a taste change, one has to use the
same standard, i.e. either pre-advertising tastes or post-advertising tastes, in order to
compare the market outcome with and without advertising. They provide a welfare
analysis for both pre-advertising and post-advertising standards. In their model, if a
marginal increase in advertising is welfare beneficial under post-advertising tastes, this
is sufficient for advertising to always be beneficial under the pre-advertising tastes.
There are circumstances under which an additional amount of advertising can be
considered to be excessive under the former tastes and beneficial under the latter.
This implies that one has to restrict to a fix standard in order to be able to make
unambiguous welfare evaluations.
The complementarity view of advertising is one way to overcome these problems, see
for example Becker and Murphy (1993). Becker and Murphy treat advertising as part
of given meta-tastes, such that advertising increases consumption utility when it is
a good and decreases utility when it is a bad. Because of the stable preferences,
welfare evaluations are unambiguous. Unlike Becker and Murphy’s model, in our model
consumers have no specific preference for advertising. As an example, this implies that
a consumer’s utility from watching a sport event on TV does not depend on how much
the TV network advertises its broadcasting. The unambiguous welfare evaluation in our
model comes at a cost. In many behavioral models like ours, consumers make decisions
that on average do not maximize their utility. In such cases, consumers’ choices do not
necessarily reflect their optimal preferences. The question then arises of whether or
not such models can still be used for a normative analysis. There is an ongoing debate
relating to this question, for which the different viewpoints in the edition of Caplin and
Schotter (2008) can serve as a good guidance. Despite the non-applicability of revealed
preferences, we still believe that a welfare analysis in our model will give useful insights.
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While consumers’ choices do not necessarily reveal their true preferences, they are still
optimal given the perceived preferences.
4.5.1 Monopoly welfare
From a normative viewpoint, we are interested in two main questions. The first question
is under which circumstances monopoly advertising leads to a higher overall welfare in
the market as compared to the case in which advertising is not allowed. The second
question is whether or not monopoly advertising is always excessive from a consumer
surplus perspective. We define advertising to be excessive if the increase in profits due
to advertising exceeds the overall increase in welfare.
Let W denote the overall welfare when advertising is feasible, and let WN denote the
welfare when advertising is not feasible. Advertising is socially desirable if and only
if the change in welfare due to advertising is positive: ∆W = W −WN > 0. Recall
x(p, ψ) ≡ max
{
0, α(ψ)V+u(c)−p
t
}
and x(p, ψ) ≡ max
{
0, α(ψ)V+u(c)−p
t
}
.
Apart from the expected utility of consuming her ideal good u(c) and the good’s price
p, the consumer’s utility depends on the distance between her own taste x on the line
and the monopolist’s good located at point 0 in the taste space. Adding those terms for
all consumers who purchase a good, we obtain an expression for the consumer surplus
CS:
CS(p, ψ) = 2θ
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c)− p− tτ ]dτ + 2(1− θ)
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c)− p− tτ ]dτ. (4.12)
It is straightforward to see that, given an optimal advertising intensity ψ∗ and
according monopoly price p∗ under advertising, and optimal monopoly price pN without
advertising, we can easily check whether advertising increases overall consumer surplus
in the market compared to the case when there is no advertising. This is the case
whenever CS(p∗, ψ∗)−CS(p0, 0) > 0. The monopolist’s profit Π can be written as the
sum of motivated and unmotivated consumers who demand the good in the buying
period times the selling price p minus the advertising costs s(ψ):
Π(p, ψ) = 2
(
θ
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
p dτ + (1− θ) ∫ x(p,ψ)
0
p dτ
)
− s(ψ).
Adding consumer surplus and the monopolist’s profit, we obtain the overall welfare W
in the market:
W (p, ψ) = CS(p, ψ) + Π(p, ψ)
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= 2
(
θ
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c)− tτ ]dτ + (1− θ)
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c)− tτ ]dτ
)
− s(ψ). (4.13)
Inserting the expressions (4.7) and (4.9) for the optimal price for each case, respectively,
into x(p, ψ) and x(p, ψ), we obtain the locations of the most distant consumers in a
monopoly as a function of the advertising intensity ψ only. Consequently, we can write
overall welfare as a function of the advertising intensity ψ only. However, we still have
to distinguish between cases in which the monopolist attracts both consumer types and
cases for which he sets a price as to sell to motivated consumers only.
If the monopolist only sells to motivated consumers, this yields the following expression
for overall welfare WMot in the market:
WMot(ψ) = 2θ
∫ α(ψ)V+u(c)
2t
0
[u(c)− tτ ]dτ − s(ψ). (4.14)
If the monopolist decides to attract both consumer types, we obtain the following
expression for the overall welfare WAll
WAll(ψ) = 2θ
∫ x(ψ)
0
[u(c)− tτ ]dτ + 2(1− θ)
∫ x(ψ)
0
[u(c)− tx]dτ, (4.15)
where
x(ψ) =
1
2t
[u(c)+(2−θ)α(ψ)V−(1−θ)α(ψ)V ]; x(ψ) = 1
2t
[u(c)+(1+θ)α(ψ)V−θα(ψ)V ].
When looking at equations 4.12, 4.14 and 4.15, one can see a big potential difference
between a welfare evaluation of advertising and a consumer surplus evaluation of
advertising. From an overall welfare perspective, it is desirable that a consumer
buys a product, as long as the consumption utility u(c) is bigger or equal than her
differentiation costs tx, u(c) ≥ tx. When investigating how advertising affects consumer
surplus, however, we also have to consider how the monopoly price changes due to
advertising, which is often more restrictive. On the other hand, it is easy to see that if
advertising increases consumer surplus, this will be sufficient for advertising to increase
welfare. This is because when advertising is feasible, the monopolist still has the choice
not to advertise at all, such that his profit under advertising must be at least as high
as his profit without advertising.
We define the distance between the most distant motivated consumer under monopoly
112
advertising and the most distant motivated consumer in a monopoly when advertising
is not feasible as ∆x ≡ x(, p∗, ψ∗) − x(pN , 0). Define the analogous distance for
unmotivated consumers as ∆x ≡ x(, p∗, ψ∗) − x(pN , 0). We can derive conditions
for which advertising increases overall welfare, and conditions for which it increases
consumer surplus. This results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Advertising increases monopoly welfare if and only if
2u(c)
t
[θ∆x+(1−θ)∆x] > θ[x(, p∗, ψ∗)2−x(pN , 0)2]+(1−θ)[x(p∗, ψ∗)2−x(pN , 0)2]+ s(ψ∗)
t
.
Advertising increases consumer surplus if and only if
2θ[(u(c)− p∗)∆x+ (pN − p∗)x(pN , 0)] + 2(1− θ)[(u(c)− p∗)∆x+ (pN − p∗)x(pN , 0)] >
θt[x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2] + (1− θ)t[x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2].
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, advertising increases welfare if the rent coming from consumers that become
persuaded to buy a good because of advertising exceeds the additional costs of
differentiation and the overall costs of advertising. When looking at equation (4.9),
we can see that if the monopolist only sells to motivated consumers with and without
advertising, advertising always increases the price. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. If only motivated consumers buy a good both under advertising and
when advertising is not feasible, then advertising always decreases consumer surplus.
Proof: See Appendix.
In a case in which the monopolist sells to only motivated consumers both with and
without advertising, if the bias is such that the most distant motivated consumer
who buys a good without advertising obtains a non-positive consumption utility, then
advertising always lowers welfare. This leads to our second corollary.
Corollary 4.2. If only motivated consumers buy a good both under advertising and
when advertising is not feasible, and α(0)V ≥ u(c), this is sufficient for advertising to
decrease welfare.
Proof: See Appendix.
4.2 graphically shows some implications of the two Corollaries. We present two cases.
In the first case, a motivated consumer’s upward bias is sufficiently low for advertising
to be potentially welfare beneficial, i.e. αI(0)V < u(c). In the second case, the opposite
holds: αII(0)V > u(c). The vertical axis in the figure represents a motivated consumer’s
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Figure 4.2: Monopoly effects if only motivated consumers are targeted
consumption utility of an ideal product variety given price p, u˜(c|o) − p. As shown in
section 4.4, when only motivated consumers are targeted, this difference between ideal
product variety and monopoly price is equal to the monopoly price. Thus, a consumer’s
surplus can be seen as the difference between the unbiased consumption utility u(c) and
the monopoly price, minus her location costs t|x|. The horizontal axis represents the
absolute distance between a producer located at point x and the monopolist located at
0, |x|, in the product space. From a welfare standpoint, it is desirable that a consumer
buys a good, as long as u(c) ≥ t|x|, i.e. as long as a consumer’s consumption utility is
at least as high as her differentiation costs.
In our first case, we furthermore assume that a motivated consumer’s utility of
consuming her ideal variety under monopoly pricing and advertising, αI(ψ
∗)V+u(c)
2
,
is also below the consumption utility u(c) that she contributes to overall welfare.
Consequently, the distance between the most distant motivated consumer and the
monopolist both with and without advertising, xI(1) and xI(0), respectively, is always
below the welfare maximising distance, xFB. Thus, if advertising costs are sufficiently
low, advertising can potentially lead to an increase in overall welfare in this case.
However, because advertising causes an upward shift in the monopoly price from
αI(0)V+u(c)
2
to αI(1)V+u(c)
2
, one can see that this shift hurts all consumers who buy the
good also without advertising, because the difference between the horizontal u(c)-line
and the monopoly price under advertising,αI(1)V+u(c)
2
, is smaller than the difference
between u(c) and the monopoly price without advertising. For motivated consumers
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who only buy under advertising, the differentiation costs are too big to have a positive
consumer surplus from consuming the good. This demonstrates the potential trade-off
between overall welfare and consumer surplus in this case.
In the second case, a motivated consumer’s upward bias is always bigger than her
consumption utility. As one can see from the figure, this implies that in a monopoly
without advertising, consumption of the most distant consumers already decreases
overall welfare, since their location costs t|xII(0)| exceed their expected consumption
utility u(c). Thus, any further upward shift in the predicted consumption utility will
always hurt welfare. Advertising can only increase consumer surplus if unmotivated
consumers buy the good under advertising. Intuitively, such a case might arise where
advertising leads to a decrease in the monopoly price.
Thus, we can conclude that depending on the different bias terms αV , αV , and on
the fraction of motivated consumers in the buying period, there exist cases in which
advertising can be both welfare beneficial and increase consumer surplus. However,
as we have shown, after certain outcomes advertising neither increases welfare nor
consumer surplus. Our results differ from the normative analysis in Dixit and Norman
(1978), where advertising is always excessive. This difference occurs because in our
model, fluctuating states of motivation result in the existence of two different consumer
types in the buying period, i.e. motivated and unmotivated consumers, who have to
make their consumption decisions.
4.5.2 Duopoly welfare
Analogously to the monopoly case, we firstly give expressions for consumer surplus and
overall profits in the market. Denote x0 the distance between firm 0 and the most distant
motivated consumer who purchases a good from this firm, x1 is the analogue distance
from firm 1 to its most distant purchasing motivated consumer, and the distances from
the two firms to their most distant purchasing unmotivated consumers are denoted x0
and x1 respectively. In case a consumer type is not served by a firm, this distance will
be set equal to 0. Let D denote the overall demand for both goods in the market. In
addition, we split up this overall demand into the demand for good A, DA, and the
demand for good B, DB. These can be written as DA = θ
∫ xA
0
dτ + (1− θ) ∫ xA
0
dτ , and
DB = θ
∫ xB
0
dτ + (1− θ) ∫ xB
0
dτ . Consequently, the overall demand for both goods can
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be written as
D := DA +DB = θ
(∫ xA
0
dτ +
∫ xB
0
dτ
)
+ (1− θ)
(∫ xA
0
dτ +
∫ xB
0
dτ
)
. (4.16)
The total consumer loss in form of cumulated costs due to the variation in consumers’
tastes, T (x), can now be written as T (x) = θt(
∫ xA
0
τdτ +
∫ xB
0
τdτ) + (1− θ)t(∫ xA
0
τdτ +∫ xB
0
τdτ). This can be rewritten as
T (x) =
t
2
[
θx2A + θx
2
B + (1− θ)(xA)2 + (1− θ)(xB)2
]
. (4.17)
This gives us the expression for the change in welfare due to advertising in duopoly:
∆W = W −WN = Du(c)− T (x)− sA(ψ)− sB(ψ)−DNu(c)− TN(x). (4.18)
As in the monopoly case, we can now write a both necessary and sufficient condition
for the social desirability of advertising in a duopoly, which is our second proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Advertising is welfare beneficial in a duopoly if and only if
DAu(c)− TA(x)−∑i∈{A,B} si(ψ)−DNu(c) + TN(x) > 0.
The next corollary shows that advertising is never beneficial if the unmotivated
consumers’ willingness to pay is sufficiently high without advertising.
Corollary 4.3. If αA(0)V + u(c) = αB(0)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 , then advertising is never
socially desirable in a duopoly.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this corollary is as follows. If α(0)V + u(c) > 3t
2
, then in the duopoly
case the full market will be served. Due to a sufficiently high initial willingness to
pay of the unmotivated consumers, the persuasive effects of advertising are not needed
here. In fact, under these conditions, in any equilibrium without advertising, prices will
always be pA = pB = t, and all consumers will be served. Advertising can thus never
be optimal. The only positive effect of advertising, namely to persuade more people to
buy the good, vanishes. Therefore, the competitive setting leads to a welfare loss due
to the advertising expenditures.
Firms would also appreciate an advertising ban in the case of a symmetric equilibrium
under advertising because of constant equilibrium prices and demands compared to
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increasing advertising costs. This is not necessarily true in an asymmetric equilibrium.
If a firm in such an equilibrium gains a higher profit than t
2
, then it benefits from
advertising compared to the non-advertising case.
Since we have two different consumer types, a relatively low initial willingness to pay
of unmotivated consumers can have several implications on the market outcomes.
As mentioned before, one can think of situations in which the willingness to pay of
motivated consumers is sufficiently high, i.e. α(0)V + u(c) ≥ 3t
2
, and at the same
time, unmotivated consumers’ willingness to pay is sufficiently smaller than t. When
advertising is not allowed, we show in the Appendix that there exist equilibria in which
firms only serve motivated consumers.
If both firms engage in advertising when allowed, and furthermore because αV (1) +
u(c) > t due to Assumption 4.1, at least in a symmetric equilibrium in which both
firms advertise, this will also increase the number of purchased goods in a duopoly.
This is because at least some unmotivated consumers will now buy the good. If the
additional utility of the new consumers offsets the advertising costs in the market, then
advertising is welfare beneficial.
Consider as an example consumers that plan to fly to a region with a high risk for
malaria infections. Even though consumers know about the risks, they can misperceive
them and hence become unwilling to pay the price for a prophylaxis. Other consumers
who are afraid of an infection would like to buy the medicine even for very high prices
at a given risk level. When being confronted with unpleasant pictures from the disease,
consumers might then be willing to spend more money for the good, which reduces the
risk of an infection.
4.6 Cooling-off periods
Mandatory cooling-off periods Loewenstein et al. (2003) mention the possibility
that “Cooling-off periods that force consumers to reflect on their decisions for several
days can decrease the likelihood that they end up owning products that they should
not.7” However, their model does not include any analysis of such cooling-off laws. In
this section, we analyze how a mandatory cooling-off period would affect overall and
7Loewenstein et al. (2003).
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Monopolist sets price p
Continued, infinite
no intervention
intervention
Purchase decision and
immediate consumption
Sign letter of intent
without consumption
Confirmation decision
and infinite consumption
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2
consumption
Figure 4.3: Game tree with and without policy intervention
consumer welfare in a variant of our model.
Suppose now that consumers can decide whether or not to purchase a durable good
c that can be consumed today and for infinitely many periods in the future, with a
constant discount rate δ. Denote mt ∈ {o, o} a consumer’s state in period τ .
We abstract from the Coase (1972) conjecture by assuming that the monopolist can
only offer the good once to consumers. For simplicity, we assume that s(1) = 0, such
that the monopolist will always advertise costlessly, and that consumers’ tastes are not
horizontally differentiated. A consumer’s predicted lifetime consumption utility when
buying the good in period t and being in state o is
U˜τ (c|mτ = o) = δτu(c, o) +
∞∑
j=τ
δj+1u˜(c|o). (4.19)
Define min{a, b} ≡ [a, b]− and max{a, 0} ≡ [a]+. The monopolist’s maximization
problem can now be written as
max
p,ψ
θ[[p, U˜(c|o)]−]+ + (1− θ)[[p, U˜(c|o)]−]+.
It follows that the monopolist will target motivated consumers only if θU˜(c|o) > U˜(c|o),
which is equivalent to θ > U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o)
Assume following policy intervention. If a consumer wants to purchase a good, she has
to sign a letter of intent first, and is only able to receive the good when agreeing to
buy it again in the next period. We assume that the probability of being in a certain
state is independent of the state in the previous period, i.e. Prob(mτ = o|mτ−1 = o) =
Prob(mτ = o|mτ−1 = o) = θ. Furthermore, we assume that a consumer cannot invest
her money at a positive interest rate in between periods. Figure 4.3 shows the timing
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θ consumer share Net overall welfare effect Net consumer
welfare effect
θ ∈
(
0, U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o)
)
negative negative
θ ∈
(
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) ,
√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o)
)
positive (negative) if θ < (>)[1 + 1−δδ
u(c,o)
u(c) ]
−1 positive
θ ∈
]√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) , 1
)
negative positive
Table 4.1: Net effect of mandatory policy intervention
of the game both with and without the policy intervention.
The monopolist’s maximization problem can be written as
max
p,ψ
θ2[[p, U˜(c|o)]−]+ + (1− θ2)[[p, U˜(c|o)]−]+. (4.20)
One can see that the monopolist will sell to motivated consumers only whenever θ >√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) , which is a higher threshold compared to the case when there is no cooling-off
period. If it is best in both cases to sell either to both consumer types, or to motivated
consumers only, this policy intervention will always hurt overall welfare. The reason
for this is that the price will not change as a result of an intervention that does not
change the consumer clientele, and the cooling-off period will lead to a loss due to
the foregone immediate consumption. The only case in which such an intervention
might increase overall welfare is if the monopolist start selling to both consumer types
instead of selling to only motivated consumers. This leads to a drop in price which
causes a demand increase. In such a case, the change in overall welfare is positive
whenever the demand increase counterweighs the loss of immediate gratification of
motivated consumers, i.e. if δ
1−δu(c) − θ[ δ1−δu(c) + u(c, o)] > 0. This is equivalent to
(1− θ) δ
1−δu(c) > θu(c, o). Rewriting this, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5. A mandatory cooling-off period increases overall welfare if and only
if the monopolist changes from targeting only motivated consumers to selling to both
consumer types, and θ < [1 + 1−δ
δ
u(c,o)
u(c)
]−1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Things change when looking at consumer welfare only. Naturally, consumers will benefit
from a price drop. If only motivated consumers buy the good with and without the
intervention, this will furthermore decrease their consumer welfare losses. However, if a
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policy intervention is not necessary, i.e. if the monopolist always sells to both consumer
types, then this will lead to a loss in consumer welfare due to the foregone immediate
consumption in the first period. We sum this up in our next proposition.
Proposition 4.6. A mandatory cooling-off period increases (decreases) consumer
welfare if θ > (<) U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) .
Proof: See Appendix.
Table 4.1 sums up the findings of the mandatory cooling-off intervention.
Voluntary return policies So far, we have only considered the case of a mandatory
cooling-off period. Such policy instruments try to prevent consumers from making
impulse purchases up front by forcing them to wait an extra period before acquiring a
product. There are, however, also prominent voluntary return policies that correspond
to money-return warranties. In chapter 3 of this thesis, we have analyzed the effects
of frictions with respect to return behavior. When abstracting from such frictions,
in the case of a one-period return period, the monopolist’s maximization problem
is identical to the mandatory case maximization problem in equation 4.20. This is
because when the monopolist targets motivated consumers only, a fraction 1 − θ of
the consumers that buy a product in the first period will return the product in the
second period. From a normative perspective, there is however an important change
compared to the mandatory cooling-off period case. Since consumers can now buy a
product in the first period, there is no foregone initial loss due to the policy intervention.
Furthermore, this policy makes targeting all consumers from the monopolist’s side more
likely. Consequently, in the case without return costs, a voluntary return period will
never hurt consumers. This leads to our next proposition.
Proposition 4.7. In the case without return costs, a voluntary return period will never
decrease consumer welfare.
Proof. In text.
In reality, due to frictions in return behavior and often-enforced rules of only being
able to return unused products, voluntary cooling-off periods will lose some of their
effectiveness. If consumers face return costs that decrease the probability of returning a
product, they change the incentives for firms: Ceteris paribus, targeting only motivated
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consumers becomes more likely. From a normative standpoint, the question then
becomes whether the foregone initial utility loss from a mandatory cooling-off period
outweighs the utility loss due to the return frictions in the voluntary case.
Dynamic aspects So far, we only included the possibility for consumers to buy a
product in the first period.8 One can also think of models in which a consumer can buy
a product at a later date. In the most natural case a firm cannot commit to a fix price
in later periods. In such a case, forward looking consumers will anticipate a decrease in
prices in later periods, and thus the whole problem becomes redundant. If consumers
are myopic and do not take different potential types in the distribution into account,
this allows a monopolist to extract even more consumer rents than in the baseline case,
sometimes also by varying prices in the different periods.
In case the monopolist can commit to the same price in later periods, there are
some similarities to the baseline mandatory cooling-off outcome. First, the only two
equilibrium price outcomes are p ≡ U˜(c|o) and p ≡ U˜(c|o), i.e. the willingness to pay
for a motivated and unmotivated consumer, respectively. Second, assuming that the
firm has the same discount rate δ as the consumers, the higher δ, the more likely is
an outcome in which the monopolist sells a good at a price p. In such a case, each
consumer eventually buys a product at a high price, because the probability of being
in a motivated state twice in a row goes to one as t→∞. Denote by Dt the demand for
the product in period t at price p. Overall, the monopolist offers a high price whenever
E[
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τDτ (p)]p > p.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have formalized a model in which a projection bias is responsible
for the demand shifts caused by persuasive advertising. Advertising increases the
predicted future consumption utility for a good, which in turn leads to an increase
in the consumers’ willingness to pay.
In our model, the theoretical computation of overall and consumer welfare is
straightforward. However, knowledge is needed about the exact form of the “revealed
8In the mandatory cooling-off period case, this attributes to the signing of the letter of intent in the first
period.
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mistakes” at least some consumers make. If consumers indeed suffer from such a bias,
the question remains whether this behavior can also be rationalized by some kind of
optimal decisionmaking by the consumer that is not accounted for in our model. One
such example would arise if questioning their biases and computing their true future
predicted consumption utility was costly for the consumers. If these costs on average
exceed the costs of “impulsively” making a wrong purchase decision, then this behavior
is on average optimal for the consumer. Another rationalization would be consumers
deriving an intrinsic utility from making impulse purchases that are so strong that they
dominate the disutility from overpaying for the product.
An important empirical questions is how one can potentially identify a change in the
bias due to advertising as the source for the demand shifts. One could test in an
experiment how consumers’ accuracy for predicting future probabilities depends on
advertising intensity.
From a policy standpoint, we have shown that consumer protection policies can also
harm consumers under some circumstances, which suggests that policy-makers should
be cautious not to over-protect consumers by introducing protection policies ad hoc.
In general, we believe that more work should be devoted to exploring how exactly
consumer biases affect consumers’ decisionmaking in an industry environment.
4.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows right from the text. Now we focus on the
case in which advertising is not feasible. Since the price p is the only choice variable
in this case, and Πpp < 0∀p in both cases, it follows that there always exists a unique
profit-maximizing price p for each segment, i.e. for the segment in which only motivated
consumers are targeted, and the segment for which only unmotivated consumers are
targeted. From equation 4.8, it follows that the monopolist’s profit when selling to both
consumer types can be written as ΠAll(0) = 1
2t
[θα(0)V + (1− θ)α(0)V + u(c)]2. From
equation (4.10) it follows analogously that the price when only targeting motivated
consumers can be written as ΠMot(0) = θ
2t
[α(0)V +u(c)]2. Therefore, ΠAll(0) ≥ ΠMot(0),
if 1
2t
[θα(0)V + (1− θ)α(0)V + u(c)]2 ≥ θ
2t
[α(0)V + u(c)]2 ≥
122
Since the firms’ profits are always non-negative, it follows from the above equation
that θα(0)V + (1 − θ)α(0)V + u(c) ≥ √θ(α(0)V + u(c)). This can be written as
(1−√θ)u(c)+(1−√θ)(1+√θ)αV ≥ √θ(1−√θ)αV . This is equivalent to √θ(α(0)V −
α(0)V )−α(0)V ≤ u(c). Rearranging this equation yields √θ ≤ u(c)+α(0)V
α(0)V−α(0)V . Naturally,
it can only be optimal for the monopolist to attract unmotivated consumers when the
willingness to pay for unmotivated consumers is positive, i.e. if α(0)V + u(c) > 0.
Then, the right hand side of the previous weak inequality will always be positive, thus
squaring this inequality will not change the sign of the weak inequality. This then
finally leads to θ ≤
(
u(c)+α(0)V
α(0)V−α(0)V
)2
. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Recall our definition max{a, 0} ≡ [a]+. We now
furthermore define min{a, b} ≡ [a, b]−.
Proof. We consider the case in which the unmotivated consumers’ willingness to pay is
sufficiently high, i.e. if α(1)V + u(c) ≥ 3t
2
. Firm A’s maximization problem when both
firms attract and serve both consumer types becomes
max
pA,ψA,
ΠA =pAθ
[[
(αA(ψA)− αB(ψB))V − pA + pB + t
2t
, 1
]−]+
+
pA(1− θ)
[[
(αA(ψA)− αB(ψB))V − pA + pB + t
2t
, 1
]−]+
− s0(ψA);
s.t. pB ∈ BRB(pA);
(4.21)
where BRB(.) is firm B’s best response function for a given price of firm A. The
analogue maximization problem for firm B becomes
max
pB ,ψB
ΠB =pBθ
[[
(αB(ψB)− αA(ψA))V − pB + pA + t
2t
, 1
]−]+
+
pB(1− θ)
[[
(αB(ψB)− αA(ψA))V − pB + pA + t
2t
, 1
]−]+
− s1(ψB);
s.t. pA ∈ BRA(pB);
(4.22)
where BRA(.) is firm A’s best response function for a given price of firm B. After a
history (ψA, ψB), we solve for the optimal profit functions using backward induction.
In a subgame following histories (ψA, ψB) = (0, 0) or (ψA, ψB) = (1, 1), we obtain the
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following best-response functions by deriving the firms’ profit functions with respect
to pA and pB respectively:
pA =θ
(αA(ψA)− αB(ψA))V
2
+ (1− θ)(αA(ψA)− αB(ψB))V
2
+
t
2
+
pB
2
=
t
2
+
pB
2
;
(4.23)
pB =θ
(αB(ψB)− αA(ψA))V
2
+
(1− θ)(αB(ψB)− αA(ψA))V
2
+
t
2
+
pA
2
=
t
2
+
pA
2
.
(4.24)
Because of our symmetry assumption with respect to the firms’ bias functions, it
therefore follows that in any subgame following a history in which both firms set the
same advertising intensity, given that unmotivated consumers willingness to pay is
sufficiently high, the resulting prices are pA = pB = t. In the pricing subgame following
(ψA, ψB) = (0, 0), the profits are then ΠA = ΠB =
t
2
; after (ψA, ψB) = (1, 1), the
resulting profits become ΠA = ΠB =
t
2
− s(1).
In the subgame resulting after the history (1, 0), there is a multitude of
possible equilibrium outcomes, because the concerned segments of the best-response
correspondences depend on the specific bias functions α(ψ) and α(ψ), as well as on the
upward and downward bias components V and V . We know that each firm i setting
prices above pi = αi(ψi)V + u(c) will have 0 demand, all prices above this mark are at
least weakly dominated by prices pi ∈ [0, αi(ψi)V +u(c)]. Therefore, the relevant action
space is compact and non-empty. Moreover, given any pair of advertising intensities
(ψA, ψB), the firms’ profit functions are continuous. Although the relevant strategy
space in this subgame is compact, the firms’ profit functions are not necessarily quasi-
concave, which would assure the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. However,
continuity of the profit functions as well as compact and non-empty action spaces of
all firms suffice to prove the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in such a
subgame, see Glicksberg (1952) for the proof.
We can deduce from Assumption 4.1 that, given that one firm does not advertise, the
other firm always has an incentive to do so. For example, given that firm B does not
advertise, firm A will make profits higher than t
2
: In such a case, we know that in
equilibrium, each firm will set prices higher than or equal to 0. If firm B sets pB = 0,
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then if firm A sets pA = t, which does not have to be firm A’s best response to firm B’s
price, its profits will already be above t
2
. One can see this by putting these prices into
equation (4.21), this gives the profit θ
[
(αA(1)−αB(0))V
2
, t
]−
+ (1− θ)
[
(αA(1)−αB(0)V
2
, t
]−
−
s0(1), which is always bigger than
t
2
because of Assumption 4.1. Because of the
complementary effects in prices, firm A’s profits will further increase in the prices
of firm B, equations 4.23 and 4.24 shows this for the case in which the advertising
firm serves both markets. Since it is under these circumstances always possible to serve
both consumer types for this firm, it will only focus on motivated consumers solely
if its profits are higher compared to the case where it serves both consumer types.
Therefore, an incentive to advertise for at least one firm in the market is guaranteed.
Whether both firms will invest in advertising thus depends on the obtained profits of
firm B. If, given these advertising intensities, firm B will earn profits less than t
2
−s(1),
then it is an optimal decision for this firm to invest in advertising in the advertising
period. In such a case, no firm can profitably deviate by setting a price different from
pA = pB = t and advertising intensity other than ψA = ψB = 1. As mentioned before,
this results in profits of ΠA = ΠB =
t
2
− s(1) and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.1. Again, after any
symmetric advertising history, i.e. either after (ψA, ψB) = (0, 0) or (ψA, ψB) = (1, 1),
equilibrium prices will be pA = pB = t, if α(0)V +u(c) ≥ 3t2 . Because of Assumption 4.1,
the advertising history (0,0) is never an equilibrium advertising strategy pair, for firms
have an incentive to deviate by setting a positive advertising intensity given that the
other firm does not advertise. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 4.1 that equilibrium
profits in a symmetric equilibrium will be t
2
− s(1) for both firms if unmotivated
consumers’ willingness to pay under advertising is equal or above 3t
2
. Therefore, if in
the subgame following after (1, 0), firm B will make an equilibrium profit bigger than
or equal to t
2
− s(1), then no firm can profitably deviate by setting another advertising
strategy in the first period. This completes the proof.
Existence of an equilibrium in which only motivated consumers are served
without advertising
Proof. Our proof goes in two steps. Firstly, we will show that if only motivated
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consumers are in the market, θ = 1, and if αi(0)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 ∀ i ∈ {A,B}, then if
advertising is not allowed, firms will both set prices equal to t. Secondly, we will show
that even if θ < 1, i.e. if there are also unmotivated consumers in the market, and if
the willingness to pay is sufficiently low for the unmotivated consumers, then under
some circumstances, given that one firm sets its price equal to t, no firm can profitably
deviate by setting a lower price and thereby also attract unmotivated consumers.
Suppose that the willingness to pay of the motivated consumers is sufficiently high,
αi(0)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 ∀ i ∈ {0, 1}, and that there are only motivated consumers in the
market, θ = 1. The resulting maximization problem for firm A in the price setting
stage when advertising is not allowed becomes
maxpAΠA =pA
[[
(αA(0)− αB(0))V − pA + pB + t
2t
, 1
]−]+
s.t. pB ∈ BRB(pA).
(4.25)
The analogous problem for firm B is
maxpBΠB =pB
[[
(αB(0)− αA(0))V − pB + pA + t
2t
, 1
]−]+
s.t. pA ∈ BRA(pB).
(4.26)
After the symmetric history (ψA, ψB) = (0, 0), by taking the derivative of the profit
functions with respect to p, one obtains the firms’ best response functions:
pA =
(α(0)− α(0))V
2t
+
t
2
+
pB
2
=
t
2
+
pB
2
pB =
(α(0)− α(0))V
2t
+
t
2
+
pA
2
=
t
2
+
pA
2
.
This will result in the optimal pricing strategies
pA = pB = t.
Now suppose that 0 < θ < 1, so that both consumer types are in the market.
Suppose furthermore that the willingness to pay for the unmotivated consumers without
advertising is at most equal to d: α(0)V + u(c) ≤ d, where d ∈ (0, t
2
).
Now in case both firms only attract motivated consumers, we know that after a
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symmetric advertising history firms set pA = pB = t. If no firm is allowed to
advertise, firms profits will be equal to ΠA = ΠB =
θt
2
. We will now show that
under some circumstances, it is not profitable for a firm to set a price so low as to
also attract unmotivated consumers. Given that the firm A sets the price pA = t, the
maximization problem of firm B after the advertising history (ψA, ψB) = (0, 0) becomes
maxpBΠB = pBθ
[[−pB+2t
2t
, 1
]−]+
+ (1− θ)
[[
αB(0)V+u(c)−pB
t
; d
]−]+
.
If d < θt
2
, then this suffices to show that a firm cannot profitably deviate in the pricing
stage by setting a price below t. As d < θt
2
< t by assumption, we know that when
setting a non-negative price, a firm can never attract all unmotivated consumers in the
market. Therefore, we know that if firm B undercuts price pA = t of firm A, so that
also unmotivated consumers demand the good, its profit will always be below d ·1 = θt
2
.
When setting a price equal to or above d, then we know that firms will only attract
motivated consumers and that the resulting maximization problem in the subgames
following advertising history (ψA, ψB) = (0, 0) yields equilibrium prices of pA = pB = t.
Since firms are not allowed to advertise, it follows that there is no advertising stage
in which firms could possibly deviate. Therefore, it follows for symmetry reasons that
under the given circumstances no firm can profitably deviate by setting a price different
from t, given that the other firm sets its price equal to t, so that an equilibrium exists
in which only motivated consumers are served with prices pA = pB = t. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. For the first part of the proposition, recall equation (4.13):
W (p, ψ) = 2
(
θ
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c)− tτ ]dτ + (1− θ) ∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c)− tτ ]dτ
)
− s(ψ).
Now, monopoly advertising is beneficial, if W (p∗, ψ∗) > W (pN , 0). Solving the integral
for both sides, this then yields 2u(c)[θx(p∗, ψ∗) + (1− θ)x(p∗, ψ∗)]− tθx(p∗, ψ∗)2− (1−
θ)tx(p∗, ψ∗)2 − s(ψ) >
2u(c)[θx(pN , 0) + (1− θ)x(pN , 0)]− tx(pN , 0)2 − (1− θ)tx(pN , 0).
Rearranging this inequality yields
2u(c)[θ(x(, p∗, ψ∗) − x(pN , 0)) + (1 − θ)(x(p∗, ψ∗) − x(pN , 0))] > t(θ[x(, p∗, ψ∗)2 −
x(pN , 0)2] + (1 − θ)[x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2]) + s(ψ∗). Dividing the inequality by t and
substituting ∆x and ∆x into this equation then yields the expression for the first part
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of Proposition 4.4.
For the second part of the proposition, recall (4.12):
CS(p, ψ) = 2θ
∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c) − p − tτ ]dτ + 2(1 − θ) ∫ x(p,ψ)
0
[u(c) − p − tτ ]dτ. Thus, the
condition CS(p∗, ψ∗) > CS(pN , 0) can be rewritten as
2θ(u(c)−p∗)x(p∗, ψ∗)−θtx(p∗, ψ∗)2 +2(1−θ)(u(c)−p∗)x(p∗, ψ∗)− (1−θ)tx(p∗, ψ∗)2 >
2θ(u(c)− pN)x(pN , 0)− θtx(pN , 0)2 + 2(1− θ)(u(c)− pN)x(pN , 0)− (1− θ)tx(pN , 0)2.
This can be rewritten as
2θ(u(c) − p∗)x(p∗, ψ∗) − 2θ(u(c) − pN)x(pN , 0) + 2(1 − θ)(u(c) − p∗)x(p∗, ψ∗) − 2(1 −
θ)(u(c)− pN)x(pN , 0) > θt(x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2) + (1− θ)t(x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2)
We further rearrange this to 2θu(c)[x(p∗, ψ∗)−x(pN , 0)]−2θ[[p∗[x(p∗, ψ∗)−x(pN , 0)] +
(pN − p∗)x(pN , 0)]] + 2(1− θ)[(u(c)− p∗)[[x(p∗, ψ∗)− x(pN , 0)] + (pN − p∗)x(pN , 0)]] >
θt[x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2] + (1 − θ)t[x(p∗, ψ∗)2 − x(pN , 0)2]. Substituting ∆x and ∆x
into this equation yields the second expression in the proposition. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.1
Proof. This proof goes in two steps. In the first step, we show that in the case
when only motivated consumers buy a good both under and without advertising,
advertising leads to a decrease in consumer surplus for every consumer that purchases
a good even without advertising. In the second step, we show that those consumers
who become persuaded to buy the good through advertising also all have a negative
consumer surplus. For the first step, we can see that the overall utility of a consumer
located at point x ∈
[
−α(0)V+u(c)
2t
, α(0)V+u(c)
2t
]
who purchases a good also without
advertising can be written as u(c) − α(0)V+u(c)
2
− tx. Advertising changes the utility
of each consumer to u(c) − α(ψ∗)V+u(c)
2
− tx, which is smaller than the previous
expression since α(ψ∗)V > α(0)V ≥ 0. because of Assumption 4.3. This completes
the first step of the proof. For the second step, recall that the consumer closest to
the monopolist on the line that does buy a good under advertising but not without
advertising is at least located at a distance x(pN , 0) = α(0)V + u(c) away from the
monopolist. Therefore, her consumption utility then becomes u(c)−p(ψ∗)−tx(pN , 0) =
u(c) − α(ψ∗)V+u(c)
2
− α(0)V+u(c)
2
= − (α(0)+α(ψ∗))V
2
< 0. Therefore, all other consumers
located further away from the monopolist who have not bought a good without
advertising will have a negative consumer surplus as well. From step 1 and step 2
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it follows that all consumers who buy a good under advertising will be worse off under
advertising compared to the situation when advertising is not feasible. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Proof. We show that once α(0)V ≥ u(c), and the monopolist only targets motivated
consumers in all cases, then every additional motivated consumer buying a good under
advertising will decrease welfare. When advertising is not feasible, it follows from (4.8)
that p = α(0)V+u(c)
2t
. Thus, the most distant consumers that buy a good lie at distance
x(pN , 0) = α(0)V+u(c)
2t
away from the monopolist. Therefore, the overall welfare gain
from the most distant consumer can be written as u(c) − tx(pN , 0) = u(c)−αV
2
< 0.
Furthermore, in this segment x = α(ψ)V+u(c)
2t
is increasing in the advertising intensity
ψ. Therefore, if α(0)V ≥ u(c), any additional consumer buying a good will reduce
overall welfare. Thus, any advertising leads to a welfare-harming increase in motivated
consumers buying the good on top of welfare-reducing advertising costs s(ψ). This
completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.3
Proof. If αA(0)V + u(c) = αB(0)V + u(c) ≥ 3t2 , then one can see from the proof of
Proposition 4.1 that there exists only one pure-strategy equilibrium when advertising
is not allowed in which firms set pA = pB = t. Therefore, if all consumers are served in
the market without advertising, advertising cannot increase the number of consumers
in the market. Furthermore, we will now show that each firm serving exactly one half
of the market minimizes overall transportation costs. Recall equation (4.17). We know
that the differentiation costs are the aggregated distances for all consumers in the
market times a parameter t. When the market is fully served, we can rewrite equation
(4.17) as T (x) = θt
(∫ xA
0
τdτ +
∫ 1−xA
0
τdτ
)
+ (1− θ)t
(∫ xA
0
τdτ +
∫ 1−xA
0
τdτ
)
= t
2
[θx2A + θ(1− xA)2 + (1− θ)(xA)2 + (1− θ)(1− xA)2].
Taking the derivatives of this expression with respect to x and x yields the first-order
conditions: ∂T
∂xA
= tθ
2
(4xA − 2) != 0 ⇔ xA = 12 .
∂T
∂xA
= t(1−θ)
2
(4xA − 2) != 0 ⇔ xA = 12 .
Taking the second-order derivatives with respect to x and x, one then obtains ∂
2T
∂x2A
= 2θt;
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∂2T
∂x2A
= 2(1−θ)t, which are both positive for all θ ∈ (0, 1). Since the second-order cross-
partial derivatives are 0, this suffices for showing that the Hessian matrix of the second-
order derivatives is positive, so that the differentiation costs function has a minimum
at xA =
1
2
; xA =
1
2
when all consumers are served. Thus, if the market is fully served,
differentiation costs are minimized if both firms serve exactly half of the market for
the motivated consumers and half of the market for the unmotivated consumers. As in
the proof for Corollary 4.1, firms therefore cannot increase consumer demand because
of advertising and also cannot lower differentiation costs in the market because of it.
Since advertising is costly, this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof. The overall welfare consists of the monopolsit’s profit, pi, and the consumer
surplus, CS(p, ψ). Note that we assume s(1) = 0 in this section, such that the
monopolist will always set ψ = 1. We will thus drop the advertising intensity ψ for
the rest of the proof. As before, define the demand for unmotivated and motivated
consumers consumers as D and D, respectively. The total demand for the good is
D = D + D. Evaluated at time τ = 0, the monopolist’s overall profits without a
policy intervention can be written as pi = D(p)p. Denote piint and pint monopolist’s
profits and price, respectively, in case of a policy intervention. These profits now turn
to piint = δD(pint)pint. In absence of the policy intervention, the consumer surplus
becomes
CS(p) = D(p)
[
u(c, o) +
∞∑
j=1
δju(c)− p
]
+D(p)
[
u(c, o) +
∞∑
j=1
δju(c)− p
]
. (4.27)
Denote CSint the consumer surplus in case of a policy intervention. This can then be
written as
CSint(p) = δ
[
D(p)
[
u(c, o) +
∞∑
j=1
δju(c)− p
]
+D(p)
[
u(c, o) +
∞∑
j=1
δju(c)− p
]]
.
(4.28)
Therefore, the change in overall consumer surplus due to the intervention can be written
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as
piint−pi+CSint−CS = D(pint)( δ
2
1− δu(c))−D(p)
δ
1− δu(c)−D(p)u(c, o)−D(p)u(c, o).
(4.29)
We firstly consider the case θ /∈ ( U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) ,
√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o)). In such a case the demand for the
good does not change due to an intervention. One can then see from equation 4.29 that
the intervention will always hurt overall welfare.
Now consider the case θ ∈ ( U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) ,
√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o)). This yields D(p) = θ and D(p
int) = 1.
Equation 4.29 can now be rewritten as δ
1−δu(c)−θ[ δ1−δu(c)+u(c, o)]. This is positive as
long as (1−θ) δ
1−δu(c) > θu(c, o). This can be rewritten as
δ
1−δu(c) > θ[u(c, o)+
δ
1−δu(c)].
Rearranging this term then yields θ < [1 + 1−δ
δ
u(c,o)
u(c)
]−1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. First consider the case θ < U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) In such a case, the monopolist will always sell
the good to all consumers at a price p = pint = u(c, o) + δ
1−δ u˜(c, o). From equations
4.27 and 4.28, the change in consumer surplus due to the intervention can be written
as, CSint(pint)− CS(p) = (δ − 1) δ
1−δ [u(c)− u˜(c, o)], which is always negative.
Now consider the case θ ∈ ( U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) ,
√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o)). In this case, we obtain p = u(c, o) +
δ
1−δ u˜(c, o), p
int = u(c, o) + δ
1−δ u˜(c, o), D(p) = θ, and D(p
int) = 1. The change in
overall consumer welfare can be written as CSint(pint) − CS(p) = δ[u(c) − u(c, o) +
δ
1−δ (u(c)−u(c, o))]−θ δ1−δ [u(c)− u˜(c, o)]. From our assumptions, it follows directly that
δ[u(c)−u(c, o)+ δ
1−δ (u(c)−u(c, o))] is always positive, and θ δ1−δ [u(c)− u˜(c, o)] is always
negative, such that the policy intervention will always increase consumer surplus in this
case.
Finally, consider the case θ >
√
U˜(c|o)
U˜(c|o) . This yields p = p
int = u(c, o)+ δ
1−δ u˜(c, o), D(p) =
D(pint) = θ. The change in consumer surplus can now be written as CSint(pint) −
CS(p) = (δ − 1) δ
1−δ [u(c)− u˜(c, o)], which is always positive. This completes the proof.
Chapter 5
General Discussion
In 1989, Timothy Bresnahan concluded in his article in the first Handbook of Industrial
Organization: “We know essentially nothing about the causes, or even the systematic
predictors, of market power, but have come a long way in working out how to measure
them.1” Surprisingly, even if the empirical literature in industrial organization has
made significant progress over the last 25 years, this statement is still true. The
framework developed in chapter 2 can be used to jointly estimate marginal costs
and the form of industry competition in a specific industry. The insights from such
studies can in principle be used to gain further knowledge about the predictors of
market power. To do so, it is necessary to study several industries in order to see the
relationship between price-cost margins and competition across different industries,
and potentially also across time.
The way the theoretical organizational economics literature has been evolving,
structural econometric methods seem to be a very promising tool for testing
hypotheses of within-firm behavior. The framework in chapter 2 makes use of industry
data in a horizontal setting to identify the form of cooperation between horizontally
aligned divisions. Inferring both frictions and the form of cooperation between different
vertically aligned division seems to be a natural next step. Ideally, such work would
also include within-firm data, for example data on divisional contracts. From the
empirical side, these topics still seem to be unanswered.
1Bresnahan (1989).
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Chapter 2 also briefly touches the issue of estimating synergies that result from
mergers. Such synergies are very often brought forward as reasons for a merger.
However, both the scope as well as the origins of the synergies are not well-explored.
One needs a general framework that can distinguish demand side synergies in terms
of an increase in joint brand evaluation from synergies arising due to savings in fixed
costs and synergies arising due to savings in marginal costs of production. Such work
also requires detailed cost data on the industry side.
From both a behavioral economics and consumer policy viewpoint, the empirical
literature seems to be even more underdeveloped. Identifying consumer biases from
a fully rational explanation to me seems to be an equally important task as detecting
market power. The theoretical incorporation of consumer biases into an industrial
organization framework, as done in chapters 3 and 4, can already give insights about
the effects of potential consumer biases on market outcomes. However, I believe that
for the near future the key question is whether empirical research in this field will
be able to distinguish biased decision making from rational behavior. While some
research has already tried to estimate the magnitude of consumer biases, even very
basic econometric identification issues have not yet been solved. From a normative
viewpoint, one key difficulty that looms is the imposed difference between revealed
choices and revealed preferences in behavioral research, see also Caplin and Schotter
(2008). Much more ground work in this respect seems necessary to meet the increased
interest in behavioral questions inside and outside of academic research.
Bibliography
Agarwal, S., Driscoll, J. C., Gabaix, X., and Laibson, D. (2009). The age of reason:
Financial decisions over the life cycle and implications for regulation. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2:51–118.
Alonso, R., Dessein, W., and Matouschek, N. (2008). When does coordination require
centralization? The American Economic Review, 98(1):145–179.
Appel, M., Labarre, R., and Radulovic, D. (2004). On accelerated random search.
SIAM Journal on Optimization, 14(3):708–731.
Armstrong, M. (2008). Interactions between competition and consumer policy.
Competition Policy International, 4(1):97–147.
Armstrong, M. and Chen, Y. (2009). Inattentive consumers and product quality.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3):411–422.
Bagwell, K. (2007). The Economic Analysis of Advertising. Handbook of Industrial
Organization, 3:1701–1844.
Becker, G. and Murphy, K. (1993). A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(4):941–964.
Bernheim, B. and Rangel, A. (2004). Addiction and cue-triggered decision processes.
American Economic Review, 94(5):1558–1590.
Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., and Pakes, A. (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium.
Econometrica, 63(4):841–890.
Bjoernerstedt, J. and Verboven, F. (2012). Does merger simulation work? a ”natural
experiment” in the swedish analgesics market. mimeo.
Bloch, F. and Manceau, D. (1999). Persuasive advertising in hotelling’s model of
product differentiation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17(4):557–
574.
Bloom, N., Genakos, C., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J. (2012). Management practices
across firms and countries. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 26(1):12–33.
133
Bibliography 134
Bonnet, C. and Dubois, P. (2010). Inference on vertical contracts between
manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price
maintenance. The RAND Journal of Economics, 41(1):139–164.
Bower, G. (1992). How might emotions affect learning. In Christianson, S., editor,
The Handbook of Emotion and Memory: Research and theory, pages 3–31. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Braun, K. (1999). Postexperience Advertising Effects on Consumer Memory. Journal
of Consumer Research, 25(4):319–334.
Bresnahan, T. (1982). The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics Letters,
10(1-2):87–92.
Bresnahan, T. (1989). Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook of
industrial organization, 2:1011–1057.
Brito, D., Pereira, P., and Ramalho, J. (2012). Mergers, coordinated effects and
efficiency in the portuguese non-life insurance industry. mimeo.
Caplin, A. and Schotter, A. (2008). The Foundations of Positive and Normative
Economics: A Handbook. Oxford University Press, USA.
Chebat, J., Davidow, M., and Codjovi, I. (2005). Silent voices: Why some dissatisfied
consumers fail to complain. Journal of Service Research, 7(4):328–342.
Choi, B. and Ishii, J. (2010). Consumer perception of warranty as signal of quality:
An empirical study of power train warranties. Technical report, Working Paper,
Amherst College.
Ciliberto, F. and Williams, J. (2010). Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit
collusion? inference on conjectural parameters in the airline industry. mimeo.
Coase, R. H. (1972). Durability and monopoly. Journal of Law and Economics,
15(1):143–49.
Conlin, M., O’Donoghue, T., and Vogelsang, T. (2007). Projection bias in catalog
orders. American Economic Review, 97(4):1217–1249.
Corts, K. (1995). The ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry in 1994 (A). Harvard
Business School.
Corts, K. (1999). Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power. Journal
of Econometrics, 88(2):227–250.
Cotterill, R. and Franklin, A. (1999). An estimation of consumer benefits from the
public campaign to lower cereal prices. Agribusiness, 15(2):273–287.
Bibliography 135
DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Journal
of Economic Literature, 47(2):315–372.
DellaVigna, S. and Malmendier, U. (2004). Contract design and self-control: theory
and evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2):352–402.
Dessein, W., Garicano, L., and Gertner, R. (2011). Organizing for synergies. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(4):77–114.
Dhar, S. and Hoch, S. (1996). Price discrimination using in-store merchandising. The
Journal of Marketing, 60(1):17–30.
Dixit, A. and Norman, V. (1978). Advertising and welfare. The Bell Journal of
Economics, 9(1):1–17.
Drago, F. and Kadar, D. (2006). Rebate or bait? A model of regret and time
inconsistency in consumer behaviour. CEPR Discussion Paper 5757.
Eliaz, K. and Spiegler, R. (2006). Contracting with diversely naive agents. The Review
of Economic Studies, 73(3):689–714.
Ellison, G. (2006). Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization. In Blundell, R.,
Newey, W., and Persson, T., editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics:
Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress. Cambridge University Press.
Emons, W. (1988). Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem. Journal of
Economic Theory, 46(1):16–33.
Erdem, T., Katz, M., and Sun, B. (2010). A simple test for distinguishing between
internal reference price theories. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 8(3):303–
332.
Eysenck, M. E. and Keane, M. T. (1993). Cognitive Psychology - A Student’s Handbook.
Taylor and Francis, Erlbaum.
Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1990). Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. The
American Economic Review, 80(1):107–126.
Fauli-Oller, R. and Giralt, M. (1995). Competition and cooperation within a
multidivisional firm. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 43(1):77–99.
Gabaix, X. and Laibson, D. (2006). Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and
information suppression in competitive markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
121(2):505–540.
Glicksberg, I. (1952). A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points. Proceedings of the American
Mathematical Society, 3(1):170–174.
Bibliography 136
Hitsch, G. (2006). An empirical model of optimal dynamic product launch and exit
under demand uncertainty. Marketing Science, 25(1):25–50.
Ho, T., Lim, N., and Camerer, C. (2006). Modeling the Psychology of Consumer
and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics. Journal of Marketing Research,
43(3):307–331.
Huppertz, J. (2007). Firms’ complaint handling policies and consumer complaint
voicing. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 24(7):428–437.
Inderst, R. and Ottaviani, M. (2013). Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms, and the Role of
Consumer Protection. Forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies.
Jolson, M., Wiener, J., and Rosecky, R. (1987). Correlates of rebate proneness. Journal
of Advertising Research, 27(1):33–43.
Knittel, C. and Metaxoglou, K. (2011). In search of the truth: Merger simulations
using random coefficient logit models. UC Davis Department of Economics working
paper.
Lafontaine, F. and Slade, M. (2012). Inter-firm contracts: Evidence. In Gibbons,
R. and Roberts, J., editors, The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton
University Press.
Lau, L. (1982). On identifying the degree of competitiveness from industry price and
output data. Economics Letters, 10(1-2):93–99.
Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T., and Rabin, M. (2003). Projection bias in predicting
future utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4):1209–1248.
Lutz, N. and Padmanabhan, V. (1998). Warranties, extended warranties, and product
quality. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16(4):463–493.
Mann, D. and Wissink, J. (1990). Money-back warranties vs. replacement warranties:
A simple comparison. American Economic Review, 80(2):432–436.
McClure, S., Li, J., Tomlin, D., Cypert, K., Montague, L., and Montague, P. (2004).
Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally Familiar Drinks. Neuron,
44(2):379–387.
McElheran, K. (2010). Delegation in multi-establishment firms: The organizational
structure of it purchasing authority. US Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies
Paper No. CES-WP-10-35.
Michel, C. (2007). A Projection-Bias Approach towards Persuasive Advertising.
Diploma Thesis, University of Bonn.
Bibliography 137
Michel, C. (2009). Essays in Behavioural Industrial Organisation. Master of Philosophy
Thesis, University of Oxford.
Nelson, P. (1974). Advertising as information. The Journal of Political Economy,
82(4):729–754.
Nevo, A. (1998). Identification of the oligopoly solution concept in a differentiated-
products industry. Economics Letters, 59(3):391–395.
Nevo, A. (2000). Mergers with differentiated products: The case of the ready-to-eat
cereal industry. The RAND Journal of Economics, 31(3):395–421.
Nevo, A. (2001). Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry.
Econometrica, 69(2):307–342.
Nocke, V. and Whinston, M. (2010). Dynamic merger review. Journal of Political
Economy, 118(6):1201–1251.
OFT (2002). Extended warranties on domestic electrical goods. Office of Fair Trading,
Fleetbank House, 2-6 Salisbury Square, London, EC4Y 8JX.
OFT (2012). Extended warranties on domestic electrical goods. Office of Fair Trading
market study report.
Oliveira, A. (2011). Estimating market power with a generalized supply relation:
Application to an airline antitrust case. mimeo.
Rivers, D. and Vuong, Q. (2002). Model selection tests for nonlinear dynamic models.
The Econometrics Journal, 5(1):1–39.
Rubinfeld, D. (2000). Market definition with differentiated products: the post / nabisco
cereal merger. Antitrust Law Journal, 68:163–185.
Schmalensee, R. (1978). Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry.
The Bell Journal of Economics, 9(2):305–327.
Spence, M. (1977). Consumer misperceptions, product failure and producer liability.
The Review of Economic Studies, pages 561–572.
TARP (1996). TARP’s Approach to Customer Driven Quality: Moving from Measuring
to Managing Customer Satisfaction. White House Office of Consumer Affairs,
Washington DC.
Thomas, C. (2011). Too many products: Decentralized decision making in multinational
firms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(1):280–306.
Vickers, J. (2004). Economics for consumer policy. Proceedings of the British Academy,
125:287–310.
Weinberg, M. C. and Hosken, D. (2012). Evidence on the accuracy of merger
simulations. Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
Yoshimoto, H. (2011). Reliability examination in horizontal-merger price simulations:
An ex-post evaluation of the gap between predicted and observed prices in the 1998
hyundai–kia merger. mimeo.

Eidesstattliche Erkla¨rung
Hiermit erkla¨re ich, die vorliegende Dissertation selbsta¨ndig angefertigt und mich keiner
anderen als der in ihr angegebenen Hilfsmittel bedient zu haben. Insbesondere sind sa¨mtliche
Zitate aus anderen Quellen als solche gekennzeichnet und mit Quellenangaben versehen.
Mannheim, 28.4.2012
Christian Felix Michel
Curriculum Vitae
2009-2013 Doctoral Studies in Economics, Graduate School for Economic and Social
Sciences, University of Mannheim, Germany
2007-2009 Master of Philosophy in Economics, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
2003-2007 Diploma in Economics, University of Bonn, Germany
2005-2006 Visiting Student, Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration
Economique, Malakoff–Paris, France
2002-2003 Mandatory Social Service at Kreiskrankenhaus Waldbro¨l, Germany
2002 “Abitur” (High School Diploma), Kopernikus Gymnasium Wissen, Wissen,
Germany
